23-7532-cv Garcia v. Pritchard Industries

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, 3 in the City of New York, on the 12th day of December, two thousand twenty-four. 4 5 PRESENT: 6 GERARD E. LYNCH, 7 EUNICE C. LEE, 8 MYRNA PÉREZ, 9 Circuit Judges. 10 _____________________________________ 11 12 Alba Garcia, 13 14 Plaintiff-Appellant, 15 16 v. 23-7532 17 18 Pritchard Industries LLC, The Macquarie 19 Group, 1 2 Defendants-Appellees. 3 _____________________________________ 4 5 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ALBA GARCIA, pro se, Astoria, 6 NY. 7 8 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Jerrold F. Goldberg, Greenberg 9 Traurig, LLP, New York, NY. 10 11 12 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

13 District of New York (Carter, J.).

14 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

15 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.

16 Alba Garcia, proceeding pro se, brought this lawsuit against her former

17 employer, Pritchard Industries LLC, and a related entity, The Macquarie Group,

18 (collectively, the “defendants”), alleging discrimination, retaliation, sexual

19 harassment, and creation of a hostile work environment. The defendants moved

20 to dismiss, arguing that, pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, Garcia’s

21 complaint was subject to mandatory arbitration. The district court construed the

22 motion to dismiss as a motion to compel arbitration, granted it, and stayed the

23 federal case pending arbitration.

2 1 While the case was stayed, Garcia alleged in a letter to the district court that

2 the defense was not complying with its discovery obligations during arbitration

3 and expressed her belief that the assigned arbitrator was biased against her. The

4 defense disputed these allegations, attaching documents from the arbitrator

5 pertaining to (among other things) discovery disputes and the remaining issues to

6 be decided at the hearing.

7 Garcia proceeded pro se throughout the arbitration process. After a hearing,

8 the arbitrator issued an opinion and final award dismissing Garcia’s claims with

9 prejudice. In the opinion, the arbitrator wrote that she went to significant lengths

10 to explain the arbitration and discovery process to Garcia and informed Garcia

11 that, as arbitrator, she was unable to provide Garcia with legal advice or assist

12 Garcia with the presentation of her case.

13 After the arbitrator dismissed Garcia’s case, the district court, via a short

14 order, dissolved the stay and dismissed the federal case. Garcia appealed the

15 district court’s order dissolving the stay and dismissing her case. We assume the

16 parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural history, and the issues

17 on appeal.

18

3 1 The Federal Arbitration Act provides that a party to an arbitration may seek

2 to vacate an arbitral award by filing a motion to vacate with the relevant district

3 court.

(a). Here, however, the record does not reflect that Garcia

4 asked the district court to vacate the arbitrator’s decision against her. She did not

5 oppose Pritchard’s request to dismiss the case or ask the district court to reopen

6 the case following the dismissal. Instead, she filed a notice of appeal of the

7 dismissal order approximately a month after the order was entered, asking this

8 court to vacate both the dismissal and the arbitrator’s award. As a result, we have

9 no substantive vacatur decision to review. Because the dismissal order was issued

10 on September 28, 2023, and the arbitration award was issued on September 14,

11 2023, time has run for Garcia to seek relief at the district court level from either the

12 dismissal order under Rule 60 or the arbitral award under

(a). See Fed.

13 R. Civ. Pro 60(c) (providing that a party may seek relief from an order within one

14 year of the order’s issuance);

(requiring notice of motion to vacate be

15 served on the adverse party within three months after an arbitral award is filed or

16 delivered). Nevertheless, in the interest of completeness, we address the merits of

17 Garcia’s arguments, which would have been unsuccessful even if they had been

4 1 properly raised below. 1

2 In an appeal of a district court judgment confirming or vacating an

3 arbitration award, we review legal conclusions de novo and findings of fact for

4 clear error. Kolel Beth Yechiel Mechil of Tartikov, Inc. v. YLL Irrevocable Trust,

(2d Cir. 2013). “The role of a district court in reviewing an arbitration

6 award is narrowly limited and arbitration panel determinations are generally

7 accorded great deference under the Federal Arbitration Act.”

(internal

8 quotation marks and alterations omitted). Accordingly, an award should be

9 enforced so long as there is some “colorable justification for the outcome.”

at

10 103–04. By contrast, the grounds for vacatur are narrow, reaching awards that are

11 the product of corruption, evident partiality, misconduct or misbehavior, or an

12 excess of jurisdiction.

