24-3078-cv Brown v. Montefiore Health Sys., Inc.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 23rd day of October, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY, JOSEPH F. BIANCO, BETH ROBINSON, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

IVALEE BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. 24-3078-cv

MONTEFIORE HEALTH SYSTEM, INC., doing business as Montefiore Medical Center, MIRIAM PAPPO, CORVEL INC, MARY-ANN LATOUR,

Defendants-Appellees. _____________________________________

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Tricia S. Lindsay, Esq., Mount Vernon, New York.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Emily Haigh and Joseph E. Field, Littler Mendelson, P.C., New York, New York. Appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York (Loretta A. Preska, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the orders of the district court, entered on September 17, 2024 and October 22,

2024, are AFFIRMED IN PART and VACATED IN PART, and the action is REMANDED to

the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order. 1

Plaintiff-Appellant Ivalee Brown appeals from the district court’s orders, granting the

motion to dismiss the amended complaint filed by Defendants-Appellees Montefiore Health

System, Inc., doing business as Montefiore Medical Center, and Miriam Pappo (collectively,

“Montefiore”), for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 2 Brown

asserted thirteen claims arising from her employment at Montefiore Medical Center (“MMC”) as

a registered dietician, including race discrimination claims pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (“Title VII”) and the New York State Human Rights Law,

1 As a preliminary matter, we note that the district court did not enter judgment as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a). “A failure to set forth a judgment or order on a separate document when required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a) does not affect the validity of an appeal from that judgment or order.” Fed R. App. P. 4(a)(7)(B). Where no judgment has been entered but the “district court announces a decision that would be appealable if immediately followed by the entry of judgment,” we will permit an appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2). FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Invs. Mortg. Ins. Co.,

(1991) (emphasis in original). Because the district court disposed of all of Brown’s claims and indicated that “[t]he Clerk of the Court shall mark this matter as closed,” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 59, we consider this a final decision under

. See Xeriant, Inc. v. Auctus Fund LLC,

, 410 n.5 (2d Cir. 2025). In addition, we consider this judgment to have been entered 150 days after the district court’s October 22, 2024, order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B), and deem the notice of appeal timely filed as of that date, see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). Therefore, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. 2 Moreover, to the extent that Brown also attempts to appeal the dismissal of her claims against Defendants- Appellees Corvel Inc. and Mary-Ann LaTour, Brown has failed to specifically address those claims in her appellate briefs and, thus, has waived any challenges to the district court’s dismissal of those claims. See Norton v. Sam’s Club,

(2d Cir. 1998) (“Issues not sufficiently argued in the briefs are considered waived and normally will not be addressed on appeal.”). Thus, we address only the dismissal of claims against Montefiore.

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et seq. (“NYSHRL”). 3 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to

explain our decision.

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). See

Moreira v. Société Générale, S.A.,

, 387 (2d Cir. 2025). A complaint survives a Rule

12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it alleges sufficient facts that, when taken as true and with all

reasonable inferences drawn in the plaintiff’s favor, state a plausible claim. See MacNaughton v.

Young Living Essential Oils, LC,

, 95 (2d Cir. 2023).

To the extent Brown challenges on appeal the district court’s dismissal of the non-

discrimination claims, the discrimination claims under

and 1983, her claims for

retaliation and disability discrimination under the NYSHRL, and her claims under the Americans

with Disabilities Act, we affirm for substantially the reasons articulated by the district court.

However, as set forth below, we conclude that the district court erred in determining that Brown

failed to allege plausible race discrimination claims under Title VII and NYSHRL based upon both

disparate treatment in connection with her termination and on a hostile work environment. 4

3 In addition to her claims under Title VII and NYSHRL, Brown brought claims for discrimination under

and 1983, “vicarious liability,” fraudulent misrepresentation, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, negligent supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, gross negligence, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 4 Historically, claims under the NYSHRL were evaluated using the same standard as Title VII. However, the statute was amended in 2019 to align the NYSHRL with the New York City Human Rights Law’s more liberal pleading standard. See

