21-28-cv (L) Doe v. East Lyme Bd. of Educ.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, RICHARD C. WESLEY, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ JANE DOE, JOHN DOE, by and through his parent JANE DOE,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v. Nos. 21-28-cv, 22- 1504-cv, 23-171-cv

EAST LYME BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant-Appellee,

CONNECTICUT STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,

Defendant,

KOTIN, CRABTREE & STRONG, LLP,

Intervenor. ------------------------------------------------------------------

FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS: Jane Doe, pro se, Old Lyme, CT

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Sheldon D. Myers, Kainen, Escalera & McHale, P.C., Hartford, CT

FOR INTERVENOR: Rowena A. Moffett, Brenner, Saltzman & Wallman, LLP, New Haven, CT

Appeal from a judgment and orders of the United States District Court for

the District of Connecticut (Janet Bond Arterton, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment and orders of the District Court are

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and the case is REMANDED for further

proceedings consistent with this order.

2 Plaintiff-Appellant Jane Doe, on behalf of herself and her son John, appeals

from a judgment and orders of the United States District Court for the District of

Connecticut (Arterton, J.), denying, among other things, Doe’s motion for

reconsideration regarding reimbursement of certain expenses she incurred and

her request to increase her attorneys’ fees award. We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to

which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to affirm in part, vacate

in part, and remand for further proceedings.

This case has a long history spanning more than thirteen years. In 2011

Plaintiffs-Appellants sued the East Lyme Board of Education under the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), asserting that the Board

violated IDEA’s “stay-put” provision by failing to pay for services required

under John’s existing individualized education plan.

In this consolidated appeal, Doe makes six principal arguments. First, she

claims that our previous decisions, Doe v. East Lyme Board of Education,

(2d Cir. 2015) (Doe I) and Doe v. East Lyme Board of Education,

(2d

Cir. 2020) (Doe III), wrongly concluded that she was not entitled to

reimbursement for private school tuition, physical therapy, assistive technology,

3 and other uncovered services. Second, she contends that the amount of

prejudgment interest affirmed in Doe III “undercompensates” her. Third, she

challenges the District Court’s calculation of her attorneys’ fees award. Fourth,

she maintains that her retainer agreement with Intervenor Kotin, Crabtree &

Strong, LLP (“KCS”), the law firm that previously represented her, should be

voided as unconscionable. Fifth, she asks for prejudgment interest on the

attorneys’ fees award. Sixth and finally, Doe argues that she should be awarded

post-judgment interest on the amount to be placed in the compensatory

education fund. We briefly address each argument.

I. Law of the Case

We previously rejected Doe’s challenge to the judgment insofar as it

denied her request for reimbursement for private school tuition, physical

therapy, assistive technology, and other uncovered services, as well as her

argument that the awarded amount of prejudgment interest is too low. See Doe I,

790 F.3d at 453–57; Doe III, 962 F.3d at 661–62, 664, 666. Finding no compelling

reason to revisit our decision, we again reject these arguments. See Johnson v.

Holder,

, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2009).

4 II. Attorneys’ Fees

Doe asserts that the District Court’s attorneys’ fees award was

unreasonable because it fell short of her realized attorneys’ fees and litigation

costs. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, H.C. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ.,

(2d Cir. 2023), we affirm. “The IDEA provides that the court, in its

discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to a

prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.”

at 125–26

(cleaned up). But the District Court’s obligation is only to ensure that the

attorneys’ fees award is reasonable, not that it is perfectly compensatory. Doe

advances no compelling argument that this award was unreasonable. 1

Doe also argues that her retainer agreement with KCS, which is governed

by Connecticut law, should be voided as unconscionable. The agreement states

that Doe would be billed $350 an hour for “[a]ny time spent on this matter.”

App’x 104. Where, as here, the language of the contract is “clear and

unambiguous, the contract is to be given effect according to its terms.” Tallmadge

Bros., Inc. v. Iroquois Gas Transmission Sys., L.P.,

(2000)

1Nor is there any merit to Doe’s claim, raised for the first time in this appeal, that she is entitled to prejudgment interest on the attorneys’ fees award. See Harrison v. Republic of Sudan,

(2d Cir. 2016). 5 (quotation marks omitted). We reject Doe’s argument that the agreement is

unconscionable because she has not established that the circumstances

surrounding its execution “rise to the level of unfair surprise, lack of knowledge

of terms, lack of legal representation, and absence of meaningful choice.” Tarpon

Bay Partners LLC v. Zerez Holdings Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2023) (applying

Connecticut law relating to unconscionability).

III. Post-Judgment Interest

Finally, Doe argues that she should have been awarded post-judgment

interest. We review the District Court’s June 10, 2022 order denying post-

judgment interest de novo. See Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso,

,

100 (2d Cir. 2004). “Pursuant to

, the award of post-judgment

interest is mandatory on awards in civil cases as of the date judgment is

entered.” Tru-Art Sign Co. v. Loc. 137 Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n,

(2d Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). Nevertheless, parties may contract around the

application of § 1961 provided that they agree to do so through “clear,

unambiguous and unequivocal language.” FCS Advisors, Inc. v. Fair Fin. Co., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Westinghouse Credit Corp., 371 F.3d at

102). Here, however, the parties’ agreement to stay the case pending appeal did

6 not contain clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal language waiving Doe’s right

to post-judgment interest. See ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co.,

(2d Cir. 2022). We therefore vacate the District Court’s order denying post-

judgment interest and remand for further proceedings as to this limited issue.

We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments and conclude that

they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s June 10,

2022 order denying post-judgment interest is VACATED, and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings on the issue of post-judgment interest,

consistent with this order. The judgment and the remaining orders of the District

Court that Doe challenges on appeal are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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