22-6564 Xiong Huang v. Garland BIA Golovnin, IJ A208 590 026

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 5th day of February, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

XIONG HUANG, Petitioner,

v. 22-6564 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONER: Thomas V. Massucci, Esq., New York, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Sabatino F. Leo, Assistant Director; Sarah L. Martin, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Xiong Huang, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of

China, seeks review of a November 22, 2022, decision of the BIA affirming an

August 8, 2019, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application

for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against

Torture (“CAT”). In re Xiong Huang, No. A208 590 026 (B.I.A. Nov. 22, 2022), aff’g

No. A208 590 026 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C Aug. 8, 2019). We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s

opinions. Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006).

We review an adverse credibility determination “under the substantial evidence

2 standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018), and “the

administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,”

(b)(4)(B).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to

whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the

applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We

defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir.

2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

.

Huang alleged that the police in China detained and hit him for practicing

Christianity in an unregistered church. Substantial evidence supports the

agency’s determination that Huang was not credible.

3 The agency reasonably relied on Huang’s inconsistent statements as to

whether police yelled at or interrogated him, whether they hit him with a hammer,

baton, or both, and whether they hit him on the chest and back only or also on the

arms. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr,

, 145 n.8 (2d

Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing

that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so

preclude even more forcefully.”). Despite an opportunity to explain these

inconsistencies, Huang did not compellingly do so. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible

explanation for . . . inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate

that a reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.”

(quotation marks omitted)).

The inconsistencies constitute substantial evidence for the adverse

credibility determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao,

n.8; Xiu Xia Lin,

(“Where the IJ’s adverse credibility finding is

based on specific examples . . . of inconsistent statements . . . a reviewing court will

generally not be able to conclude that a reasonable adjudicator was compelled to

find otherwise.” (quotation marks omitted)). The adverse credibility

4 determination is dispositive of all forms of relief. See Hong Fei Gao,

(“Where the same factual predicate underlies a petitioner’s claims for asylum,

withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, an adverse credibility

determination forecloses all three forms of relief.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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