22-6329 Singh v. Garland BIA Golovnin, IJ A216 579 262 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 10th day of December, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: SUSAN L. CARNEY, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

JAGMIT SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. No. 22-6329 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, United States Attorney General,

Respondent. _____________________________________ For Petitioner: Suraj Raj Singh, Esq., Richmond Hill, NY.

For Respondent: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Stephen J. Flynn, Assistant Director; Kathryn McKinney, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Jagmit Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a

decision of the BIA affirming a decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying

his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the

Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). See In re Jagmit Singh, No. A216 579 262

(B.I.A. June 27, 2022), aff’g No. A216 579 262 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. June 13, 2019).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural

history.

“[W]e review the decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA,” but we

only consider the grounds for the IJ’s decision that the BIA reached and relied on.

Yan Chen v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005). We review an adverse

credibility determination “under the substantial evidence standard,” Hong Fei Gao

2 v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018), and “the administrative findings of fact

are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude

to the contrary,”

(b)(4)(B).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

the applicant’s . . . written and oral statements (whenever made and whether or

not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the statements

were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency

of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an

inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim,

or any other relevant factor.”

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s

credibility determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain

that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”

Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

.

Singh alleged that members of the Bharatiya Janata Party (the “BJP”)

attacked him twice and threatened him because of his political affiliation with the

3 Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s

determination that Singh was not credible.

The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Singh’s border

interview 1 and hearing testimony regarding why he entered the United States and

whether he feared political persecution in India. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii);

Likai Gao v. Barr,

, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency

might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him

credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”).

Contrary to Singh’s contention, his testimony directly conflicted with his answers

at the border interview. He testified that he left India because his life was in

danger due to his political affiliation and that he would be persecuted upon return.

However, during his border interview, he stated that he entered the United States

to work and make money for his family and that he had no fear of returning to

India. Singh did not compellingly explain these inconsistencies. See Majidi v.

Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a

1We find no error in the agency’s conclusion that the record of this interview was sufficiently reliable because the report provided an apparently verbatim account of questions and answers, the officer’s questions were designed to directly elicit the details of Singh’s asylum claim, Singh answered every question, he conceded that some accurate information was documented, and he confirmed at the interview that the information was correct. See Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft,

(2d Cir. 2004).

4 plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must

demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his

testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies between Singh’s

credible fear interview 2 and his testimony, including when the BJP first attacked

him, how long he spent in the hospital after the first attack, and who reported the

attacks to the police. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii).

First, Singh testified that the BJP’s initial attack occurred on October 22,

2016, but at his credible fear interview, he said it occurred on September 22, 2016.

The agency reasonably relied on this inconsistency because Singh gave precise

dates, and it related to one of only two incidents of physical harm. See Singh v.

Garland,

(2d Cir. 2021) (“The more serious the inconsistency – i.e.,

the greater the importance of the fact upon which inconsistency is found for the

success of the petition and the more likely it is that a truthful account would not

have included the inconsistency – the more substantial that evidence is in casting

2The record of Singh’s credible fear interview “bears sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its consideration by the agency”: it was memorialized in a typewritten list of questions and answers, it was conducted with the aid of an interpreter, and Singh’s answers were responsive, thus indicating he had no difficulty understanding the interpreter. Ming Zhang v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2009).

5 doubt on the petitioner’s credibility.”). The agency was also not required to credit

Singh’s allegation of interpreter error. See Majidi,

.

Second, Singh testified that he was hospitalized for eight days after the first

attack, but at his credible fear interview, he stated that he was hospitalized for a

month and a half. Singh’s explanation that he thought he was being asked about

how long he was under medical treatment, not hospitalization, was not presented

to the agency, and is not compelling as the interview record reflects that he said

that he was “hospitalized” for the longer period. See INS v. Phinpathya,

, 188 n.6 (1984) (considering an applicant’s argument meritless when “there

[was] no basis in the present record” and the argument was based only on

“unsupported assertions in [his] brief”). Additionally, while Singh’s medical

documents are consistent with his testimony that he was hospitalized for eight

days, they do not explain why he made inconsistent statements at the credible fear

interview. See Majidi,

.

Third, Singh testified that his father and several villagers reported the first

attack to the police and that his father and brother reported the second attack.

However, during his credible fear interview, Singh stated that he alone reported

the second attack to the police. Additionally, his testimony and credible fear

6 interview conflict with statements made in his family’s affidavits. With respect

to the first attack, Singh’s brother, Jaspreet, stated that Jaspreet, their father, and

some villagers reported the attack, while Singh’s sister and mother stated that

Singh’s father and some villagers, but not Jaspreet, reported that attack. With

respect to the second attack, Singh’s father stated that only he reported the second

attack, thus contradicting Singh’s testimony that both his father and his brother

reported the second attack. Singh’s explanation during his hearing was unclear

and again did not resolve the inconsistencies. See Majidi,

. He now

argues that the line of questioning was confusing, but even crediting this new

explanation, it does not resolve the inconsistencies in the supporting documents.

Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency also reasonably relied on

his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence. “We

generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be afforded an

applicant’s documentary evidence.” Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir.

2013). And “[a]n applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear

on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant

unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao

Yang v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007). The affidavits submitted were

7 not drafted in or translated from their native language, the authors were not

available for cross-examination, and Singh’s sister’s and mother’s affidavits used

nearly identical language. See Mei Chai Ye v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(2d Cir. 2007) (“[We have] firmly embraced the commonsensical notion that

striking similarities between affidavits are an indication that the statements are

‘canned.’”). And, as discussed above, even though Singh presented medical

records, they do not resolve the inconsistency between his testimony and his

credible fear interview. See Majidi,

.

The inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration provide substantial

evidence for the IJ’s adverse credibility determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao,

n.8; Xiu Xia Lin,

; Biao

Yang,

. The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of

Singh’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all

three forms of relief were based on the same factual predicate. See Hong Fei Gao,

(“Where the same factual predicate underlies a petitioner’s claims

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under . . . CAT, an adverse

credibility determination forecloses all three forms of relief.”).

* * *

8 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

9