23-121 Knox v. CRC Management Co.

In the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

August Term 2023 Argued: February 12, 2024 Decided: April 9, 2025

No. 23-121

NATASHA KNOX, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CRC MANAGEMENT CO., LLC, CLEAN RITE CENTERS-3533 BOSTON RD., LLC, 4352 BRONX BLVD. LAUNDROMAT, LLC, CECILIA ASHMEADE, KEN FERRIS, Defendants-Appellees. *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York No. 20-cv-4073, Edgardo Ramos, Judge.

Before: KEARSE, PARK, and PÉREZ, Circuit Judges.

Natasha Knox appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her suit

against her former employer and two of her former supervisors. Knox alleges

discriminatory and retaliatory termination, a hostile work environment, refusal to

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption accordingly. accommodate her disability, and unpaid wages. The district court found that

Knox had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on

any of her claims. We disagree. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable

to Knox, including Knox’s own testimony and sworn affidavit, we cannot

conclude that any of her claims were so lacking in support as to prevent a

reasonable jury from finding in her favor. Accordingly, we VACATE the district

court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings on each of Knox’s claims.

STEPHEN BERGSTEIN, Bergstein & Ullrich, New Paltz, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

JEREMI L. CHYLINSKI, Gordon & Rees, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.

MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judge:

Natasha Knox appeals from a summary judgment dismissing her suit

against her former employer and two of her former supervisors. Knox alleges

discriminatory and retaliatory termination, a hostile work environment, refusal to

accommodate her disability, and unpaid wages. The district court found that

Knox had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on

any of her claims. We disagree. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable

2 to Knox, including Knox’s own testimony and sworn affidavit, we cannot

conclude that any of her claims were so lacking in support as to prevent a

reasonable jury from finding in her favor. Accordingly, we VACATE the district

court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings on each of Knox’s claims.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background

From December 2018 until her termination in April 2019, Natasha Knox, a

Black woman of Jamaican descent, worked as a customer service attendant at three

Clean Rite laundromats in the Bronx. 1 Her job included tending to customers,

washing and folding laundry, and keeping the equipment clean. While Knox

worked mainly at Clean Rite’s location on White Plains Road, she would

occasionally pick up extra shifts at two other locations.

In February 2019, Knox began having problems with Cecilia Ashmeade, her

supervisor at the White Plains Road location. Ashmeade would make derogatory

comments to Knox on a daily basis, telling her that she was “too ‘hood’ and

1 As we must at the summary-judgment stage, we view the record in the light most favorable to the non- movant, Knox, and describe the facts accordingly. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

(1986) (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). We use “Clean Rite” to refer collectively to the three company defendants, though we express no view—since the issue has not been presented—as to whether any of them would be entitled to summary judgment on the basis of their corporate separateness.

3 ‘ghetto’ to work” for Clean Rite and that “the Yankee in [her] makes [her] timid.”

J. App’x at 237 ¶ 5. Knox reported these comments to her District Lead, Vincent

Butler, who took no action. The following month, Butler was replaced by Kenneth

Ferris, who began routinely making derogatory comments of his own. In one

instance, he told Knox that she “looked like Aunt Jemima.”

at 238 ¶ 15. In

another, he “criticized [her] for ‘talking Jamaican’ when [she] got ‘upset.’”

at

238 ¶ 16.

In early March, Knox visited her doctor regarding a broken thumb she had

sustained in a car accident about a month earlier. Since the accident, Butler had

allowed Knox to perform lighter duties, but she continued to experience pain. Her

doctor gave her a new hand brace and instructed her not to lift more than 25

pounds. Knox told Ashmeade about her doctor’s instruction and asked that she

not be required to lift more than 25 pounds during her shifts. Ashmeade

responded that Knox “shouldn’t have this job” if she needed an accommodation,

and she continued to require Knox to do work that involved lifting more than 25

pounds. Knox told her Regional Leader, Neville Baptiste, about Ashmeade’s

derogatory comments and her refusal to accommodate Knox’s thumb injury. With

respect to her request for an accommodation, Baptiste told Knox, “[W]e might

4 need to have a conversation if you can’t do your job.” J. App’x at 238 ¶ 12. Knox

also met with Ferris to discuss Ashmeade’s derogatory comments.

