23-6301 Singh v. Garland BIA Gordon-Uruakpa, IJ A206 089 461

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 8th day of November, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., RICHARD C. WESLEY, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

BALJIT SINGH, Petitioner,

v. 23-6301 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Jana Junuz, Law Offices of Jana Junuz, P.C., S. Richmond Hill, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director; Walter Bocchini, Senior Litigation Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Baljit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a March 7,

2023, decision of the BIA affirming a November 15, 2018, decision of an Immigration

Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under

the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Baljit Singh, No. A206 089 461 (B.I.A. Mar.

7, 2023), aff’g No. A206 089 461 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov. 15, 2018). We assume the

parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions.

See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006). We review an

adverse credibility determination “under the substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei

Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings of fact are

conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the

contrary,”

(b)(4)(B).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a trier of

fact may base a credibility determination on,” among other things, “the consistency 2 between the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to

whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s

claim, or any other relevant factor.”

(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v.

Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

.

Singh alleged that rival party members threatened him and attacked him twice on

account of his support for the Shiromani Akali Dal Mann Party. Substantial evidence

supports the agency’s determination that Singh was not credible.

The agency reasonably found Singh not credible based on the nearly identical

language in his own statement and his supporting affidavits. See Singh v. B.I.A.,

(2d Cir. 2006) (upholding adverse credibility determination based, in part, on

“nearly identical language in the written affidavits allegedly provided by different

people in India”); see also Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(2d Cir. 2007)

(“[O]ur case law on intra-proceeding similarities has firmly embraced the

commonsensical notion that striking similarities between affidavits are an indication that

3 the statements are ‘canned.’”). Singh provided a personal statement and four supporting

affidavits that are nearly identical apart from variations in pronouns. When questioned

at the hearing, Singh denied providing his statement to any of the affiants or instructing

them on what to say, but he had no compelling explanation as to why the affidavits were

so similar to his own statement. Accordingly, the agency reasonably found that the

similarities impugned Singh’s credibility. See Mei Chai Ye,

(“[I]n most

cases, it is reasonable and unproblematic for an IJ to infer that an applicant who . . .

submits the strikingly similar documents is the common source of those suspicious

similarities.”); Siewe v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false

document or a single instance of false testimony may (if attributable to the petitioner)

infect the balance of the alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”).

The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistent evidence regarding who

attempted to report Singh’s attackers to the police. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai

Gao v. Barr,

, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might

preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple

inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”). Singh’s asylum application

and his mother’s affidavit stated that, after the first alleged attack, Singh and his father

went to the police station to file a complaint against his attackers, but the police refused

to take the complaint and pushed him and his father out of the station. In contrast, the

4 affidavits from his uncle, friend, and the sarpanch state that they each accompanied

Singh’s father to the police station the day after the attack and were pushed out by the

police officers. 1

Even though this inconsistency may have stemmed from the same source as the

agency’s other ground for doubting Singh’s credibility—the identical language used by

Singh’s own statement and his supporting affidavits—the agency still acted reasonably

in relying on it because Singh failed to compellingly explain the inconsistency. When

asked if his father made four separate trips to the police station in a single day—only one

with Singh himself—as suggested by the multiple statements, Singh conceded that even

though he had lived in the same house as his father, he had no knowledge of multiple

trips to the police station. Singh therefore did not compellingly explain this

inconsistency. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do

more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he

must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his

testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original)).

Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further on his

failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. See Biao Yang v.

Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“An applicant’s failure to

1 This inconsistency may well have resulted from the affidavits being copied from Singh’s asylum statement; as discussed above, each affidavit repeats Singh’s own statement virtually verbatim. 5 corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of

corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has

already been called into question.”). As previously noted, the affidavits were strikingly

similar and conflicted with each other and thus did not reliably corroborate his claims.

See Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“We defer to the agency’s

determination of the weight afforded to an alien’s documentary evidence.”).

The similarity of the affidavits to Singh’s statement, the inconsistency, and the lack

of reliable corroboration constitute substantial evidence for the adverse credibility

determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao,

n.8; Xiu Xia Lin,

; Biao Yang,

; Singh,

. The adverse credibility

determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because

all three claims are based on the same factual predicate. See Hong Fei Gao,

(“Where the same factual predicate underlies a petitioner’s claims for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, an adverse credibility

determination forecloses all three forms of relief.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending motions

and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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