25-775-cv Lafayette v. Blueprint Basketball

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 15th day of October, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, DENNY CHIN, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

Robert Lafayette,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 25-775-cv

Blueprint Basketball, Byron Robertson, Cara Caswell, Burlington School District, Vermont Elite, Sam Jackson,

Defendants-Appellees,

Thomas C. Nuovo, Joseph Farnham, Joseph McNeil, Winooski School District,

Defendants. _____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Robert Lafayette, pro se, Morrisville, VT.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES Thomas C. Nuovo, Bauer BLUEPRINT BASKETBALL, BYRON Gravel Farnham, LLP, ROBERTSON, AND CARA CASWELL: Colchester, VT.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES Joseph A. Farnham, SAM JACKSON, VERMONT ELITE, AND McNeil, Leddy & BURLINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT: Sheahan, P.C., Burlington, VT.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of

Vermont (Crawford, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Robert Lafayette, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment

dismissing his action. Lafayette commenced this action against Blueprint Basketball and

others after Blueprint prohibited him from attending games and practices and removed

his son from Blueprint’s basketball team. In his Second Amended Complaint, Lafayette

sought to assert discrimination, failure to accommodate, and retaliation claims under the

2 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),

et seq., as well as various state

law claims, against a slew of defendants. 1 The defendants moved under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a

claim. The district court granted the motions, holding that Lafayette failed to state a

claim under the ADA, and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state

law claims. See Lafayette v. Blueprint Basketball, No. 23-CV-631,

, at *10

(D. Vt. Mar. 31, 2025). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the

procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as

necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“[W]e review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6), construing the complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the

complaint as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”

Moreira v. Société Générale, S.A.,

, 387 (2d Cir. 2025) (citation modified).

Because Lafayette “has been pro se throughout, his pleadings and other filings are

interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.” Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR,

1Specifically, in the Second Amended Complaint, Lafayette named Blueprint Basketball, Byron Robertson, Cara Caswell, Burlington School District, Vermont Elite, and Sam Jackson as Defendants. He named several additional defendants in his initial Complaint. 3 Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2024).

DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, it is unclear whether Lafayette intended to bring his claims

only under the ADA’s public accommodations provisions (Title III), or if he also intended

to bring his claims under the ADA’s employment provisions (Title I) based on his time as

a volunteer assistant coach with Blueprint. See Second Am. Compl. at 11–13, Lafayette v.

Blueprint Basketball, No. 23-CV-631,

(D. Vt. Mar. 31, 2025), Dkt. 24

(stating that Blueprint and Vermont Elite are both subject to Title III of the ADA but also

citing

(b)(4), which pertains to employment discrimination under the

ADA). In any event, for the reasons set forth below, Lafayette fails to state a claim under

either Title I or Title III of the ADA.

First, the district court correctly held that Lafayette failed to state a discrimination

claim under the ADA. To establish a prima facie discrimination claim under Title III

based on public accommodations, a plaintiff must show “that: (1) [they are] a qualified

individual with a disability; (2) the defendant is an entity subject to the Act[]; and (3) the

plaintiff was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from . . . services,

programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against on the basis of disability.”

Costin v. Glen Falls Hosp.,

(2d Cir. 2024) (citation modified).

4 Here, Lafayette alleged that he and his son were denied the opportunity to

continue participating in Blueprint’s offerings, including playing on the team and

attending practices and games. 2 However, even assuming that Lafayette was a qualified

individual with a disability and that Blueprint was subject to the ADA, he did not

plausibly allege that he was banned from future Blueprint games and practices because

of a disability. According to Lafayette’s own allegations, he criticized a referee at a

game, resulting in his ejection from the game, and Blueprint thereafter banned him from

future games and practices. Lafayette further alleges that Blueprint removed his son

from the team after Lafayette emailed Blueprint to “advise[] his disgust” with its decision

to ban Lafayette from games and practices. Second Am. Compl. at 6, Lafayette v.

Blueprint Basketball, No. 23-CV-631,

(D. Vt. Mar. 31, 2025), Dkt. 24.

