22-1653 (L) United States v. Purvis-Mitchell

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this Court’s local rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this Court, a party must cite either the federal appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of February, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, GERARD E. LYNCH, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. __________________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. 22-1653 (L), 22-1654 (Con)

TYLER PURVIS-MITCHELL,

Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________________________

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: STEPHEN N. PREZIOSI, New York, NY. FOR APPELLEE: STEVEN D. CLYMER, Assistant United States Attorney (Emmet O’Hanlon, Paul D. Silver, on the brief), for Carla B. Freedman, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Albany, NY.

Appeal from the July 26, 2022, judgment of the United States District Court for the

Northern District of New York (Mae A. D’Agostino, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment entered on July 26, 2022, is AFFIRMED in part and

the case REMANDED for further proceedings.

Defendant-Appellant Tyler Purvis-Mitchell (“Purvis-Mitchell”) appeals from the

district court’s July 26, 2022, judgment, rendered following a jury trial, convicting him of

possessing with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation

of

(a)(1), and (b)(1)(B). The district court sentenced Purvis-Mitchell

principally to 150 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Purvis-Mitchell argues that the

district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized from his

rental car, home, and cellphone, and abused its discretion in denying his motion for a

new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. He additionally argues, for the

first time on appeal, that the government’s post-trial disclosure of potential impeachment

evidence violated his rights under Brady v. Maryland,

(1963). We reject Purvis-

Mitchell’s arguments as to the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress and motion

for a new trial. We decline to consider his post-trial Brady claim on the present record 2 and remand the case to the district court with a limited mandate to consider the claim in

the first instance on a renewed motion under Rule 33. We assume the parties’ familiarity

with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues on appeal, to which we

refer only as necessary to explain our decision.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Suppress

Purvis-Mitchell first argues that the district court erred in denying his pro se

motion to suppress because the search warrants issued for his rental car, home, and

cellphone lacked probable cause and were insufficiently particular and overbroad, in

violation of the Fourth Amendment. He further argues that the affidavits submitted in

support of the warrant applications contained false information and material omissions

regarding surveillance video footage of an April 12, 2020, shooting and that, as a result,

the district court erred in concluding that the good faith exception to the exclusionary

rule applied. Because we conclude that the district court did not err in applying the good

faith exception, we need not address Purvis-Mitchell’s challenges to the existence of

probable cause or the particularity and breadth of the warrants. See United States v. Jones,

(2d Cir. 2022).

On appeal from a ruling on a motion to suppress, “we review the [district] court’s

factual findings for clear error . . . [and its] legal determinations, including the existence

of probable cause and the good faith of officers relying on a search warrant, de novo.”

3 United States v. Boles,

(2d Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Raymonda,

(2d Cir. 2015)). “[T]he ‘good-faith exception’ to the exclusionary rule

applies when the [officers] executing a search warrant ‘act with an objectively reasonable

good-faith belief that their conduct is lawful.’” Jones,

(quoting Davis v.

United States,

, 238 (2011)). The Supreme Court has recognized that police

reliance on a warrant is not objectively reasonable if, inter alia, the warrant application is

“so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render reliance upon it unreasonable.”

United States v. Moore,

(2d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Leon,

(1984)).

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court rejected the arguments Purvis-

Mitchell now raises on appeal, concluding that “there were no false statements in the

search warrant applications, let alone intentional or recklessly false statements, . . . nor

was any relevant information omitted that would have influenced the probable cause

calculus.” App’x at 164. Specifically, the district court found that the surveillance video,

as described in the affidavits, shows a man “consistent with [Purvis-Mitchell’s] height

and weight[,] as listed in his criminal history report[,]”

at 160–61, exiting a gray

Chrysler sedan and taking what “appears to [be] a shooting position,” id. at 158. It further

noted that “the individual in question appears to be holding a firearm.” Id. at 159. We

discern no error, let alone clear error, in the district court’s conclusions. See United States

v. Bershchansky,

(2d Cir. 2015) (“When reviewing for clear error, we may

4 reverse only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed, and [w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s

choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted)).

