23-6613 Singh v. Bondi BIA Douchy, IJ A208 926 172

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of November, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, STEVEN J. MENASHI, MYRNA PÉREZ, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

JASVIR SINGH, Petitioner,

v. 23-6613 NAC PAMELA BONDI, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, Dalbir Singh & Associates, New York, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Jennifer R. Khouri, Senior Litigation Counsel; Robert P. Coleman III, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Jasvir Singh, a native and citizen of India, seeks review of a May

26, 2023, decision of the BIA affirming a June 18, 2019, decision of an Immigration

Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Jasvir Singh, No. A208 926

172 (B.I.A. May 26, 2023), aff’g No. A208 926 172 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. June 18, 2019).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural

history.

We review both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions “for the sake of

completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir.

2006). We review adverse credibility determinations “under the substantial

evidence standard.” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

(2d Cir. 2018).

2 “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable

adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

(b)(4)(B). Nevertheless, “an IJ’s reasons for finding an applicant not

credible [must] be both (1) supported by substantial evidence in the record and (2)

logically related to the applicant’s credibility.” Singh v. Garland,

, 426

(2d Cir. 2021).

“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a

trier of fact may base a credibility determination on . . . the consistency between

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made and

whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances under which the

statements were made), the internal consistency of each such statement, [and] the

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard to

whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the

applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.”

(b)(1)(B)(iii).

“We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality of the

circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an

adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

(2d Cir.

2008); accord Hong Fei Gao,

.

3 We conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse

credibility determination here. The agency reasonably found Singh not credible

based on multiple inconsistencies in his descriptions of his two alleged attacks.

See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr,

, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020)

(“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an alien from showing that an IJ

was compelled to find him credible. Multiple inconsistencies would so preclude

even more forcefully.”). First, as the IJ found, Singh was inconsistent about what

he was doing at the time of the first attack. In his application and testimony, he

stated that he was first attacked when he was riding his bike home from the city.

At his credible fear interview, however, he said he was first attacked while he was

putting up posters in a neighboring village, and that his attackers also tore down

his posters. Second, Singh was inconsistent about which attack resulted in him

receiving a broken shoulder, losing consciousness, and being hospitalized. In his

application and testimony, he stated that he sustained those injuries the first time

he was attacked, when he was returning home on his bike. But at his credible fear

interview, he associated those injuries with the second attack, on December 5,

2015, which he stated occurred as he was leaving his temple. And third, Singh

was inconsistent about which shoulder was broken. At his credible fear

4 interview, he said his left shoulder was broken, but Singh’s application and

hearing testimony indicated that he was treated at the hospital for a broken right

shoulder after the first attack.

When confronted with inconsistencies in his accounts, Singh denied that his

statements during the credible fear interview were different than his hearing

testimony, and said that his hearing testimony was correct. The agency was not

compelled to accept this explanation as it did not resolve the differences between

the interview record, application, and testimony. See Majidi v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible explanation

for his inconsistent statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a

reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). Taken together, these inconsistencies are neither

“trivial” nor “inconsequential,” and they are not readily susceptible to the

“innocent explanation” that Singh simply mixed up the dates of the two incidents.

Singh, 6 F.4th at 431. Rather, Singh associates specific, memorable details of his

injuries and hospitalizations with two entirely different events (being attacked on

the road returning home versus outside of his temple). We cannot say that these

inconsistencies have “little or no tendency to support a reasonable inference that

5 the petitioner has been untruthful.” Id. at 427.

Nor was the agency required to credit Petitioner’s explanation that he was

nervous and tired at his credible fear interview. We have specifically “reject[ed]

the notion that a petitioner’s claim that []he was nervous and distracted during the

credible fear interview automatically . . . negates its reliability as a source of h[is]

statements.” Ming Zhang v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2009).

Moreover, the x-rays Singh provided added further inconsistency. To

confirm that it was his right shoulder that was broken, Singh provided x-rays

dated March 3 and March 10, 2015, indicating a right shoulder injury. However,

he testified that he left the hospital on March 3 and was then treated at home by a

village doctor for three months. On cross-examination, Singh explained that he

returned to the hospital for a checkup on March 10, but his testimony was not

corroborated by other medical records, any prior statement by Singh, or

statements from family members, and it contradicted prior statements by Singh

and his father that he left the hospital on March 3 because they could not afford

further treatment at the hospital. Although “omissions are less probative of

credibility than inconsistencies created by direct contradictions in evidence and

testimony,” they “must still be weighed in light of the totality of the circumstances

6 and in the context of the record as a whole.” Hong Fei Gao,

.

Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency reasonably relied on his

lack of reliable corroborating evidence. “An applicant’s failure to corroborate his

or her testimony may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in

general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already been

called into question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2007). As

the IJ noted, the affidavit from Singh’s father and a letter from his doctor did not

confirm Singh’s statements that surgery was recommended, the x-ray from March

10 conflicted with his statements that he could not afford further treatment at the

hospital, and none of the evidence resolved his inconsistent statement that his left

shoulder was broken. See Y.C. v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2013) (“We

defer to the agency’s determination of the weight afforded to an alien’s

documentary evidence.”). Furthermore, the agency reasonably accorded limited

weight to affidavits from friends, family, and others who live in Singh’s village

because several of the affiants were interested parties, and none was available for

cross-examination. See Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 149 (“[T]he IJ acted within her

discretion in according [the affidavits] little weight because the declarants

(particularly [the petitioner]’s wife) were interested parties and neither was

7 available for cross-examination.”).

The above inconsistencies and lack of reliable corroboration constitute

substantial evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See

(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao, 968 F.3d at 145 n.8; Xiu Xia Lin,

; Biao

Yang,

. The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of

asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms of relief

are based on the same factual predicate. See Hong Fei Gao,

(“Where

the same factual predicate underlies a petitioner’s claims for asylum, withholding

of removal, and protection under the CAT, an adverse credibility determination

forecloses all three forms of relief.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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