23-7418 Jaafar v. Garland BIA Christensen, IJ A088 443 209

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 31st day of October, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, DENNY CHIN, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

ALI HASSAN JAAFAR, Petitioner,

v. 23-7418

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Theodore N. Cox, Esq., New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; David J. Schor, Senior Litigation Counsel; Aric A. Anderson, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DISMISSED.

Petitioner Ali Hassan Jaafar, a native and citizen of Lebanon, seeks review of a

September 22, 2023, decision of the BIA affirming a January 30, 2019, decision of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for cancellation of removal. In re Jaafar,

No. A088 443 209 (B.I.A. Sept. 22, 2023), aff’g No. A088 443 209 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan.

30, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural

history.

We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of

completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006). A

nonpermanent resident, like Jaafar, may have his removal cancelled if, as relevant here,

he “establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship

to [his] spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully

admitted for permanent residence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). “[C]ancellation of

removal is a two-step process. First, an alien must prove eligibility by showing that he

meets the statutory eligibility requirements. Second, assuming an alien satisfies the

2 statutory requirements, the Attorney General in his discretion decides whether to grant

or deny relief.” Mendez v. Holder,

, 319–20 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Rodriguez

v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2006)). The burden of proof is on the applicant at

both stages. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A).

Our jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of cancellation of removal is limited

to constitutional claims and questions of law. See

(a)(2)(B), (D); cf.

Wilkinson v. Garland,

(2024) (holding that “hardship” for purposes of

statutory eligibility is reviewable as a mixed question of law and fact).

Jaafar does not raise a colorable question of law as to the agency’s discretionary

denial of cancellation. Because we do not have jurisdiction to review the discretionary

denial of relief, we do not reach the alternative eligibility determination. See INS v.

Bagamasbad,

(1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required

to make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they

reach.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

3