23-589 Davis-Guider v. City of Troy et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of December, two thousand twenty-four.

Present: JOHN M. WALKER, JR., MICHAEL H. PARK, ALISON J. NATHAN, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________

MICHAEL DAVIS-GUIDER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 23-589

CITY OF TROY, RONALD FOUNTAIN, DANIELLE COONRADT, CHARLES MCDONALD, TIM COLANERI, RENSSELAER COUNTY, MICHAEL SIKIRICA,

Defendants-Appellees.* __________________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: MAX RODRIGUEZ, Pollock Cohen LLP, New York, NY (Brett H. Klein, Brett H. Klein Esq. PLLC, New York, NY on the brief).

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: RHIANNON I. GIFFORD, Pattison, Sampson, Ginsberg & Griffin, PLLC, Troy, NY, for

* The Clerk’s office is directed to amend the caption as reflected above. City of Troy, Ronald Fountain, Danielle Coonradt, Charles McDonald, Tim Colaneri.

CRYSTAL R. PECK, Bailey, Johnson & Peck, P.C., Albany NY, for Rensselaer County, Michael Sikirica.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of

New York (Stewart, M.J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Michael Davis-Guider appeals from the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to Defendants on Davis-Guider’s (1) malicious prosecution claims under

and New York state law; (2) § 1983 claims that Defendants denied his right to a fair trial

by fabricating evidence; and (3) supplemental claims, including municipal liability claims under

Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,

(1978), and § 1983

conspiracy claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural

history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Davis-Guider was the prime suspect in an investigation by the Troy Police Department into

the death of the two-year-old daughter (“V.D”) of Davis-Guider’s girlfriend. Davis-Guider

claims that he found V.D. unresponsive when we woke up, briefly attempted CPR, and

immediately called 911. But Troy Police Department Officer Danielle Coonradt reported that

Davis-Guider told her he was awake by 11:00am, two hours before he called 911 at 1:09pm. And

the autopsy report of Rensselaer County medical officer Michael Sikirica concluded that V.D.’s

death was a homicide caused by blunt force trauma.

2 The Rensselaer County District Attorney’s Office presented the case against Davis-Guider

to a grand jury. Troy Police Department Detective Ronald Fountain testified that Davis-Guider

was oddly calm about V.D.’s death, and that, in his view, V.D.’s bed appeared too tidy for Davis-

Guider to have performed CPR on it as he had claimed. Sikirica also told the grand jury that

V.D. had electrical activity in her heart when EMS arrived, which meant she was fatally struck

just 15-20 minutes prior. After hearing this evidence, the grand jury indicted Davis-Guider on

two counts of manslaughter and endangering the welfare of a child. But Davis-Guider was

ultimately acquitted, after first spending nearly a year in jail awaiting trial.

Following his acquittal, Davis-Guider filed a complaint against the City of Troy, Ronald

Fountain, Danielle Coonradt, Charles McDonald, Tim Colaneri, Rensselaer County, and Michael

Sikirica, among others, alleging that he was indicted due to their investigatory misconduct.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, the district court granted their motions, and Davis-

Guider now appeals.

“We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, ‘construing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in its

favor.’” Mitchell v. City of New York,

(2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Costello v. City

of Burlington,

(2d Cir. 2011)). This Court “‘may affirm on any grounds for

which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds not relied upon

by the district court.’”

(quoting Holcomb v. Lykens,

(2d Cir. 2003))

(cleaned up).

3 I. Malicious Prosecution

“In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim against a state actor for malicious prosecution, a

plaintiff must show a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment and must establish the

elements of a malicious prosecution claim under state law.” Manganiello v. City of New York,

, 160–61 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted). Under New York state law, “a

plaintiff must prove ‘(1) the initiation or continuation of a criminal proceeding against plaintiff;

(2) termination of the proceeding in plaintiff’s favor; (3) lack of probable cause for commencing

the proceeding; and (4) actual malice as a motivation for defendant’s actions.’”

at 161

(quoting Murphy v. Lynn,

(2d Cir. 1997)). A malicious prosecution claim

brought under § 1983 also requires a “sufficient post-arraignment liberty restraint.” Kee v. City

of New York,

(2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[A] malicious prosecution claim will be defeated by a showing of probable cause (that is,

by a showing of an independently reasonable basis for the deprivation of liberty).” Barnes v. City

of New York,

(2d Cir. 2023). And because a grand jury indicted Davis-Guider,

probable cause is presumed. Savino v. City of New York,

(2d Cir. 2003). The

“only” way Davis-Guider can rebut the presumption of probable cause and thus survive summary

judgment is by showing that his “indictment was procured by ‘fraud, perjury, the suppression of

evidence or other police conduct undertaken in bad faith.’”

(quoting Colon v. City of New

York,

(1983)) (emphasis in original).

