24-1768-cr United States v. Carter

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 14th day of October, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: BARRINGTON D. PARKER, SUSAN L. CARNEY,

Circuit Judges. * _____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 24-1768

*This case was originally assigned to a three-judge panel, but one member of the panel was unable to participate in consideration of the matter. The remaining members of the panel, who are in agreement, have decided this case pursuant to Second Circuit Internal Operating Procedure E(b). CHARLES CARTER, AKA CHASE,

Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________________

FOR APPELLEE: Joseph Nocella, Jr., United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, David C. James, Bradley T. King, Assistant United States Attorneys, Of Counsel, Brooklyn, NY

FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Steven Alan Metcalf, II, Metcalf & Metcalf, P.C., New York, NY

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of New York (Gary R. Brown, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment is AFFIRMED.

Defendant-Appellant Charles Carter pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute

and possess with intent to distribute at least 40 grams of fentanyl. As part of

Carter’s plea agreement, Carter and the Government jointly recommended a 204-

month sentence of imprisonment. The district court sentenced Carter to 240

months in prison, to be followed by five years of supervised release. On appeal,

2 Carter challenges his sentence as procedurally and substantively unreasonable.

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the remaining facts, the procedural

history, and the issues on appeal.

This Court reviews sentencing decisions for “reasonableness.” United States

v. Cossey,

(2d Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). The

reasonableness inquiry is “akin to a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”

(quotation marks omitted). The sentence a district court imposes is procedurally

unreasonable if, as relevant here, that court “does not give proper consideration to

the § 3553(a) factors” or “does not adequately explain the sentence imposed.”

United States v. Diamreyan,

(2d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks

omitted). The sentence a district court imposes is substantively unreasonable if it

cannot be “located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v.

Cavera,

(2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).

I. Procedural Reasonableness

Carter argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable for two

reasons: first, because the district court did not consider the harsh conditions of

the pre-sentencing confinement Carter endured as a mitigating factor in

sentencing, and second, on the ground that the district court did not properly

3 explain why it rejected the below-Guidelines sentence both Carter and the

Government recommended. On both counts, we disagree.

A district court need not perform any “robotic incantations” of the Section

3553(a) factors when imposing a sentence. United States v. Wagner-Dano,

(2d Cir. 2012). Instead, the court need only explain its decision well enough

“to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair

sentencing.” Gall v. United States,

(2007).

The district court satisfied that requirement here. Its analysis of the Section

3553(a) sentencing factors spanned more than five pages of the sentencing

transcript. In that discussion, the court emphasized the seriousness of Carter’s

offense conduct, the effect of Carter’s crime on the victims and their families, and

Carter’s extensive criminal history. That discussion makes clear why the district

court chose to impose a sentence within the Guidelines rather than below them.

Moreover, a district court need not “make specific responses to points

argued by counsel in connection with sentencing,” let alone “address every

argument the defendant has made.” United States v. Bonilla,

(2d

Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). We therefore have no difficulty concluding

4 that the district court’s “detailed reasoning is fully adequate to justify the sentence

imposed in all respects”—whether or not the court discussed the conditions of

Carter’s confinement at length. United States v. Conca,

(2d Cir. 2011).

II. Substantive Reasonableness

Carter also argues that imposing thirty-six additional months of

incarceration above the 204 months the Government, Probation Department, and

Carter jointly recommended was substantively unreasonable. Again, we disagree.

Substantive reasonableness review is “deferential.” Cavera,

.

Sentences are rarely struck down unless they are “shockingly high, shockingly

low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Bleau,

(2d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).

Notably, Carter does not contend that his 240-month sentence is

“shockingly high.” Nor could he. Carter was sentenced toward the very bottom

of his advisory Guidelines range. And while a “within-Guidelines sentence is not

presumptively reasonable,” a Guidelines sentence “will fall comfortably within

the broad range of sentences that would be reasonable” in “the overwhelming

majority of cases.” United States v. Pollok,

(2d Cir. 2025)

(quotation marks omitted).

5 Instead, Carter challenges how the district court weighed the relevant

sentencing factors to arrive at a 240-month sentence. Specifically, he argues that

the court improperly prioritized the seriousness of his crime over mitigating

circumstances like the conditions of confinement he experienced at the

Metropolitan Detention Center and his efforts to rehabilitate himself while

incarcerated.

But a defendant’s “disagreement” with how the district court weighed the

Section 3553(a) factors “does not render his sentence substantively unreasonable.”

United States v. Rivera,

(2d Cir. 2024). The district court imposed

the sentence it did because Carter sold large quantities of fentanyl, that fentanyl

contributed to the deaths of two people, and after Carter learned that his first

victim had died, he “continued . . . to deal the very same substances.” App’x 129.

On those facts, the seriousness of Carter’s bears the weight the district court

assigned it, cf. Pollok, 139 F.4th at 145–46, and the resulting 240-month sentence

was substantively reasonable.

6 We have considered Carter’s remaining arguments and conclude they are

without merit. 1 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

1To the extent Carter argues that the district court improperly calculated his Guidelines range, that argument is waived. In his plea agreement, at his plea hearing, in his sentencing memorandum, and at his sentencing hearing, Carter repeatedly affirmed that his projected Guidelines range was correct. Any challenge to it on appeal is therefore waived. See United States v. Yu-Leung,

(2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]rue waiver . . . negate[s] even plain error review.” (cleaned up)).

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