Around that same time, Knox complained to Clean Rite that she had not

been paid for the extra shifts she worked at two other Clean Rite locations. She

filed a formal complaint with Ferris, who never got back to her.

On April 14, after taking a taxi to work, Knox reimbursed herself by taking

fifteen dollars from the cash register and putting her taxi receipt in its place. Knox

testified that Clean Rite would pay employees’ taxi fare, and Ferris had given Knox

permission to reimburse herself from the register as long as she left a receipt. But

the following day, Knox’s new supervisor, Ashley Peguero, confronted her and

asked her to return the money. Knox declined, explaining that she was owed taxi

fare and had not acted contrary to company policy. Peguero informed Ferris, who

fired Knox three days later, citing her removal of cash from the register and her

refusal to return it.

II. Procedural History

Knox sued Clean Rite, Ashmeade, and Ferris, alleging discriminatory and

retaliatory termination, a hostile work environment, refusal to accommodate a

5 disability, and unpaid wages. She also alleged that Ashmeade and Ferris aided

and abetted Clean Rite’s discrimination and retaliation.

Clean Rite moved for summary judgment. Knox moved to strike the

defendants’ answer with respect to Ashmeade and Ferris, who had since failed to

appear, and requested that default judgment be entered against them. The district

court granted summary judgment for Clean Rite, dismissed the claims against

Ashmeade and Ferris sua sponte, and denied Knox’s motion as moot. Knox timely

appealed.

DISCUSSION

“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and

drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Ashley v. City of New York,

(2d Cir. 2021). In doing so, we are “required to consider the record as a

whole” and “to disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that a jury

would be entitled to disbelieve.” Moll v. Telesector Res. Grp., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2024).

We conclude that Knox has adduced sufficient evidence to survive

summary judgment on all of her claims against Clean Rite. With respect to her

6 claims against Ashmeade and Ferris, we vacate their dismissal and remand for the

district court to consider how best to proceed in light of their failure to appear.

I. Racial and National-Origin Discrimination

Knox alleges discriminatory termination, retaliation, and a hostile work

environment, bringing claims under

, Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City

Human Rights Law. Because there are genuine and material factual disputes as to

each theory, summary judgment on these claims is not warranted.

A. Discriminatory Termination

Knox alleges that Clean Rite’s decision to fire her was motivated at least in

part by her race or national origin. To succeed on this theory under § 1981, Title

VII, and the New York State Human Rights Law, she must satisfy the burden-

shifting framework set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

, 802–

03 (1973). 2 See Brown v. City of Syracuse,

(2d Cir. 2012); Vivenzio v.

City of Syracuse,

(2d Cir. 2010). Meeting her burden under this

framework would also satisfy her burden under the more lenient New York City

2 Knox does not present direct evidence of discriminatory intent, in which case McDonnell Douglas burden shifting would be unnecessary. See Porter v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Med. Ctr.,

(2d Cir. 2024) (“The McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination, e.g., that the employer’s motivation was discriminatory on its face.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

7 Human Rights Law. See Bennett v. Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc.,

,

, 121–22 (1st Dep’t 2011).

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, Knox must first show that (1) she

belonged to a protected class, (2) she was qualified for her job, (3) she was fired,

and (4) her firing took place “under circumstances giving rise to an inference of

discriminatory intent.” Brown,

(internal quotation marks omitted).

If she meets this prima facie burden, “a presumption of discriminatory intent

arises,” and the burden shifts to Clean Rite “to articulate a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for” firing her. Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc.,

(2d

Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). If it does so, then the burden shifts

back to Knox, who must show that Clean Rite’s justification was pretextual or that

her firing “was motivated at least in part by [her] membership in a protected

class.” Bart v. Golub Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2024); see also Bennett, 936

N.Y.S.2d at 121.

Clean Rite argues that summary judgment was warranted because Knox

failed to establish a genuine factual dispute as to whether Clean Rite’s reason for

firing her was discriminatory. We disagree.

