Cecere v. Canisius University
Cecere v. Canisius University
Opinion
25-798-cv Cecere v. Canisius University UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of November, two thousand twenty-five. Present: SUSAN L. CARNEY, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ WILLIAM CECERE IV, Plaintiff- Appellant, v. 25-798-cv CANISIUS UNIVERSITY, FKA CANISIUS COLLEGE, DR. AIMEE LARSON,
Defendants-Appellees.
_____________________________________
For Plaintiff-Appellant: Steven Cohen, Tiveron Law PLLC, Amherst, NY.
For Defendants-Appellees: Thomas S. D’Antonio, Hodgson Russ LLP, Rochester, NY.
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of New
York (Elizabeth A. Wolford, Chief Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant William Cecere IV appeals from a judgment of the United States
District Court for the Western District of New York (Elizabeth A. Wolford, Chief Judge) entered
on March 5, 2025. Cecere was dismissed from the Physician Assistant (“PA”) Program at Canisius
University based on his failure to get vaccinated against COVID-19, or to secure a clinical
placement that would recognize his medical exemption from the vaccine requirement, in order to
complete his clinical studies. He brought suit in New York state court against Defendants-
Appellees Canisius University and Dr. Aimee Larson, the Director of the PA Program, alleging
that he was unable to get a COVID-19 vaccine because he had previously suffered adverse effects
from other vaccines; that this inability constituted a disability; and that his dismissal from the PA
Program constituted a violation of his rights under state law as well as under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 12182. The Defendants removed the case to federal court.
The district court dismissed Cecere’s ADA claim with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Cecere failed to plausibly allege a qualifying disability or
that any of his major life activities was substantially limited by the alleged disability. It then
remanded the state-law claims to state court. Cecere now appeals, challenging the dismissal of his
ADA claim. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the case.
2 We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
Kellogg v. Nichols,
149 F.4th 155, 159 (2d Cir. 2025). 1 In doing so, “[w]e consider the facts
alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents
incorporated by reference in the complaint.” Santos v. Kimmel,
154 F.4th 30, 33 (2d Cir. 2025).
This includes documents upon which the complaint heavily relies and which are therefore integral
to the complaint. See Pearson v. Gesner,
125 F.4th 400, 406 (2d Cir. 2025). A complaint must
be construed liberally, with all factual allegations accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences
drawn in the plaintiff’s favor. See Clark v. Hanley,
89 F.4th 78, 90-91(2d Cir. 2023). Even so, a
complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level” and contain more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555(2007).
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate: “(1) that she is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that the defendants are
subject to [the ADA]; and (3) that she was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from
defendants’ services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by
defendants, by reason of her disability.” Dean v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical
Scis.,
804 F.3d 178, 187(2d Cir. 2015). For purposes of the ADA, Congress has defined a
“disability” to include, as relevant here, “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities.”
42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A).
Here, Cecere’s ADA claim fails at the threshold step because—even assuming (without
deciding) that an allergy to any or all COVID-19 vaccines can constitute a qualifying disability
1 Unless otherwise indicated, when quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases,
footnotes, and citations are omitted.
3 under the ADA—Cecere’s amended complaint fails to plausibly allege that he has any such
allergy. Cecere’s amended complaint contains the conclusory allegation that “Plaintiff was
disabled due to his inability to receive the COVID-19 vaccine.” Joint App’x at 19. 2 But Cecere
supplies no factual allegations that are sufficient to support that assertion. At most, Cecere alleges
that he has experienced allergic reactions to other vaccines in the past. He does not, however,
allege any non-speculative factual basis for inferring that his reactions to these other vaccines
would be replicated if he were to receive a COVID-19 vaccine.
In his amended complaint, Cecere alleges that after receiving the meningococcal vaccine
in December 2020, he experienced pain down his spine that limited his ability to move and caused
him to have difficulty breathing. He alleged that his mother (a dentist) gave him Benadryl, which
she chose because Cecere had suffered “an anaphylaxis reaction to Motrin (Ibuprofen) when he
was little.” Joint App’x at 8. He further alleged that he had suffered “other adverse
reactions . . . in childhood from other vaccinations and medications,” Joint App’x at 10, although
he did not further specify what sort of reactions they were, or which vaccinations or medications
had triggered them. Fearful that these symptoms would return if he received a COVID-19 vaccine,
Cecere sought a medical exemption so he could complete the clinical phase of the PA Program at
Canisius. His original doctor, who administered the meningococcal vaccine, declined to provide
him such an exemption letter, and Canisius rejected a medical exemption letter written by Cecere’s
mother. In December 2021, Cecere met with a new primary care provider, Dr. Kevin Cleary, who
wrote him a medical exemption letter (to which Cecere refers in his amended complaint, and which
2 Cecere’s amended complaint does contain the allegation that Canisius “failed to honor plaintiff’s allergic reaction to the COVID-19 vaccination.” Joint App’x at 19. But because Cecere expressly alleges that he never received any COVID-19 vaccine, it is impossible that he had an allergic reaction to such a vaccine. We therefore cannot accept this allegation as true, even construing Cecere’s amended complaint liberally.
4 the district court therefore properly consulted on the motion to dismiss). This letter consists of a
single sentence: “William Cecere has had prior severe allergic reactions to vaccines, including
viral vaccines and is unable to get the covid 19 vaccine.” Joint App’x at 149. Dr. Cleary’s letter
does not state that Cecere has an allergy to one or more COVID-19 vaccines; nor does it state that
Cecere would likely have an allergic reaction to any COVID-19 vaccine that would be the same
(or even similar) to the reaction he had to the meningococcal vaccine or to any other previous
vaccines. Such a vague and conclusory statement about other unspecified vaccines and reactions
is insufficient to plausibly allege that Cecere was, in fact, allergic to COVID-19 vaccines; it was
therefore also insufficient to raise Cecere’s right to relief under the ADA above the speculative
level. See Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Cecere’s
amended complaint.
Because we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Cecere failed to adequately allege
that he was in fact allergic to COVID-19 vaccines, we need not reach the district court’s alternative
basis for dismissal—namely, that Cecere also failed to allege that any of his major life activities
was substantially limited by the alleged disability.
We have considered Cecere’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the
foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5
Reference
- Status
- Unpublished