(requiring that the NYSHRL be “construed liberally for the accomplishment of the remedial purposes thereof”). Because we conclude that Brown plausibly alleged discrimination claims under the federal standard (as discussed infra), we reach the same conclusion under the more liberal NYSHRL pleading standard. 3 I. Disparate Treatment Claim

“[F]or a discrimination claim to survive a motion to dismiss, absent direct evidence of

discrimination, what must be plausibly supported by facts alleged in the complaint is that the

plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class, (2) was qualified, (3) suffered an adverse employment

action, and (4) has at least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated

by discriminatory intent.” Buon v. Spindler,

, 79 (2d Cir. 2023) (alterations adopted)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). There is no dispute that Brown (who is Black)

was a member of a protected class, that she was qualified for her position as a registered dietician,

and that her termination was an adverse employment action.

Thus, as the district court did, we focus on whether the allegations in the amended

complaint are sufficient to plausibly support that her termination was motivated by race or color.

“In making the plausibility determination, the court must be mindful of the elusive nature of

intentional discrimination” and that it may be “easily conceal[ed].” Vega v. Hempstead Union

Free School Dist.,

(2d Cir. 2015). As such, the plaintiff’s burden at this stage is

“minimal”: she need only allege facts that “give plausible support to a minimal inference of

discriminatory motivation.” Littlejohn v. City of New York,

(2015).

Brown alleges that her termination in 2022, after working at MMC for more than 20 years

(including as a registered dietician), was motivated by the racial animus of her supervisor, Miriam

Pappo, who is white. Although the district court held that Brown’s allegations were too conclusory

to support a plausible claim, we disagree. In particular, the amended complaint alleges, inter alia,

that: (1) Brown was the only Black employee in MMC’s Clinical Nutrition Department, App’x at

4; (2) Pappo, since being placed in her role as Director of the Department, has hired only one other

Black employee, despite numerous hires over the years, id.; (3) Pappo was enthusiastic about that

4 employee’s qualifications upon reviewing her written application materials, but after the applicant

arrived for her interview—thus revealing her race—Pappo instead opted to hire a less qualified

white male, id. at 5; (4) Pappo subsequently hired that Black applicant for a subordinate position

as a “relief” dietician only after receiving pressure from staff, id.; (5) another Black former

employee, who was terminated in 2019 and replaced by a white employee, also complained of

discrimination by Pappo, including that Pappo “pressured, intimidated, and discriminated against

her, failed to properly train her, and openly mocked and scolded her in front of other employees[,]”

which, according to Brown, was the “exact same treatment [she] was subjected to at the hands of

[Pappo],” id. at 26–27; and (6) Brown heard Pappo “disparag[e] communities which have [] largely

Black demographic[s] in favor of those with largely white demographic[s],” id. at 27. 5

The amended complaint further alleges that Pappo, motivated by this racial animus,

engaged in a campaign of harassment to prompt Brown’s termination, including refusing to allow

Brown to cover a particular colleague’s work shifts and offering those shifts to white dieticians,

refusing to provide Brown with the proper ergonomic workstation to accommodate her medical

needs resulting from a work-related injury, initially denying her the opportunity to serve as a

preceptor for New York University oncology interns while all other dieticians in the department

(who were white) served in that role, and submitting false information regarding Brown’s workers’

5 Although Montefiore asserts that “a plaintiff in a discrimination case cannot rely on allegations made by other employees as evidence to bolster their own discrimination claims,” Appellees’ Br. at 14, that assertion is incorrect. It is well settled that “[e]vidence relating to company-wide practices may reveal patterns of discrimination against a group of employees, increasing the likelihood that an employer’s offered explanation for an employment decision regarding a particular individual masks a discriminatory motive.” Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,

(2d Cir. 1990); see also Lieberman v. Gant,

, 68–69 (2d Cir. 1980) (noting that “[e]vidence of general patterns of discrimination by an employer is relevant even in an individual disparate treatment case”). Similarly, with respect to a hostile work environment claim, we have emphasized that, “because the crucial inquiry focuses on the nature of the workplace environment as a whole, a plaintiff who herself experiences discriminatory harassment need not be the target of other instances of hostility in order for those incidents to support her claim.” Whidbee v. Garzarelli Food Specialties, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2000) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 5 compensation case “in hopes that [Brown] would be terminated or resign.” App’x at 19; see

Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ.,

(2d Cir. 2009) (explaining that “an inference of

discriminatory intent may be derived from a variety of circumstances, including, but not limited

to: . . . the sequence of events leading to the plaintiff’s discharge” (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted)). “Because discrimination claims implicate an employer’s usually unstated intent

and state of mind, . . . rarely is there direct, smoking gun, evidence of discrimination.” Vega,

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As such, even if alleged “instances of

disparate treatment may not separately rise to the level of adverse employment actions, [a plaintiff]

is permitted to create a mosaic with the bits and pieces of available evidence that, taken together,

support a plausible inference of intentional discrimination.” Buon, 65 F.4th at 84 (alterations

adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); accord Vega, 801 F.3d at 86–87; see also

Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging for City of New York,

, 879 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Actions

taken by an employer that disadvantage an employee for no logical reason constitute strong

evidence of an intent to discriminate.”).

Taking these and other allegations in the amended complaint collectively, and construing

them in the light most favorable to Brown, we conclude that she has met the minimal burden of

alleging facts that give rise to a plausible inference of discrimination with respect to her

termination. See Vega,

(explaining that, at the motion to dismiss stage, “the question

is not whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail, but whether the well-pleaded factual allegations

plausibly give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e., whether plaintiffs allege enough

to ‘nudge their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” (alteration adopted)

(emphases omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007))).

6 II. Hostile Work Environment Claim

To state a hostile work environment claim, “a plaintiff must plead facts that would tend to

show that the complained of conduct: (1) is objectively severe or pervasive—that is, creates an

environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive; (2) creates an environment

that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile or abusive; and (3) creates such an environment

because of the plaintiff’s [protected class].” Patane v. Clark,

(2d Cir. 2007)

(per curiam) (alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Ultimately, to

avoid dismissal under [Rule] 12(b)(6), a plaintiff need only plead facts sufficient to support the

conclusion that she was faced with harassment of such quality or quantity that a reasonable

employee would find the conditions of her employment altered for the worse.”

(alteration

adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In considering whether a plaintiff has

stated a hostile work environment claim, “courts should examine the totality of the circumstances,

including: the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes

with the victim’s job performance.” Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth.,

(2d Cir. 2014) (alterations adopted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

In addition to the allegations summarized above in connection with the disparate treatment

claim, the amended complaint contains other allegations of Pappo’s treatment of Brown in support

of the hostile work environment claim based on her race. For example, it alleges that “[Brown]

was left out of research assignments, had duties and responsibilities removed from her without

notice, [and was] berated and demeaned before her colleagues.” App’x at 28. The amended

complaint further alleges that Brown was subject to “excessive scrutinization and micromanaging

of her work, actions[,] and whereabouts, [] isolation from her co-workers, [the] removal of duties

7 and responsibilities, [and the] denial of professional opportunities” which, “coupled with the

continuous denial of her rightfully earned benefits, [was] all a part of the ongoing discrimination

which [] created a very hostile work environment affecting [her] physical, mental and emotional”

condition.

If proven, the alleged conduct, when considered in its totality and construed in the

light most favorable to Brown, could plausibly be sufficiently pervasive or severe to constitute a

hostile work environment.

Moreover, although these alleged instances are not specifically linked to Plaintiff’s status

in a protected class (such as with specific alleged comments), it is well-settled that “[f]acially

neutral incidents may be included, of course, among the ‘totality of the circumstances’ that courts

consider in any hostile work environment claim.” Alfano v. Costello,

(2d Cir.

2002). Again, in reviewing the totality of the circumstances, especially where Brown alleges that

she and two other named Black co-workers were treated differently than similarly situated white

co-workers in a number of material respects, she has plausibly alleged that the alleged harassment

could be related to her status in a protected class, even if such status was not referenced specifically

by anyone in connection with the alleged conduct.

In sum, we conclude that Brown sufficiently alleged a plausible hostile work environment

claim.

* * *

Accordingly, we VACATE the orders of the district court insofar as they dismissed

Brown’s discrimination claims and AFFIRM the orders in all other respects. We REMAND this

action to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this order.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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