(a). Because Garcia is proceeding pro se, her

13 submissions are liberally construed “to raise the strongest arguments they

1 Garcia does not challenge the applicability of the Federal Arbitration Act or the district court’s ruling that the collective bargaining agreement required arbitration in this case. Therefore, Garcia has abandoned these issues, and we need not consider them. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown,

, 92–93 (2d Cir. 1995). And while Garcia’s brief otherwise focuses on the merits of her claims, judicial review of an arbitration decision does not “provide parties with a[n] . . . opportunity to relitigate the merits of their dispute.” Trustees of N.Y. State Nurses Ass’n Pension Plan v. White Oak Glob. Advisors, LLC,

, 609 n.21 (2d Cir. 2024).

5 1 suggest.” Publicola v. Lomenzo,

(2d Cir. 2022) (quoting McLeod v.

2 Jewish Guild for the Blind,

(2d Cir. 2017)).

3 Partiality

4 Garcia argues that the arbitrator was not neutral and allowed the

5 defendants to avoid complying with discovery, rendering the arbitration

6 unfair. The district court may vacate an arbitration award under 9 U.S.C.

7 § 10(a) where a party proves by clear and convincing evidence that “there was

8 evident partiality … in the arbitrator.” Certain Underwriting Members of Lloyds

9 of London v. Fla., Dep’t of Fin. Servs.,

(2d Cir. 2018). There is

10 evident partiality in the arbitrator when “a reasonable person would have to

11 conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the arbitration.”

12 Garcia has failed to demonstrate that there was evident partiality in the

13 arbitrator. The arbitrator’s letters and final opinion suggest a fair discovery

14 process, with the arbitrator thoroughly explaining the process to the parties and

15 spending time addressing each of Garcia’s discovery requests. Meanwhile, the

16 comments allegedly made by the arbitrator—which pertained to the lack of

17 merit of Garcia’s case and the arbitrator’s (appropriate) refusal to act as Garcia’s

18 lawyer—do not reflect actionable bias. “[J]udicial remarks during the course

6 1 of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the

2 parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge,”

3 unless they reflect “such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make

4 fair judgment impossible.” Liteky v. United States,

(1994). The

5 alleged remarks fell well short of this standard. Therefore, the district court did

6 not err in dismissing the case, despite Garcia’s claims of partiality.

7 Fundamental Fairness

8 To the extent that Garcia is also making a procedural argument that she was

9 wrongly prohibited from obtaining evidentiary materials in discovery or deprived

10 of an adequate translator in a pre-arbitration meeting, her argument fails because

11 she does not show a violation of fundamental fairness. The district court may

12 vacate an arbitration award based on the arbitrator “refusing to hear evidence

13 pertinent and material to the controversy; or [] any other misbehavior by which

14 the rights of any party have been prejudiced.”

(a)(3). “It is well settled

15 that procedural questions that arise during arbitration, such as which witnesses to

16 hear and which evidence to receive or exclude, are left to the sound discretion of

17 the arbitrator and should not be second-guessed by the courts.” Nat’l Football

18 League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n,

(2d Cir.

7 1 2016). Further, “[a]rbitrators do not need to comply with strict evidentiary rules,

2 and they possess substantial discretion to admit or exclude evidence.”

(internal

3 quotation marks omitted).

4 Garcia does not indicate what discovery was missing and whether the

5 arbitrator refused to hear pertinent evidence. Assuming that discovery was

6 missing, Garcia does not explain how the exclusion of the evidence rendered the

7 discovery process unfair. And although Garcia alleged that she was not provided

8 an adequate translator at one pre-arbitration discovery meeting, her concern that

9 as a result the arbitrator “may not [have been] able to adequately understand [her

10 discovery] requests” is undercut by the arbitrator’s thoughtful handling of those

11 requests, as discussed above. Reply Br. at 3. The record also reflects that a

12 translator was present at the arbitration itself, and that the arbitrator attentively

13 reviewed Garcia’s testimony there. As a result, the record indicates that the

14 arbitrator engaged in a fair discovery process and arbitration hearing. Because

15 “vacatur is warranted in such a circumstance only if fundamental fairness is

16 violated,”

(internal quotation marks omitted), vacatur is not warranted here.

17 * * *

18

8 1 We have considered Garcia’s remaining arguments and conclude they are

2 without merit. 2 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

3 FOR THE COURT: 4 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

2 This Court denied Garcia’s motion to introduce new evidence on November 20, 2024. 9