8 At a minimum, a jury could reasonably infer that Knox’s race or national

origin played at least some part, even if not the only part, in her firing. See Bart,

; Bennett, 936 N.Y.S.2d at 121. First, Knox adduced evidence that

Ferris had made discriminatory comments to her not long before firing her, telling

her that she “looked like Aunt Jemima” and “criticiz[ing] [her] for ‘talking

Jamaican’ when [she] got ‘upset.’” J. App’x at 238 ¶¶ 15, 16. Second, neither Ferris

nor his predecessor, Butler, had taken any action in response to Knox’s complaint

about racial harassment by Ashmeade. This is sufficient evidence to make out a

prima facie case of discriminatory discharge.

Clean Rite asserts that it fired Knox for a legitimate reason: she took fifteen

dollars from its cash register and refused to give it back. But Knox testified at her

deposition, and asserted in a sworn declaration, that Clean Rite employees were

permitted to take cash from the register to pay their taxi fare so long as they left a

receipt, which she did. Knox also said that other employees “engaged in this

practice openly as well with no discipline.” J. App’x at 239 ¶ 20. If Clean Rite

previously gave its employees permission to take cash from the register for their

cab rides, as we must assume to be true for purposes of summary judgment, then

9 it had no reason to demand that Knox return the money. Neither taking the money

nor refusing to return it would be a legitimate reason for Knox’s termination.

Presented with this evidence of pretext alongside the evidence making up

Knox’s prima facie case, including racial comments made by Ferris, who fired her,

a reasonable jury could determine that Knox was terminated because of her race

or national origin.

In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court erroneously found

that “a plaintiff’s self-serving statement, without direct or circumstantial evidence

to support the charge, is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”

Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co., LLC, No. 20-cv-4073,

, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.

3, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). To the contrary, “[a]t summary

judgment, [a plaintiff is] entitled to rely on his own testimony to establish his . . .

claim.” Rentas v. Ruffin,

(2d Cir. 2016); see also Bellamy v. City of

New York,

(2d Cir. 2019) (a “plaintiff’s testimony alone may be

independently sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact”). Testimony, of

course, includes sworn statements made in depositions or declarations under the

penalty of perjury. See

; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). “There is nothing

in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)] to suggest that nonmovants’ affidavits

10 alone cannot—as a matter of law—suffice to defend against a motion for summary

judgment.” Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc.,

, 57 (2d Cir. 1998). And “[t]o

hold . . . that the nonmovant’s allegations of fact are (because ‘self-serving’)

insufficient to fend off summary judgment would be to thrust the courts—at an

inappropriate stage—into an adjudication of the merits.” Id. To the extent the

district court’s analysis discounted Knox’s sworn statements for being “self-

serving,” doing so was error. 3

B. Retaliatory Termination

Knox also alleges that Clean Rite fired her in retaliation for asserting her

civil rights. Federal and state-law retaliation claims are “subject to the same

standards” as one another, Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC,

(2d Cir.

2023), including the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework described

earlier, see Littlejohn v. City of New York,

(2d Cir. 2015) (§ 1981 and

Title VII); Tafolla v. Heilig,

(2d Cir. 2023) (New York State Human

3 “Of course, if the nonmovant’s affidavit fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e), in that it is conclusory or not based on the affiant’s personal knowledge, the affidavit would be insufficient to defend against a motion for summary judgment.” Danzer, 151 F.3d at 57 n.5. Nor may a party “create an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit in opposition to a summary judgment motion that, by omission or addition, contradicts the affiant’s previous deposition testimony.” Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Moll v. Telesector Res. Grp., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2014) (“[F]actual issues that a party creates by filing an affidavit crafted to oppose a summary judgment motion that contradicts that party’s prior testimony are not ‘genuine’ issues for trial.”). But neither situation applies here.

