22-1224-cr United States v. Williams

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., MICHAEL H. PARK, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 22-1224-cr

RONALD WILLIAMS, AKA BLACKMAN, AKA JURMAINE, AKA LEON GORDON, AKA MARCUS REESE,

Defendant-Appellant,

1 LEON CAMPBELL, AKA COUNTRY,

Defendant. ------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: SUSAN G. KELLMAN (Ezra Spilke, on the brief), Law Offices of Susan G. Kellman, Brooklyn, NY

FOR APPELLEE: HIRAL D. MEHTA (Susan Corkery, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorney, for Breon Peace, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (LaShann DeArcy Hall, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Ronald Williams appeals from a judgment of the

United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (DeArcy Hall,

J.) convicting him, after a jury trial, of (1) conspiracy to distribute marijuana, in

violation of

, 841(a), and 841(b)(1)(C); (2) conspiracy to commit

obstruction of justice murder, in violation of

(k), 1512(a)(1)(C),

2 and 1512(a)(3)(B)(i); (3) conspiracy to commit murder for hire, in violation of

(a); (4) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in

violation of

(g)(1) and 924(a)(2); and (5) use of a firearm during

and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of

(c)(1)(A)(i). Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence to support

his conviction on the conspiracy to commit murder charges; the District Court

erroneously excluded his post-arrest statement to law enforcement; and the

District Court erred in calculating his criminal history at sentencing. We assume

the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior

proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to

affirm.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

First, Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence at trial to

support two counts of conviction: conspiracy to commit murder for hire and

obstruction of justice murder, each stemming from a plot between Williams and

co-conspirator Leon Campbell to kill Everton Leslie, a suspected government

informant.

We review a challenge to a conviction based on the sufficiency of the

3 evidence de novo and “uphold the jury verdict if drawing all inferences in favor

of the prosecution and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Cuti,

(2d

Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). A defendant challenging a conviction on

sufficiency grounds thus bears a “heavy burden.”

(quotation marks omitted).

Williams has not met that burden. As the District Court noted, the jury

heard evidence that: “(1) Williams was aware that Campbell had been pursued

by federal law enforcement, (2) Williams was aware that Campbell suspected an

informant, (3) Campbell had accused Leslie of being an informant, and (4)

Williams was aware that Campbell no longer believed that the informant was a

former prison inmate.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 374, at 7. The jury also heard multiple

phone calls between Campbell and Williams, including a call during which

Campbell described Leslie to Williams, told Williams Leslie’s approximate

address and current location, and offered Williams $5,000 to kill Leslie. Based on

this and other evidence adduced at trial, we conclude that there was sufficient

evidence presented to prove both conspiracy charges.

4 II. Williams’ Post-Arrest Statement

Williams next asserts that the District Court erred in excluding a portion of

his post-arrest statements to law enforcement officers, while admitting his

inculpatory statements. In particular, Williams contends that his post-arrest

exculpatory statements – that he never intended to carry out the murder for hire

and instead intended to rob Campbell – were necessary to put the admitted

statements in context. He thus argues that the exculpatory statements should

have been admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 106, the rule of

completeness.

The rule of completeness “provides that an omitted portion of a statement

must be placed in evidence if necessary to explain the admitted portion, to place

the admitted portion in context, to avoid misleading the jury, or to ensure fair

and impartial understanding of the admitted portion.” United States v. Thiam,

(2d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted); see Fed. R. Evid. 106.

The rule, however, “does not require introduction of portions of a statement that

are neither explanatory of nor relevant to the admitted passages.” Thiam,

(quotation marks omitted). We review a district court’s application of

the rule of completeness for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Williams, 930

(2d Cir. 2019).

With these principles in mind, we reject Williams’ argument. As the

District Court noted, the admitted passage refers only to the intent and conduct

of Campbell, not of Williams. Accordingly, Williams’ statements were “neither

explanatory of nor relevant to the admitted passage[],” United States v. Johnson,

(2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted), and the District Court

did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit them.

III. Sentencing

Williams finally challenges his sentence, arguing that his 2007 attempted

assault and 2009 weapons charges were part of the same course of conduct as his

2013 conspiracy to distribute marijuana charge and thus should have been

considered relevant conduct for purposes of his sentencing.1 We review a

district court’s determination of whether acts constitute relevant conduct for

clear error. United States v. McCray,

(2d Cir. 2021). On clear-error

review, we conclude that Williams has not demonstrated that his 2007 and 2009

1 “Under the Guidelines a defendant’s base offense level is determined based on ‘relevant conduct,’” United States v. Burnett,

(2d Cir. 1992), which does not count as part of a defendant’s criminal history, see U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n.1. Relevant conduct includes acts that “were part of the same course of conduct . . . as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2) (emphasis added). 6 charges and the marijuana distribution conviction in this case are “sufficiently

connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part

of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt.

n.5(B)(ii). We therefore see no error in the District Court’s finding that Williams’

2007 and 2009 charges were not relevant conduct, and we accordingly affirm the

sentence.

CONCLUSION

We have considered Williams’ remaining arguments and conclude that

they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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