22-1467-cr United States v. Williams

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER“). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 31st day of January, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., EUNICE C. LEE, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 22-1467-cr

JAMES WILLIAMS, AKA SEALED DEFENDANT 1,

Defendant-Appellant. ------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: THEODORE S. GREEN, Green & Willstatter, White Plains, NY

FOR APPELLEE: JEFFREY C. COFFMAN (Michael D. Maimin, Stephen J. Ritchin, on the brief), for Damian Williams, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Vincent L. Briccetti, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

James Williams appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on July 1,

2022, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(Briccetti, J.). After trial, a jury found Williams guilty of conspiring to distribute

and possess with intent to distribute 28 grams or more of cocaine base, in

violation of

and 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B), and using and carrying a

firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime or possessing a firearm

in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of

(c)(1)(A)(i) and 2. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying

2 facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to

explain our decision to affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Williams argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his

conviction on either count. We review his challenge de novo, viewing the

evidence “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,” and we will uphold the

conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Capers,

(2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted). We conclude that Williams has not

met this “heavy burden.” United States v. Landesman,

, 319 (2d Cir.

2021) (quotation marks omitted).

With respect to Williams’s conspiracy conviction, the Government

presented evidence that Williams, following his arrest on state drug charges,

directed Ajah Hodges and Blessing Rogers, among others, to transport and store

drugs, including 42 grams of crack cocaine contained in a gym bag. Both

Hodges and Rogers testified that they were aware that Williams was dealing

crack cocaine and that they were aware that the gym bag contained drugs. The

jury could have reasonably found that Williams’s references during his calls to 3 the bag’s contents were code for drugs. App’x 113, 175, 264. This evidence was

thus sufficient for the jury to find a conspiracy to possess and distribute 28 grams

or more of cocaine base. United States v. Huezo,

(2d Cir. 2008).

Williams also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

§ 924(c) conviction. Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for

a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams’s conduct

violated § 924(c)(1)(A), we reject the challenge. As for Williams’s possession of

the guns, Rogers testified at trial that Williams’s brother acknowledged that the

guns in the gym bag belonged to Williams. And keeping in mind that

“[c]onstructive possession exists when a person has the power and intention to

exercise dominion and control over the contraband in question,” United States v.

Willis,

(2d Cir. 2021) (quotation marks omitted), there was also

evidence that Williams controlled his gym bag, which contained guns as well as

drugs, by directing how and where it would be transported and stored, see

United States v. Dhinsa,

(2d Cir. 2001) (“It is of no moment that

other individuals also may have exercised control over the weapons.”). A

rational juror could also have found that the evidence showed “some nexus

between the firearm[s]” recovered by the police “and the drug selling operation.”

4 United States v. Finley,

(2d Cir. 2001). The guns at issue in this

case were stored together with the drugs, and Williams repeatedly emphasized

the need to keep them together. This evidence was sufficient for a rational juror

to find that the guns “afforded some advantage (actual or potential, real or

contingent) relevant to the vicissitudes of drug trafficking.” United States v.

Lewter,

(2d Cir. 2005).

II. Motion to Suppress

Williams also appeals the District Court’s denial of his pretrial motion to

suppress evidence obtained as a result of the police’s search of the gym bag,

arguing that the evidence was the fruit of a prior illegal search conducted by a

confidential informant (“CI”). In considering this argument, we note that the

protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment do not apply “to a search or

seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as

an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any

governmental official.” United States v. Jacobsen,

(1984)

(quotation marks omitted). Here, Williams failed to show that the CI’s initial

search of the gym bag was requested by a government official. To the contrary,

during the suppression hearing, the Government adduced testimony, which the 5 District Court credited, that police were not even aware of the bag until the CI

told them what was in it. “We . . . pay special deference to the district court’s

factual determinations going to witness credibility.” United States v. Jiau,

(2d Cir. 2013). For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s

denial of Williams’s suppression motion.

III. Motion in Limine

Finally, Williams argues that the District Court erred in admitting

evidence that he sold crack cocaine to an undercover officer in January 2018 and

possessed crack cocaine and $11,000 in cash when he was arrested in May 2018.

We disagree. A key issue at trial was whether Williams directed associates to

transport cocaine and firearms after his May arrest. During his recorded calls

from jail, Williams spoke with others in coded language and referred to his

January sales, the seizure of his $11,000, and the May arrest. The challenged

evidence was permissibly admitted as direct evidence to “complete the story of

the crime on trial,” United States v. Carboni,

(2d Cir. 2000)

(quotation marks omitted), and provide “background of the conspiracy

charged,” United States v. Williams,

, 33‒34 (2d Cir. 2000) (quotation

marks omitted). Moreover, the District Court mitigated any risk of unfair 6 prejudice by instructing the jury that it could consider the evidence only for the

limited purpose of interpreting Williams’s calls from jail. See United States v.

Snype,

, 129–30 (2d Cir. 2006). We thus conclude that the District

Court did not act “arbitrarily and irrationally” in admitting the challenged

evidence. United States v. Garcia,

(2d Cir. 2002) (quotation

marks omitted).

CONCLUSION

We have considered Williams’s remaining arguments and conclude that

they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Cathrine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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