We also reject Purvis-Mitchell’s claim that the affidavits were “so lacking in indicia

of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.” Leon,

(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, in addition to describing the

surveillance video, each affidavit noted that (1) rental car records established that Purvis-

Mitchell had rented the Gray Chrysler sedan identified in the video, (2) staff of the rental

car company had confirmed that the vehicle was returned by Purvis-Mitchell after the

shooting, and (3) Purvis-Mitchell had rented a second vehicle and was still in possession

of it. Additionally, the affidavit underlying the warrant for Purvis-Mitchell’s cellphone,

which was obtained after his arrest, noted that the cellphone was discovered in close

proximity to “where [he] was taken into custody” and that he “identified [the phone] as

his [] during an interview” with the arresting officer. App’x at 109. These facts provided

Albany police with “at least arguable probable cause” to believe that evidence of a crime

would be found in Purvis-Mitchell’s rental car, home, and cellphone. Jones,

; see also

(noting that the good faith exception does not apply where the

“‘affidavits are bare bones’—that is, when they are ‘totally devoid of factual

5 circumstances to support conclusory allegations’” (quoting United States v. Clark,

(2d Cir. 2011))). We therefore conclude that the good faith exception applied.

II. Rule 33 Motion for a New Trial

Purvis-Mitchell next argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying

his motion for a new trial, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33, based on his claim that the

government violated its obligations under Brady by disclosing certain Albany Police

“chain of custody” reports ten days before his trial began. The district court rejected this

claim, concluding that the reports were neither suppressed by the government nor

“material” under Brady.

We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33

for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hunter,

(2d Cir. 2022). “A Brady

violation occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence materially favorable to

the accused.” United States v. Triumph Capital Grp., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2008)

(quoting Youngblood v. West Virginia,

(2006) (per curiam)). Undisclosed

“[e]vidence is ‘material’ within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable

probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have

been different.” Turner v. United States,

(2017) (quoting Cone v. Bell,

, 469–70 (2009)). “While the trial judge’s factual conclusions as to the effect of

nondisclosure are entitled to great weight, we examine the record de novo to determine

6 whether the evidence in question is material as a matter of law.” Hunter,

(quoting United States v. Madori,

(2d Cir. 2005)).

The chain of custody evidence was not “material” for purposes of Brady because

Purvis-Mitchell was not prejudiced by the delayed disclosure. Here, the government

presented substantial evidence that Purvis-Mitchell possessed the methamphetamine in

question with the intent to distribute it. See id. at 32 (“Where the evidence against the

defendant is ample or overwhelming, the withheld Brady material is less likely to be

material.” (quoting United States v. Gil,

(2d Cir. 2002))). This evidence

included (1) the testimony of Albany Police detectives who recovered methamphetamine-

laced pills from Purvis-Mitchell’s rental car and home; (2) Purvis-Mitchell’s post-arrest

admission that the pills recovered from the rental car were his, and (3) text messages

between Purvis-Mitchell and a potential customer discussing the sale of

methamphetamine-laced pills. The potential impact of the delayed disclosure was also

limited given that defects in the chain of custody go to weight, not admissibility, see

United States v. Morrison,

(2d Cir. 1998), and Purvis-Mitchell’s defense was

not that the pills did not belong to him, but that the government could not prove that he

had intended to distribute them, see Gov’t App’x at 202. In sum, because the belatedly

disclosed evidence was not material under Brady, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in denying Purvis-Mitchell’s Rule 33 motion.

7 III. Brady Claim Based on Post-Trial Disclosure

Finally, Purvis-Mitchell argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the

government violated its obligations under Brady by disclosing impeachment evidence

concerning a government witness ten months after the end of his trial. The government,

in response, concedes that the information is “favorable to Purvis-Mitchell,” but “denies

that it suppressed [the] information” in question. Gov’t Brief at 71. Because the district

court has not considered this issue, we lack a sufficient record to determine “whether any

[undisclosed] evidence favorable to the [d]efendant[] was material, suppressed, or both.”

United States v. Stillwell,

(2d Cir. 2021). Accordingly, we remand the case

to the district court, in accordance with the procedures set forth in United States v. Jacobson,

(2d Cir. 1994), to consider Purvis-Mitchell’s claim in the first instance.

* * *

We have considered Purvis-Mitchell’s remaining arguments and conclude that

they are without merit. For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court

entered on July 26, 2022, is AFFIRMED in part and the case REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this order.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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