Davis-Guider has not pointed to any evidence that would create a reasonable inference that

his indictment was the product of bad-faith conduct. First, Davis-Guider argues that Coonradt’s

report, Fountain’s testimony, and Sikirica’s testimony all contained errors because, in fact, he

4 wasn’t awake at 11:00am, he didn’t have a calm demeanor, V.D.’s bed wasn’t tidy, and V.D. didn’t

have a heartbeat when EMS arrived. Davis-Guider asserts that Defendants made

misrepresentations to the contrary in bad faith because they sought “to manufacture support for a

hunch” that he killed V.D. Appellant’s Br. at 4. But even accepting his version of events,

Davis-Guider offers no proof that Defendants’ alleged mistakes were motivated by bad faith. See

Colon,

(proving bad faith requires more than “witnesses’ differing perceptions of

the incidents they observed”). Davis-Guider’s bare allegation that Defendants were “motivat[ed]

to paint [him] as more suspicious than he was,” Appellant’s Br. at 33, is “mere ‘conjecture’ and

‘surmise’” that cannot on its own support a malicious prosecution claim. Savino,

(quoting Bryant v. Maffucci,

(2d Cir. 1991)).

Second, Davis-Guider argues that Defendants acted in bad faith by hastily ruling out any

cause of V.D.’s death where Davis-Guider wasn’t to blame. Specifically, Davis-Guider faults

Sikirica for declaring V.D.’s death a homicide before all the medical test results had come back,

and for failing to tell the grand jury that EMS’s unsuccessful CPR attempts might have contributed

to V.D.’s death. But this too is insufficient to establish bad faith. By the time Sikirica told

Fountain he planned to rule V.D.’s death a homicide, Sikirica had already examined V.D.’s body,

noting bone fractures and liver lacerations which he thought inconsistent with any other cause of

death. And even assuming Sikirica should have given greater consideration to alternative

explanations for V.D.’s death, that failure would not be akin to bad faith, which requires that any

“discrepancies between the evidence possessed by the authorities and the evidence presented

‘[must be] so substantive that failure to disclose them would be comparable to fraud or perjury.’”

Marshall v. Sullivan,

(2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Gisondi v. Town of Harrison, 72

(1988)); see also Colon,

(explaining that the failure to pursue

“further avenues of investigation . . . is not the equivalent of fraud or suppression of evidence”).

Davis-Guider thus failed to rebut the presumption of probable cause by creating a plausible

inference of bad-faith conduct, so the district court properly granted summary judgment for

Defendants on the § 1983 and New York malicious prosecution claims.

II. Fair Trial

In a § 1983 suit alleging the denial of a fair trial because of fabricated evidence, a plaintiff

must show that “an (1) investigating official (2) fabricate[d] information (3) that is likely to

influence a jury’s verdict, (4) forward[ed] that information to prosecutors, and (5) the plaintiff

suffer[ed] a deprivation of life, liberty, or property as a result.” Garnett v. Undercover Officer

C0039,

(2d Cir. 2016).

The second element of a fair trial claim based on fabricated evidence requires a plaintiff to

prove that a defendant’s use of inaccurate information was “knowing, as opposed to mistaken.”

Barnes,

; see also Garnett,

(explaining that “an arrestee must prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer created false information” (emphasis added)).

Absent scienter, showing that the prosecution relied on false evidence is insufficient.

Here, Davis-Guider has not pointed to any evidence showing that Defendants knowingly

used inaccurate evidence. Davis-Guider’s argument relies on the speculation that because

Defendants provided prosecutors with inaccurate information, they must have fabricated evidence.

Without any proof of scienter, however, that assumption is not a reasonable inference. The mere

fact that the parties present conflicting evidence does not mean that one side’s evidence was

fabricated. See Steinbergin v. City of New York,

, at *3 (2d Cir. Apr. 27, 2022)

6 (summary order) (concluding that plaintiff could not make a fabricated evidence claim “simply by

denying that he sold drugs to [an undercover officer]” because, at most, the allegation would

support an inference of mistaken identification, rather than knowing fabrication); Morse v. Fusto,

(2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that a plaintiff must prove a defendant’s fabrication

was “made knowingly”); Halsey v. Pfeiffer,

(3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]estimony that

is incorrect or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely because it turns out to

have been wrong.”).

Because Davis-Guider has adduced no evidence that Defendants knowingly fabricated

evidence, the district court properly granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

Davis-Guider’s fair trial claims.

III. Municipal Liability and § 1983 Conspiracy

Finally, the district court properly granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on

Davis-Guider’s municipal liability and § 1983 claims. Those theories of liability depend on the

viability of Davis-Guider’s § 1983 malicious prosecution and fair trial claims. See Anilao v.

Spota,

(2d Cir. 2022) (“[A] Monell claim cannot succeed without an independent

constitutional violation.”); Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff,

, 119 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[A]

plaintiff alleging a § 1983 conspiracy claim must prove an actual violation of constitutional

rights.”). Because we conclude that the district court correctly dismissed Davis–Guider’s fair

trial and malicious prosecution claims, it was also correct to reject his municipal liability and

§ 1983 conspiracy claims.

* * *

7 We have considered all of Davis-Guider’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

8