11 Rights Law). To establish a prima facie case of retaliatory termination, Knox must

show (1) that she engaged in activity protected under the relevant statute; (2) that

Clean Rite knew about this activity; (3) that Clean Rite fired her; and (4) “that there

was a causal connection between [her] protected activity and [her firing].” Kaytor

v. Elec. Boat Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2010). If Clean Rite can then “articulate

some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for” firing her, Knox must then prove that

her protected activity “was a ‘but-for’ cause of” her firing, which she can do by

showing that Clean Rite’s proffered reason is pretextual. Zann Kwan v. Andalex

Grp. LLC,

, 845–46 (2d Cir. 2013). As with her discriminatory-

termination claims, if Knox meets her burden on her federal and state-law

retaliation claims, she will also meet her burden under the more permissive New

York City Human Rights Law. See Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of New York,

(2d Cir. 2015).

We conclude that Knox has adduced sufficient evidence to defeat summary

judgment as to each of her burdens. As to the first and second elements of her

prima facie case, Knox testified that she complained to her managers—including

Neville Baptiste, who (according to Clean Rite) directed Knox’s termination—

about racial harassment and Ashmeade’s refusal to accommodate her injured

12 thumb. “[M]aking complaints to management” about workplace discrimination

qualifies as protected activity under the first element. Littlejohn,

(quoting Sumner v. U.S. Postal Serv.,

(2d Cir. 1990)). And

knowledge of a complaint by the person who directed an adverse employment

action is sufficient to meet the second. See Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2010).

As to the third prima facie element, the parties do not dispute that Clean

Rite fired Knox. As to the fourth element, “[a] plaintiff can indirectly establish a

causal connection to support a discrimination or retaliation claim by showing that

the protected activity was closely followed in time by the adverse employment

action.” Tafolla, 80 F.4th at 125–26 (quoting Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2010)). Knox stated in her declaration that she last complained

to management about discrimination around mid-March 2019, and the parties

agree that Clean Rite fired her on April 18, 2019. Interpreting the entire record in

the light most favorable to Knox, we find that a rational jury could infer a causal

connection from the roughly one-month period between Knox’s protected activity

and her firing. Cf. Gorman-Bakos v. Cornell Coop. Extension of Schenectady Cnty., 252

(2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a four-month period was sufficient);

Banks,

(noting that we have held “several months” to be sufficient).

Knox’s burden at the next stage—after Clean Rite has articulated a non-

retaliatory reason for her firing—is somewhat higher. To survive summary

judgment at this stage, she cannot rely solely on temporal proximity. Zann Kwan,

. Here, however, Knox also presented other evidence to support

her argument that the employer’s proffered reason for the termination was

pretextual. As with Knox’s discrimination claims, there is sufficient record

evidence that Clean Rite’s proffered reason—that Knox took cash from the register

and refused to return it—was mere pretext. Combined with the temporal

proximity between Knox’s complaints and her firing, this evidence would allow a

rational jury to conclude that Clean Rite would not have fired her but for her

protected activity. See

(“A plaintiff may prove that retaliation was a but-

for cause of an adverse employment action by demonstrating weaknesses,

implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered

legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its action. From such discrepancies, a

reasonable juror could conclude that the explanations were a pretext for a

prohibited reason.”).

14 Having adduced evidence on each element of her retaliation claims, Knox is

entitled to take those claims to a jury. Summary judgment was therefore

inappropriate.

C. Hostile Work Environment

Knox also asserts a hostile-work-environment theory under § 1981, Title VII,

the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights

Law. Here too, satisfying her burden on her federal and state-law claims, which

are again subject to similar standards, will also satisfy her burden on her city-law

claim. See Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2000)

(§ 1981 and Title VII); Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc.,

(2d Cir.

2006) (New York State Human Rights Law); Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N.

Am., Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2013) (New York City Human Rights Law).

“To establish a hostile work environment claim under [federal or New York

law], a plaintiff must first produce evidence that the workplace is permeated with

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or

pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.” Williams v. N.Y.C.

Hous. Auth.,

(2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Under this standard, racially offensive comments by a coworker can create a

15 hostile work environment, as can offensive comments based on a person’s ancestry

or national origin. See Whidbee,

. Under federal and state law, “[t]o

withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate either that a single

incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of incidents were sufficiently

continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of her working

environment.”

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Schwapp v.

