Guarniere v. City of N.Y.
Guarniere v. City of N.Y.
Opinion
23-851-cv Guarniere v. City of N.Y.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of April, two thousand twenty-four.
PRESENT: RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., ALISON J. NATHAN, SARAH A. L. MERRIAM, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ DAMIEN GUARNIERE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 23-851-cv
CITY OF NEW YORK,
Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee,
OMAR IBRAHIM,
Defendant-Cross-Claimant-Appellee, JOHN OR JANE DOE 1-10,
Defendant-Appellee. ------------------------------------------------------------------
FOR APPELLANT: Sang J. Sim, Sim & DePaola, LLP, Bayside, NY
FOR APPELLEE CITY OF NEW YORK: Richard Dearing, Jane L. Gordon, Amanda Abata, Assistant Corporation Counsel, for Hon. Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY
FOR APPELLEE OMAR IBRAHIM: Douglas LaBarbera, LaBarbera & Associates P.C., New York, NY
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Denise Cote, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Damien Guarniere appeals from a judgment of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cote, J.)
dismissing his case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to
prosecute. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the
2 record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our
decision to affirm.
Guarniere sued the City of New York and Officer Omar Ibrahim in
February 2021, alleging violations of federal, state, and city law in connection
with his May 2020 arrest. From the outset, the litigation was marred by
Guarniere’s failure to prosecute his case and to comply with court deadlines and
discovery orders. Indeed, he made no attempt to conduct discovery until after
the close of fact discovery. He also failed to timely oppose the Defendants’
motions for partial summary judgment.
On April 1, 2023, Guarniere filed a facially deficient joint pretrial order,
after the court-ordered deadline of March 31, 2023, and despite the District
Court’s warning that “[a]ny failure to file timely may result in dismissal for
failure to prosecute.” Joint App’x 314. On April 3, 2023, the City moved to
dismiss the case for failure to prosecute. That same day, the District Court
ordered Guarniere to show cause why it should not strike most of his witnesses
and bar him from offering documentary evidence at trial. It also ordered him to
file any opposition to the City’s motion to dismiss by April 6, 2023. When
3 Guarniere failed to meet the deadline to respond to the order to show cause, the
District Court dismissed his case for failure to prosecute.
We review a district court’s decision to dismiss a case for failure to
prosecute for abuse of discretion, considering “(1) the duration of the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with the court order, (2) whether plaintiff was on notice that
failure to comply would result in dismissal, (3) whether the defendants are likely
to be prejudiced by further delay in the proceedings, (4) a balancing of the court's
interest in managing its docket with the plaintiff’s interest in receiving a fair
chance to be heard, and (5) whether the judge has adequately considered a
sanction less drastic than dismissal.” Baptiste v. Sommers,
768 F.3d 212, 216(2d
Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). “No single factor is generally dispositive,”
id.,and “the district court is not required to discuss the factors on the record,”
Shannon v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
186 F.3d 186, 194 (2d Cir. 1999).
Reviewing the record in its entirety, we discern no abuse of discretion.
First, Guarniere’s delay was significant, as evidenced by his consistent failure to
comply with court scheduling orders. Second, the District Court notified
Guarniere that delay could result in dismissal, but Guarniere nevertheless failed
to comply with two subsequent deadlines, including one in which he was
4 ordered to respond to the City’s motion to dismiss. Third, because memories
fade and evidence can be lost over time, “prejudice to defendants resulting from
unreasonable delay may be presumed.” Shannon, 186 F.3d at 195 (quotation
marks omitted). Fourth, the District Court could reasonably conclude that its
interest in managing its docket ultimately outweighed Guarniere’s interest in
being heard on the merits of his claim. Here, the docket had ballooned as a result
of filings related to Guarniere’s delays and failures to comply with court orders,
and Guarniere repeatedly failed to capitalize on several opportunities to be
heard. Fifth and finally, the District Court explored sanctions short of dismissal,
but none of them mitigated Guarniere’s failure to comply with its deadlines and
orders. For example, Guarniere continued to miss deadlines after the District
Court denied his requests for extension to conduct discovery and to respond to
the Defendants’ motions for partial summary judgment. Under these
circumstances, the District Court acted within its discretion to dismiss the case. 1
1Guarniere’s notice of appeal indicates that he also intended to challenge the District Court’s grant of partial summary judgment and denial of his motion for reconsideration. As his briefs on appeal fail to raise those challenges, we conclude that they are abandoned. 5 We have considered Guarniere’s remaining arguments and conclude that
they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District
Court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
6
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished