24-65 Pulla-Inga v. Bondi BIA London, IJ A216 780 335/254

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of November, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, Chief Judge, JON O. NEWMAN, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

NUBE ALEXANDRA PULLA-INGA, E. J. CHABLA-PULLA, Petitioners,

v. 24-65 NAC PAMELA BONDI, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent.*

* The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above. _____________________________________ FOR PETITIONERS: Usman B. Ahmad, Esq., Long Island City, NY.

FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Cindy S. Ferrier, Assistant Director; Sarai M. Aldana, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation, United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioners Nube Alexandra Pulla-Inga and her son, natives and citizens of

Ecuador, seek review of a December 7, 2023, decision of the BIA affirming a

September 8, 2022, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum and

withholding of removal. 1 In re Nube Alexandra Pulla-Inga, Nos. A 216 780 335/254

(B.I.A. Dec. 7, 2023), aff’g Nos. A 216 780 335/254 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Sept. 8, 2022).

We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural

history.

1We do not address relief under the Convention Against Torture because Pulla- Inga has not addressed that form of relief in her brief. See Debique v. Garland,

(2d Cir. 2023) (“consider[ing] abandoned any claims not adequately presented in an appellant’s brief” (quotation marks omitted)).

2 We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA and thus do not

consider Pulla-Inga’s arguments that her proposed social groups are cognizable

because the BIA did not rely on that ground in affirming the IJ’s decision. See

Alvarez v. Garland,

, 637–38 (2d Cir. 2022). We review factual findings

for substantial evidence and questions of law and application of law to fact de novo.

See Yanqin Weng v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2009). “[T]he administrative

findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude to the contrary.”

(b)(4)(B).

“The burden of proof is on the applicant [for asylum and withholding of

removal to] establish that . . . race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular

social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for

persecuting the applicant.”

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see Quituizaca v. Garland,

, 109–14 (2d Cir. 2022) (holding that the “one central reason” standard

applies to both asylum and withholding of removal). An applicant must prove

“a sufficiently strong nexus” between the suffered harm and a protected ground.

Castro v. Holder,

(2d Cir. 2010). “Whether the requisite nexus

exists depends on the views and motives of the persecutor.” Paloka v. Holder,

, 196–97 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted).

3 Pulla-Inga has abandoned her social group claims by not addressing

whether the agency erred in finding that she failed to establish a nexus between

the social groups and the harm suffered. See Debique,

. And an

applicant has the burden to demonstrate both that the groups are cognizable and

that there is a nexus between the groups and the harm suffered or feared. See

Paloka,

. Even if we were to reach the nexus determination, we

would find no error. Pulla-Inga points out that her son was targeted by gang

members at soccer practice when other players were not, but she testified that he

was targeted because the gang wanted him to sell drugs, which does not establish

that he was targeted because of his membership in a particular social group. See

(“To succeed on a particular social group claim, the applicant must establish

that . . . the alleged persecutors targeted the applicant ‘on account of’ [his]

membership in that group.”); see also Garcia-Aranda v. Garland,

(2d

Cir. 2022) (finding persecution was not on account of family-based social group

when applicant’s family was targeted by a gang for monetary gain).

The agency also did not err in finding that Pulla-Inga failed to establish a

fear of harm based on a political opinion. Pulla-Inga testified that her son was

asked to sell drugs, he refused because he did not want to be involved in the drug

4 trade, and he was then assaulted and threatened for his refusal to participate.

“[O]pposition to criminal elements such as gangs, even when such opposition

incurs the enmity of these elements, does not thereby become political opposition

simply by virtue of the gang’s reaction.” Zelaya-Moreno v. Wilkinson,

(2d Cir. 2021). Put another way, “disapproving of things that have a negative

impact on one’s life or even one’s country does not necessarily amount to a political

opinion.”

Because the nexus findings are dispositive of asylum and

withholding of removal, we do not reach the agency’s alternative conclusion that

Pulla-Inga failed to establish that the authorities were unable or unwilling to

protect her and her son from gang members. See INS v. Bagamasbad,

(1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings

on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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