23-6303 Singh v. Garland BIA Sichel, IJ A206 098 303

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th day of March, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., WILLIAM J. NARDINI, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

SATNAM SINGH, Petitioner,

v. 23-6303 NAC MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Richmond Hill, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Lindsay B. Glauner, Senior Litigation Counsel; Alanna T. Duong, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Satnam Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a

March 10, 2023, decision of the BIA affirming a February 1, 2019, decision of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Satnam

Singh, No. A206 098 303 (B.I.A. Mar. 10, 2023), aff’g No. A206 098 303 (Immigr. Ct.

N.Y.C. Feb. 1, 2019). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts

and procedural history.

Under the circumstances, we have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s

opinions. Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006).

We review an adverse credibility determination “under the substantial evidence

standard,” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018), and “the

administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator 2 would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,”

(b)(4)(B).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to

whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the

applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We

defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir.

2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

.

Singh alleged that Congress Party members threatened and beat him on

account of his support for the Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar Party. Substantial

evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh was not credible.

The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies in Singh’s descriptions of

an alleged 2008 attack. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr,

137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien

from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible. Multiple

inconsistencies would so preclude even more forcefully.”). Contrary to Singh’s

contention, his testimony did not merely provide supplemental descriptions of the

2008 incident but conflicted with his application as to whether Congress Party

members knocked him off his motorcycle by hitting it with their car or by hitting

him with a rod on his ankle and whether only one or all four Congress Party

members physically attacked him. Despite an opportunity to explain these

inconsistencies, Singh did not compellingly do so. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a

reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (quotation

marks omitted)).

The agency also reasonably relied on a discrepancy regarding whether his

brothers accompanied him to the police station after he was purportedly attacked

in 2012. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh testified that his brothers

accompanied him to the police station to report the attack, but his brothers did not

mention doing so in their affidavits. The agency reasonably relied on this

4 omission because one of the brothers discussed Singh going to the police station

to report the attack and thus “would reasonably have been expected to disclose”

that he accompanied Singh. Hong Fei Gao,

. Singh did not

compellingly explain this omission but merely restated that his brothers

accompanied him to the police station. See Majidi,

.

The agency also did not err in relying on Singh’s inconsistent evidence

regarding whether Congress Party members harmed any of his family members

after he left India. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh testified that Congress

Party members had not harmed his family members after he left India, but he

submitted an affidavit from his wife stating that Congress Party members had

beaten her three times since his departure. His attempts to explain were unclear

and did not resolve the inconsistency. See Majidi,

.

Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied further

on his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating evidence.

“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,

because the absence of corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to

rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into question.” Biao Yang v.

Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007). In addition to the omission in his

5 brothers’ affidavits and the inconsistency with his wife’s affidavit, Singh failed to

submit medical evidence of a three-day hospitalization after his alleged 2012

attack; his explanation that the doctor had not provided a letter because he was

treated only for internal injuries was not compelling as it did not resolve why there

would not be a record of the treatment he received for a three-day hospital stay.

See id.; Majidi,

.

The above inconsistencies and lack of corroboration constitute substantial

evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8; Biao Yang,

. The

adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of

removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on the same factual

predicate.* See Hong Fei Gao,

(“Where the same factual predicate

underlies a petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the CAT, an adverse credibility determination forecloses all three forms of

relief.”).

* As the Government argues, Singh does not challenge the BIA’s finding that he waived CAT relief. However, the IJ denied CAT relief because Singh was not credible, so any challenge to the adverse credibility determination necessarily related to all forms of relief. 6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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