Town of Avon,

(2d Cir. 1997) (“For racist comments, slurs, and

jokes to constitute a hostile work environment, there must be more than a few

isolated incidents of racial enmity, meaning that instead of sporadic racial slurs,

there must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments.” (alteration

adopted) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). If a rational jury could

find either to be the case, then summary judgment must be denied.

Knox has shown a genuine factual dispute under this standard. In her

sworn declaration, she described being subjected to daily harassment from her

supervisor: “Defendant Ashmeade began making daily criticisms that I was too

‘hood’ and ‘ghetto’ to work at Clean Rite. Defendant Ashmeade also criticized me

by saying ‘the Yankee in you makes you timid,’ a reference to my national origin.”

J. App’x at 237 ¶ 5. Knox also attested that Ferris, her District Lead, would

16 “routinely mak[e] derogatory comments concerning [her] race and nationality.”

at 238 ¶ 14. She described two examples: “In or around Mid-March 2019, I

arrived at work wearing a scarf and was informed by Defendant Ferris that I

‘looked like Aunt Jemima,’” id. ¶ 15; and “[i]n or around late March, Defendant

Ferris criticized me for ‘talking Jamaican’ when I got ‘upset,’” id. ¶ 16.

Drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, a rational jury could

conclude that daily and routine comments such as these “were sufficiently

continuous and concerted” to have worsened the conditions of Knox’s

employment. Williams,

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also

Torres v. Pisano,

(2d Cir. 1997) (a hostile work environment is

actionable under Title VII when harassment “is of such quality or quantity that a

reasonable employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the

worse”).

In reaching the opposite conclusion, the district court found that daily

comments such as these, even though “deplorable,” were not actionable because

they lasted only two months and did not involve “any physical altercations with

[a] coworker.” Knox,

, at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted).

That conclusion is out of step with our precedents. In Whidbee, for example, we

17 found that “a stream of racially offensive comments over the span of two to three

months” was sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

; see also

. The plaintiffs there described seven separate incidents in which the same

coworker made offensive comments, usually directed at the plaintiffs’ other

coworkers, and which did not accompany any physical altercations. See

at 66–

68; cf. Fox v. Costco Wholesale Corp.,

, 75–76 (2d Cir. 2019) (“On Fox’s

evidence at this stage, we hold, a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the

‘hut-hut-hike’ comments made for months by co-workers when Fox experienced

verbal tics were sufficiently severe and pervasive to change the conditions of Fox's

employment.”). Here, Knox testified that offensive comments were made to her

on a daily basis. 4

In considering whether racially offensive comments constitute a hostile

work environment, a jury considers their “quantity, frequency, and severity.”

Schwapp,

(internal quotation marks omitted). Comments that are

less severe but more frequent may nonetheless constitute an actionable detriment

4 While Knox does not press the point, the district court’s finding that she was not involved in any physical altercations appears to be incorrect. In her deposition, Knox testified that Ashmeade “bumped [her] and pushed [her] into the counter” in an attempt to “get a rise out of [her].” J. App’x 93–94 at 65:22–66:1. Physical altercations can contribute to a hostile work environment even when not specifically accompanied by discriminatory remarks. See Rasmy v. Marriott Int’l, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2020) (“Our case law is clear that when the same individuals engage in some harassment that is explicitly discriminatory and some that is not, the entire course of conduct is relevant to a hostile work environment claim.”).

18 to an employee’s working conditions. See Whidbee,

. We cannot say

that the daily comments that Knox alleges are insufficient as a matter of law. See

Rasmy,

(“[T]he overall severity and pervasiveness of discriminatory

conduct must be considered. By its very nature that determination is bound to

raise factual disputes that likely will not be proper for resolution at the summary

judgment stage.”). 5

II. Disability Discrimination

Knox alleges that Clean Rite violated state and city law by refusing to

provide a reasonable accommodation for her injured thumb—namely, by

requiring her to lift more than 25 pounds despite her doctor’s instruction not to.

To succeed on her state-law claim, Knox must prove that (1) she was

disabled within the meaning of the statute, (2) Clean Rite knew she was disabled,

(3) she could have performed the essential functions of her job with a reasonable

accommodation, and (4) Clean Rite refused to make such an accommodation. See

Noll v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp.,

(2d Cir. 2015). If Knox meets this

5 In part of its analysis, the district court also seemed to discount all but the “five instances of derogatory comments” that Knox alleged “specifically.” Knox,

, at *13. This too was error. We have held that specific descriptions of each instance of harassment—which, if harassment occurred daily, could be difficult to provide—are unnecessary for a plaintiff to defeat summary judgment. See Torres,

. A jury “could reasonably find pervasive harassment, even in the absence of specific details about each incident.”

19 burden, she also meets her less-demanding burden under the New York City

Human Rights Law. See Romanello v. Intesa Sanpaolo, S.p.A.,

(2013).

We conclude that Knox has adduced sufficient evidence to defeat summary

judgment under both state and city law. 6 The record contains evidence (1) that

Knox broke her finger, which prevented her from lifting heavier loads; (2) that she

notified Clean Rite management of this injury and her doctor’s instruction not to

lift more than 25 pounds; (3) that she was able to perform her job while avoiding

heavier lifting; and (4) that her supervisor denied her request not to lift more than

25 pounds. At a minimum, the record reflects a genuine factual dispute as to each

element of Knox’s claim, making dismissal on summary judgment inappropriate.

III. Wage-and-Hour Violations

Knox also alleges that Clean Rite failed to pay her minimum wage and

overtime under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and state labor law. In

particular, she alleges that Clean Rite never paid her for the extra shifts she worked

6Though dismissing the claim in its entirety, the district court did not address the theory that Knox presses here—that Clean Rite violated state and city law by failing to accommodate her injury. The court’s analysis was limited to Knox’s theory that Clean Rite fired her because of her injury. Knox does not appeal the grant of summary judgment on that particular issue.

20 at two locations, some of which required her to work more than a total of 40 hours

per week.

We conclude that Knox has adduced sufficient evidence to defeat summary

judgment on these claims. She stated in her sworn declaration that she worked 32

hours per week at Clean Rite’s White Plains Road location, that she worked about

8 hours per week (and sometimes more) at two other Clean Rite locations, and that

she never received compensation for her work at these latter two locations. She

also testified at her deposition that the employee time sheets appeared to have

been altered and that compensation for her hours seems to have been allocated to

Ashmeade.

“[A]t summary judgment, if an employer’s records are inaccurate or

inadequate, an employee need only present sufficient evidence to show the

amount and extent of the uncompensated work as a matter of just and reasonable

inference.” Kuebel v. Black & Decker Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2011) (alteration

adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A]n employee’s burden in this

regard is not high. It is well settled . . . that it is possible for the plaintiff to meet

this burden through estimates based on his own recollection.”

(citation

omitted). Knox has met her burden at this stage.

21 IV. Claims Against Individual Defendants

Finally, Knox seeks to reinstate her claims against Ashmeade and Ferris,

who have failed to appear since answering the complaint. They are no longer

represented by defendants’ counsel, who lost contact with them, nor have they

appeared pro se in the district court or in this Court. After Ashmeade and Ferris

failed to heed the district court’s order to appear, Knox moved to strike their

answer and for default judgment against them. The district court, in its order

granting summary judgment for Clean Rite, denied that motion as moot,

reasoning that the claims against Ashmeade and Ferris were not cognizable once

the claims against Clean Rite were dismissed. With our reinstatement of the claims

against Clean Rite, that premise is no longer sound.

We are cognizant that neither Ashmeade nor Ferris has moved for summary

judgment, nor have they appeared in our Court to request affirmance on an

alternative ground. In this circumstance, the most appropriate course is to vacate

the dismissal of the claims against them and allow the district court on remand to

reconsider Knox’s motion. We express no view as to whether that motion should

be granted.

22 CONCLUSION

In sum, we hold as follows:

1. There being genuine disputes of material fact as to each of Knox’s

claims against Clean Rite, summary judgment on those claims is

inappropriate.

2. Knox’s claims against Ashmeade and Ferris should be reinstated to

allow the district court to reconsider Knox’s motion to strike their

answer and for default judgment.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

23