23-6111 Gonzalez-Bran v. Garland BIA Prieto, IJ A206 729 535

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of December, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, BETH ROBINSON, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

ANGELA MARIA GONZALEZ-BRAN, Petitioner,

v. 23-6111 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Reuben S. Kerben, Kerben Law Firm, P.C., Kew Gardens, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Keith I. McManus, Assistant Director; Lauren L. Taiclet, Trial Attorney; Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Angela Maria Gonzalez-Bran, a native and citizen of El Salvador,

seeks review of a December 29, 2022, decision of the BIA affirming an August 16,

2019, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum

and withholding of removal. 1 See In re Angela Maria Gonzalez-Bran, No. A 206 729

535 (B.I.A. Dec. 29, 2022), aff’g No. A 206 729 535 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Aug. 16, 2019).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural

history.

We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong

1 Gonzalez-Bran also brought a claim under the Convention Against Torture before the agency but she does not pursue that claim on appeal to this Court. 2 Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(2d Cir. 2005). We review fact-finding

under the substantial evidence standard, and we review questions of law and the

application of law to fact de novo. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder,

(2d

Cir. 2009). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

(b)(4)(B).

Gonzalez-Bran alleged that local gang members extorted, threatened, and

assaulted her because of her status as a female police officer and as a single mother.

To establish eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, she had to show

her “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion was . . . at least one central reason” for that harm.

(b)(1)(B)(i); see also

§ 1231(b)(3)(A); Quituizaca v. Garland,

,

109–14 (2d Cir. 2022). In other words, Gonzalez-Bran must “demonstrate a nexus

between the persecution [she] alleges (or fears) and an asserted protected ground

. . . .” Jin Jin Long v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2010).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion that Gonzalez-Bran

failed to demonstrate that her identity either as a female police officer or as a single

mother was one central reason she was targeted by gang members. See Edimo-

3 Doualla v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2006) (reviewing nexus determination

for substantial evidence). “The applicant must . . . show, through direct or

circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from [a

protected ground].” Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that the gang members who

threatened Gonzalez-Bran did so because of general criminal and financial

motives – that is, they threatened to harm her because she refused to pay them,

not because she was a police officer or a single parent. The only evidence even

hinting at an identity-based motive is a March 2014 phone call demanding money

in which the caller stated that he knew Gonzalez-Bran was a police officer and a

single mother. But Gonzalez-Bran did not present evidence compelling the

conclusion that there was a nexus between these attributes and the demand for

money.

Asylum may be granted even where the persecutors have more than one

motive. See Acharya v. Holder,

, 296–97 (2d Cir. 2014). But the

protected ground “cannot be a minor, incidental, or tangential reason for the

harm.” Garcia-Aranda v. Garland,

(2d Cir. 2022). Rather, as

noted, it must be a central reason for it. The people threatening Gonzalez-Bran

4 did not demand assistance related to her work as a police officer, nor did they

explicitly suggest that her single parent status was a basis for their threats.

Further, Gonzalez-Bran acknowledged that many others in her community –

“different people, people who had stores, businesses, business men” – had

received similar threats and extortion demands. Certified Administrative Record

at 144. Accordingly, the agency’s conclusion that the extortion demands she

received had no nexus to a protected ground is supported by substantial evidence.

See Yueqing Zhang,

. Moreover, the physical injuries Gonzalez-Bran

suffered in 2012 occurred as part of her ordinary duties as a police officer, rather

than as part of the extortion scheme.

Finally, Gonzalez-Bran does not contend that she used her position as a

police officer to engage in any political or societal action that would have triggered

the threats against her. “Persecution on account of being a policeman . . . is not

generally a basis for refugee status.” Acharya,

; see also Castro v.

Holder,

(2d Cir. 2010) (noting that “an ordinary policeman targeted

by criminals for taking routine law enforcement activities against isolated corrupt

police officers in a system otherwise manifesting adherence to the rule of law”

would not support a claim of political persecution).

5 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

6