These allegations do not raise a plausible inference of disability discrimination; instead,

they suggest that Lafayette and his son were barred due to Lafayette’s disruptive

behavior. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (“The plausibility standard . . .

asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” (citation

2 Because Lafayette is not an attorney, he cannot bring legal claims on behalf of his son. Cheung v. Youth Orchestra Found. of Buffalo, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 1990) (“[A] non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of his or her child.”). As a result, the Court does not address any such claims. 5 modified)).

Similarly, to the extent Lafayette sought to assert an employment discrimination

claim under Title I, he was unsuccessful.

The elements of an ADA [employment discrimination] claim are that: (1) the employer is subject to the ADA, (2) the employee is disabled or is perceived to be disabled as defined by the ADA, (3) the employee is qualified to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodations, and (4) the employee suffers an adverse employment action because of his disability.

Sharikov,

.

Lafayette alleged that he was a volunteer assistant coach with Blueprint, but after

the incident with the referee, Blueprint prohibited him from attending future games and

practices. Again, however, Lafayette did not plausibly allege that Blueprint took these

actions “because of his disability.” See

As described above, Lafayette’s own

allegations reflected that Blueprint banned him from games and practices following the

incident with the referee. Though Lafayette suggested that his behavior resulted from

his disability, that is of no moment: “[U]nder the ADA, workplace misconduct is a

legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for terminating employment, even when such

misconduct is related to a disability.” McElwee v. County of Orange,

(2d

Cir. 2012). Thus, Lafayette has failed to state an employment discrimination claim under

the ADA.

6 Second, the district court correctly held that Lafayette did not state an ADA claim

for failure to accommodate. Under Title III, discrimination includes “a failure to make

reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when . . . necessary [for

an] . . . individual[] with disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making such

modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of [its] . . . services.”

(b)(2)(A)(ii); see PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,

(2001). In the Title I

employment context:

To make out a prima facie disability discrimination case based upon a failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) plaintiff is a person with a disability under the meaning of the ADA; (2) an employer covered by the statute had notice of his disability; (3) with reasonable accommodation, plaintiff could perform the essential functions of the job at issue; and (4) the employer has refused to make such accommodations.

Tafolla v. Heilig,

(2d Cir. 2023) (citation modified).

Here, Lafayette did not allege what accommodation, or type of accommodation,

any of the defendants should have proactively offered him. And he does not allege that

any of the defendants refused any accommodation that he requested. To the contrary,

Lafayette alleged that Blueprint had previously granted him an accommodation excusing

him from “game bookkeeping duties.” Second Am. Compl. at 4, Lafayette v. Blueprint

Basketball, No. 23-CV-631,

(D. Vt. Mar. 31, 2025), Dkt. 24. Insofar as

Lafayette seeks to frame his request for excusal of his behavior in the incident with the

7 referee as an accommodation, a “requested accommodation that simply excuses past

misconduct is unreasonable as a matter of law.” McElwee,

. Because

Lafayette does not allege that any defendant refused to accommodate him, he has failed

to state a prima facie claim for failure to accommodate.

Third, the district court correctly concluded that Lafayette failed to state a

retaliation claim under the ADA.

[T]he elements of a retaliation claim under . . . the ADA are (i) a plaintiff was engaged in protected activity; (ii) the alleged retaliator knew that plaintiff was involved in protected activity; (iii) an adverse decision or course of action was taken against plaintiff; and (iv) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse action.”

Natofsky v. City of New York,

(2d Cir. 2019) (citation modified).

Even if Lafayette engaged in protected activity and suffered adverse actions, his

allegations failed to plausibly suggest a causal connection between the alleged protected

activity and adverse actions. Lafayette offered an attenuated and vague chain of events,

namely that he contacted Robertson, who then contacted Lafayette’s son’s coach, who in

turn accused Lafayette of lying and took various actions against his son. Although

Lafayette alleged that the coach took these actions after communicating with Robertson,

Lafayette did not offer any further details about what was communicated from Robertson

to the coach, what actions the coach took, or how those actions harmed Lafayette and his

8 son, apart from reducing his son’s playing time. In sum, Lafayette’s allegations of

retaliation do not “nudge[] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” and

therefore this claim also fails. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007).

We have considered all of Lafayette’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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