23-6193 United States v. Sansone

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 12th day of December, two thousand twenty-four.

Present: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, GUIDO CALABRESI, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. 23-6193

MARCELLO SANSONE,

Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________

For Appellee: Nicholas W. Chiuchiolo, Marguerite B. Colson, Daniel G. Nessim, and Jacob R. Fiddelman, Assistant United States Attorneys, on behalf of Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.

For Defendant-Appellant: Elizabeth M. Johnson, Law Offices of Elizabeth M. Johnson, New York, NY. Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Jed S. Rakoff, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Marcello Sansone appeals the judgment entered February

23, 2023, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Rakoff,

J.). Sansone pled guilty to one count of conspiring to distribute oxycodone outside the

scope of professional practice and without a medical purpose, in violation of

and 841(b). The district court sentenced Sansone principally to 120 months’

imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised release. On appeal, Sansone

argues that the district court erred by allowing an individual who was not a statutory

“victim” as defined by the Crime Victims’ Rights Act,

(“CVRA”) to speak

at his sentencing. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,

procedural history, and issues on appeal to which we refer only as necessary to explain

our decision to AFFIRM.

Sansone was a patient of Dr. Howard Adelglass who, through his pain

management clinic, wrote thousands of medically unnecessary prescriptions for large

quantities of oxycodone in exchange for cash. Sansone initially served as a “gatekeeper”

patient who referred other drug addicts and dealers to Adelglass’s clinic. In October

2018, Sansone took over as the clinic’s office manager and gained control of the

2 prescribing physician’s patient schedule. Sansone used his position to extort sexual acts

and nude photographs from female patients who were addicted to oxycodone,

threatening to cut off access to the clinic if they refused to comply.

Judge Rakoff granted the government’s request to permit one of the women

Sansone extorted, Victim-1, to address the district court at Sansone’s sentencing.

Sansone did not object. On appeal, Sansone argues that the district court erred because

the CVRA only creates a statutory right for those “directly and proximately harmed as a

result of the commission of a Federal offense” to speak at sentencing.

(e)(2)(A). Sansone contends that the harm Victim-1 suffered (being coerced into

unwanted sexual contact) was not a direct and proximate result of Sansone’s crime of

conviction (conspiracy to distribute oxycodone) and therefore she was not authorized by

the CVRA to address the sentencing court. We disagree.

Assuming arguendo that Victim-1 does not qualify as a statutory crime victim, the

district court did not err in permitting her to speak during the sentencing hearing. While

the CVRA provides certain victims with a statutory right to speak, it does not impose

limits on who the district court may allow to speak. “[D]istrict courts have broad

discretion both as to the type of information they may consider in imposing sentence and

the source from which that information derives.” See United States v. Smith,

(2d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Messina,

(2d Cir. 2015)). In

passing the CVRA, Congress “has not placed arbitrary limits on what information a

3 district court may consider at sentencing.” Id. at 215. Victim-1’s testimony about the

damaging effects of Sansone’s conduct was relevant to the district court’s consideration

of the statutory purposes of sentencing and Sansone had a fair opportunity to respond in

his remarks to the district court. We therefore find no error.

* * *

We have considered Sansone’s remaining arguments and conclude that they are

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court is

AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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