24-771 Samarov v. Bondi BIA Reid, IJ A220 640 443

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of November, two thousand 4 twenty-five. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 MICHAEL H. PARK, 8 BETH ROBINSON, 9 MYRNA PÉREZ, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 SUHROB MUKHIDINOVICH 14 SAMAROV, 15 Petitioner, 16 17 v. 24-771 18 NAC 19 PAMELA BONDI, UNITED STATES 20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 21 Respondent. 22 23 24 1 _____________________________________ 2 3 FOR PETITIONER: David Molot, Law Office of David Molot, 4 New York, NY. 5 6 FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant 7 Attorney General; Nancy E. Friedman, Senior 8 Litigation Counsel; Sharon M. Clay, Trial 9 Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, 10 United States Department of Justice, 11 Washington, DC.

12 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

13 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

14 DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

15 Petitioner Suhrob Mukhidinovich Samarov, a native and citizen of

16 Uzbekistan, seeks review of a February 23, 2024, decision of the BIA affirming a

17 May 31, 2022, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying his application for

18 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

19 (“CAT”). In re Suhrob Mukhidinovich Samarov, No. A220 640 443 (B.I.A. Feb. 23,

20 2024), aff’g No. A220 640 443 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. May 31, 2022). We assume the

21 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

22 Under the circumstances, we have considered both the IJ’s and BIA’s

23 decisions. See Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,

(2d Cir. 2006).

2 1 We review the agency’s factual findings for substantial evidence and questions of

2 law de novo. See Yanqin Weng v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2009). “[T]he

3 administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

4 would be compelled to conclude to the contrary[.]”

(b)(4)(B).

5 “We consider abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an

6 appellant’s brief, and an appellant’s failure to make legal or factual arguments

7 constitutes abandonment.” Debique v. Garland,

, 684 (2d Cir. 2023)

8 (quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (providing that “the

9 argument” in an appellant’s brief “must contain . . . appellant’s contentions and

10 the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on

11 which the appellant relies”). In his brief, Samarov states the law, quotes

12 testimony, closing statements, and the IJ’s decision in his case, and restates his

13 claims for asylum and withholding of removal, but he does not identify a legal or

14 factual error in the agency’s decisions or even restate his CAT claim and thus has

15 abandoned review of all forms of relief. See Debique, 58 F.4th at 684–85 (finding

16 petitioner abandoned any arguments by failing to “state the issue and advance an

3 1 argument”). 1

2 Even considering Samarov’s conclusory statements that his past harms

3 cumulatively rose to the level of persecution, that he was persecuted because of

4 his ethnicity, and that there is a pattern or practice of persecution of Tajiks, see

5 Petitioner’s Br. at 24–26, the agency did not err. As the agency found, even

6 considered cumulatively, the harassment Samarov’s children faced, his inability

7 to file a second complaint in the case of the theft of his car, his two-day detention

8 in the customs offices without physical harm, and being hit twice by a loan shark’s

9 assistant did not rise to the level of persecution because he was not severely beaten

10 or injured. See Beskovic v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing

11 that the difference between harassment and persecution must be assessed in the

12 context of mistreatment, where any physical degradation intended to cause pain,

13 humiliation, or suffering can rise to persecution if it occurs during an arrest or

14 detention based on a protected ground); Mei Fun Wong v. Holder,

, 72

15 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include every

1 We note that the brief submitted by Samarov’s attorney, David Molot, is inadequate and warn that future briefing of this quality may result in discipline. Error cannot be shown by simply repeating the agency’s conclusions and changing words in them. Compare Petitioner’s Br. at 25, with Certified Administrative Record at 5 (BIA Dec.). 4 1 sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.” (quotation marks omitted)); cf.

2 Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2011) (finding no error in the

3 agency’s determination that an alien failed to establish past persecution when

4 “prior to his arrest and detention by local police, he suffered only minor bruising

5 from an altercation with family planning officials, which required no formal

6 medical attention and had no lasting physical effect”). Because Samarov did not

7 demonstrate past persecution, he was not entitled to a presumption of a well-

8 founded fear of persecution. See

(b)(1).

9 The agency did not err in finding that Samarov failed to establish that the

10 harms he suffered and his fears of future harm were or would be on account of his

11 Tajik ethnicity. Samarov was required to establish that his Tajik ethnicity was “at

12 least one central reason” that motivated the alleged persecution. See Quituizaca v.

13 Garland,

, 105 (2d Cir. 2022). The IJ’s conclusion that Samarov failed

14 to establish that his Tajik ethnicity was not “the one central reason” for the alleged

15 persecution, however, imposed an incorrect and overly stringent standard. See

16 Acharya v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2014) (applying an “incorrect and

17 overly stringent legal standard” in requiring the petitioner to prove his political

18 opinion was “the central reason” for persecution). In any event, the BIA correctly

5 1 recognized that Samarov’s ethnicity does not need to be the central reason for the

2 harm, but only at least one central reason.

3 Applying the correct standard here, Samarov did not testify or present

4 direct or circumstantial evidence that customs and court officials prevented him

5 from leaving customs offices and fined him on account of his ethnicity rather than

6 for violating import laws, and he testified that the loan shark assaulted him

7 because he failed to repay a debt. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias,

(1992)

8 (“But since the statute makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence of it,

9 direct or circumstantial.”); Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales,

(2d Cir.

10 2005) (holding that an asylum “applicant must . . . show, through direct or

11 circumstantial evidence, that the persecutor’s motive to persecute arises from [a

12 protected ground].”); Melgar de Torres v. Reno,

(2d Cir. 1999)

13 (“[G]eneral crime conditions are not a stated ground” for asylum). Ultimately,

14 Samarov failed to provide evidence that he was or would be singled out for

15 persecution on account of a protected ground. See

(b)(1)(B)(i),

16 1231(b)(3)(A); Yueqing Zhang,

, 547–48.

17 The agency also did not err in concluding that Samarov failed to establish a

18 pattern or practice of persecution of Tajiks in Uzbekistan. Country conditions

6 1 evidence reflects that millions of Tajiks live in Uzbekistan and enjoy equal rights,

2 and that violence and discrimination against ethnic minorities are rare. See

3

(b)(2)(iii) (providing that an asylum applicant need not show a

4 well-founded fear of being “singled out” for persecution if “[t]he applicant

5 establishes that there is a pattern or practice in his or her country of nationality . .

6 . of persecution of a group of persons similarly situated”); Mufied v. Mukasey, 508

, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing as reasonable the “systemic, pervasive,

8 or organized” standard for finding a pattern or practice of persecution).

9 In sum, the agency reasonably found that Samarov did not satisfy his

10 burden for asylum or withholding of removal because he failed to show that he

11 suffered past persecution or that he has an objectively reasonable fear of future

12 persecution on account of his ethnicity. See

(b)(1)(B)(i),

13 1231(b)(3)(A);

(b), 1208.16(b).

14 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

15 motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

16 FOR THE COURT: 17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 18 Clerk of Court

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