23-7290-cr United States v. Jackson

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 31st day of October, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges, CAROL BAGLEY AMON, District Judge.∗

_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. 23-7290-cr

RAYMOND JACKSON, AKA JERRY WOO,

Judge Carol Bagley Amon, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of ∗

New York, sitting by designation. Defendant-Appellant.∗∗ _____________________________________

FOR APPELLEE: Dana R. McCann, Jacob R. Fiddelman, Assistant United States Attorneys, of counsel, for Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Raymond Jackson, pro se, Cresson, PA.

Appeal from an order of the United States District Court for the Southern District

of New York (Loretta A. Preska, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the order denying compassionate release is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-appellant Raymond Jackson is serving a 35-year federal sentence

arising from his participation in the criminal activities of the Preacher Crew, a criminal

organization. Specifically, in June 1999, the court imposed a 120-month sentence for

conspiracy to commit murder in aid of racketeering in violation of

(a)(5),

a 60-month sentence for one count of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of

violence in violation of

(c), and a 240-month sentence for a second count

∗∗ The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.

2 under

(c), all running consecutive to each other.

In 2022, Jackson moved for compassionate release under

(c)(1)(A).

The district court denied the motion, reasoning that Jackson failed to offer an

extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction and that the

(a) sentencing factors weighed against reducing his sentence. See United States v.

Jackson, No. 96-cr-515,

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2023). Jackson appealed. We

assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural history, and the

issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.

We review the denial of a compassionate release motion for abuse of discretion.

United States v. Fernandez,

, 426 (2d Cir. 2024). A district court abuses its

discretion when it: (1) bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) makes a clearly

erroneous assessment of the evidence, or (3) renders a decision that cannot be located

within the range of permissible decisions.

Before it may grant a compassionate release motion, a district court must find that:

(1) the movant exhausted his administrative remedies, (2) an extraordinary and

compelling reason justifies sentence reduction, and (3) the § 3553(a) sentencing factors

weigh in favor of sentence reduction. See United States v. Keitt,

, 71 (2d Cir.

2021) (per curiam). Failure to meet one of the above conditions requires that the motion

for compassionate release be denied. See

. Accordingly, when the district court

conducts an independent assessment of the

(a) sentencing factors and

3 concludes that the factors weigh against sentence reduction, we will generally affirm,

regardless of whether an extraordinary and compelling reason for sentence reduction

exists. See United States v. Jones,

, 374 (2d Cir. 2021).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the § 3553(a)

sentencing factors weighed against compassionate release. The court reasoned that the

seriousness of Jackson’s crimes and the need for just punishment counseled against a

sentence reduction. Jackson,

, at *4. Jackson “participated in multiple

murders” that were “callous and brutal,” as part of a crew that engaged in “systemic

violence against enemies and perceived enemies.”

Contrary to Jackson’s arguments,

the district court’s focus on those factors does not suggest that other relevant § 3553(a)

factors were not considered. Indeed, we presume that the district court has “considered

all relevant § 3553(a) factors and arguments unless the record suggests otherwise.”

United States v. Halvon,

, 570 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The record does not suggest that the court disregarded the evidence

Jackson presented. Moreover, how the district court chooses to weigh the various

§ 3553(a) factors is generally not grounds for finding abuse of discretion. Id. at 571

(explaining that the district court giving greater weight to some factors does not mean

that the court “failed to consider” the other factors).

Jackson also argues that the district court failed to consider the disparity between

his sentence and the average sentence length in the Southern District of New York for

4 murder and firearms offenses. However, the relevant § 3553(a) factor counsels only

against “unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who

have been found guilty of similar conduct.”

(a)(6) (emphasis added). The

particular brutality of the murders Jackson participated in, as well as his participation in

assaults, extortion, and narcotics trafficking as a member of the Preacher Crew, are factors

that differentiate him from other individuals with murder and firearm convictions.

Because the district court expressly considered Jackson’s individualized history and

conduct, see

, at *4, and we generally presume the court considered all

the § 3553(a) factors, we discern no error here.1

We have considered Jackson’s remaining arguments and conclude they are

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

1 Because we affirm the district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) sentencing factors do not favor sentence reduction, we need not decide whether an extraordinary and compelling reason justifies sentencing reduction. See Jones, 17 F.4th at 374. 5