United States v. Norman
United States v. Norman
Opinion
23-7898-cr United States v. Norman
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of December, two thousand twenty-four.
PRESENT: RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. No. 23-7898-cr
JAHAN NORMAN,
Defendant-Appellant. ------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR APPELLANT: Daniel Habib, Federal Defenders of New York, Inc., New York, NY
FOR APPELLEE: Nicholas J. Moscow, Andrés Palacio, Assistant United States Attorneys, for Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York (Rachel P. Kovner, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Jahan Norman appeals from the November 27, 2023
judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Kovner, J.), convicting him, following a guilty plea, of distributing and
possessing with intent to distribute 40 or more grams of fentanyl and 10 or more
grams of a fentanyl analogue, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B)(vi). The District Court sentenced Norman principally to 100 months’
imprisonment and attached to the judgment a signed preliminary order
authorizing the forfeiture of $119,875.00, the final version of which was entered
three months later. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
2 and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to
explain our decision to affirm.
On appeal, Norman contends that the District Court lacked the authority
to order forfeiture at sentencing because it failed to enter a preliminary order of
forfeiture before sentencing, as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32.2(b)(2)(B). Rule 32.2(b)(2)(B) provides that “[u]nless doing so is impractical,
the court must enter the preliminary order [of forfeiture] sufficiently in advance
of sentencing to allow the parties to suggest revisions or modifications before the
order becomes final.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b)(2)(B). But we have held in United
States v. McIntosh that the rule “is a time-related directive.”
58 F.4th 606, 611(2d
Cir. 2023). Although “legally enforceable,” such directives do “not deprive a
judge or other public official of the power to take the action to which the
deadline applies if the deadline is missed” so long as there is no significant
prejudice to the defendant caused by the missed deadline.
Id. at 609, 611
(quoting Dolan v. United States,
560 U.S. 605, 611(2010)).
In September 2023 the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari
filed in McIntosh. Norman, who does not claim prejudice from the delay caused
by the missed deadline in this case, acknowledged that our decision in McIntosh
3 would foreclose his argument. He nevertheless understandably sought to
preserve his challenge pending the Supreme Court’s review and decision in
McIntosh.
The Supreme Court has now affirmed our decision in McIntosh. See
McIntosh v. United States,
601 U.S. 330(2024). It held that “the failure to enter a
preliminary order [before sentencing] does not bar a judge from ordering
forfeiture at sentencing subject to harmless-error principles on appellate review.”
Id. at 333. That holding squarely forecloses Norman’s appeal, which offered no
other reason to void entry of the District Court’s final forfeiture order. See
id. at 345.
We have considered Norman’s remaining arguments and conclude that
they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
Court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
4
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished