24-3154-cr United States v. Mercedes-Mejia

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of October, two thousand twenty-five. Present: GUIDO CALABRESI, DENNY CHIN, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. No. 24-3154-cr FAUSTO RAMON MERCEDES-MEJIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________

For Appellee: THOMAS R. SUTCLIFFE, Assistant United States Attorney, for John A. Sarcone III, United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York, Syracuse, New York.

For Defendant-Appellant: MELISSA A. TUOHEY, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Syracuse, New York.

1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of

New York (Brenda K. Sannes, Chief Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Fausto Ramon Mercedes-Mejia appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court

for the Northern District of New York (Sannes, C.J.) entered on November 15, 2024, following

his guilty plea to one count of illegal reentry into the United States after having committed an

aggravated felony in violation of

(a). Mercedes-Mejia is a citizen of the

Dominican Republic. He was arrested on April 26, 2024, when U.S. Border Patrol agents assisting

with a routine traffic stop determined that he was present in the United States without lawful status

and previously had been removed. In 2004, Mercedes-Mejia—an undocumented non-citizen at

the time—was arrested for participating in a scheme to transport cocaine from El Salvador to

Washington, DC. He pleaded guilty to conspiracy to import five kilograms or more of cocaine

and was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Upon

completing his sentence, Mercedes-Mejia was deported in 2013.

In the present case, the district court sentenced Mercedes-Mejia to 24 months’

imprisonment. The sentence fell within the advisory sentencing range of 21 to 27 months under

the United States Sentencing Guidelines. On appeal, he argues that the sentence imposed by the

district court was procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We review the procedural and

substantive reasonableness of a sentence under a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”

United States v. Yilmaz,

(2d Cir. 2018).

2 I. Procedural Reasonableness

A district court “errs procedurally if it . . . rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous finding

of fact,” or “fails adequately to explain its chosen sentence.” United States v. Cavera,

(2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). Mercedes-Mejia contends that his sentence was procedurally

unreasonable because the district court relied on what he claims was a clearly erroneous finding

of fact. In particular, he asserts that “[t]here simply was no evidence in the record to support” the

district court’s finding that his illegal return to the United States “put the country at jeopardy for

further potential involvement in the drug trade and illegal criminal conduct.” Appellant’s Br. at

12-13 (citing App’x at 66-67). We are unpersuaded.

As an initial matter, the Government contends that Mercedes-Mejia “did not raise [this]

argument below,” so “the plain error standard of review applies.” Appellee’s Br. at 14. Whether

plain or clear error applies need not be addressed here “because [Mercedes-Mejia] cannot

demonstrate procedural unreasonableness under any standard of review.” United States v.

Verkhoglyad,

(2d Cir. 2008). The district court acted well within its discretion

and committed no error when it determined that Mercedes-Mejia’s illegal reentry into the country

increased the risk of further illicit drug activity. The last time he was in the country, Mercedes-

Mejia participated in a complex scheme to transport significant quantities of cocaine and channel

large cash payments in return. Even though the offense took place some time ago, it was more

than reasonable for the district court to infer present risk based on past behavior.

II. Substantive Reasonableness

Mercedes-Mejia also claims that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because his

prior conviction “cannot bear the weight the district court assigned to it.” Appellant’s Br. at 12.

He reasons that the offense took place over two decades ago; he was only a low-level player in the

3 drug-distribution organization; he already “paid greatly” through his ten-year imprisonment; and

he has not committed any new crimes since.

As mitigating factors, Mercedes-Mejia states that

he returned to the United States in 2023 only to support an ex-partner’s adult child experiencing

mental-health challenges, has family responsibilities in the Dominican Republic, intends to return

there voluntarily, and has a low risk of recidivism. We again are unpersuaded.

In assessing reasonableness, we “set aside a district court’s substantive determination only

in exceptional cases where the trial court’s decision ‘cannot be located within the range of

permissible decisions.’” Cavera,

(quoting United States v. Rigas,

(2d Cir. 2007)). Though the factors that Mercedes-Mejia presses are permissible

considerations under the totality of the circumstances, we will not override the district court’s

determination of their appropriate weight. The district court “considered the mitigating factors”

and the fact that his previous offense occurred “some time ago,” but ultimately it concluded that a

lesser sentence would not be “sufficient to reflect the seriousness of this offense, to promote respect

for the law, and to provide [Mercedes-Mejia] a just punishment.” App’x at 66.

None of the mitigating factors, independently or in aggregate, required the district court to

impose a sentence lower than the within-guidelines 24 months it chose. Indeed, we have

repeatedly and summarily deemed sentences of similar or longer durations for the same offense to

be substantively reasonable. See, e.g., United States v. Cantin-Echevarria,

, 19-

20 (2d Cir. 2015) (summary order); United States v. Andujar,

(2d Cir.

2010) (summary order). The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence of

24 months.

4 * * *

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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