22-2317
Alessi Equip., Inc. v. Am. Piledriving Equip., Inc.



                             United States Court of Appeals
                                For the Second Circuit

                                                  August Term 2023

                                          Argued: November 7, 2023
                                          Decided: November 21, 2025

                                                      No. 22-2317


                                              ALESSI EQUIPMENT, INC.,

                                     Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellee,

                                                          v.

                                AMERICAN PILEDRIVING EQUIPMENT, INC.,

                                   Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellant.

                          Appeal from the United States District Court
                             for the Southern District of New York
                      No. 18-cv-3976, Judith C. McCarthy, Magistrate Judge.


Before:             WALKER, RAGGI, SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges.

        American Piledriving Equipment, Inc. (“APE”), a manufacturer of
construction equipment, appeals from the amended December 30, 2022 judgment
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(McCarthy, M.J.) awarding damages, including pre-judgment interest, to APE’s
distributor, Alessi Equipment, Inc. (“Alessi”), for breach of a distribution
agreement executed by the parties in 2012 (the “2012 Distributor Agreement”). On
January 6, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment against APE as to
liability on Alessi’s claim for breach of the 2012 Distributor Agreement, and in
favor of APE as to liability and damages on its breach-of-contract counterclaim
against Alessi. A jury thereafter awarded Alessi $920,846.70 in damages arising
from APE’s breach. The district court later denied APE’s motion for judgment as
a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), or in the
alternative, for a new trial or remittitur pursuant to Rule 59(a). The district court
also awarded Alessi pre-judgment interest over APE’s objection that Alessi’s
request for such interest was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

       In a summary order filed today, we reject APE’s challenges on appeal to the
district court’s grant of summary judgment as to liability on Alessi’s breach-of-
contract claim, as well as its denial of APE’s post-trial motion under Rule 50(b) and
Rule 59(a). Here, we address APE’s argument that the district court erred in
awarding Alessi prejudgment interest and conclude that Alessi’s motion for that
interest pursuant to Rule 59(e) was timely filed. Specifically, we hold that the
purported judgment entered by the district court on June 23, 2022 was not
sufficiently “final,” and thus did not trigger the 28-day deadline for filing the Rule
59(e) motion, because it omitted any reference to APE’s successful counterclaim or
to the award of prejudgment interest to which each party was entitled, and did not
satisfy the requirements for the entry of a judgment under Rule 58. We therefore
AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to its award of prejudgment interest
to Alessi.

      AFFIRMED.

                                      BRIAN D. WALLER, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.,
                                      New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant.

                                      KRISTOPHER M. DENNIS, The Law Office of
                                      Kristopher M. Dennis, New York, NY (Keith
                                      A. Lavallee, Lavallee Law Offices PLLC,
                                      Farmingdale, NY, on the brief), for Plaintiff-
                                      Appellee.

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judge:

      American Piledriving Equipment, Inc. (“APE”), a manufacturer of

construction equipment, appeals from the amended December 30, 2022 judgment

                                          2
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

(McCarthy, M.J.) awarding damages, including pre-judgment interest, to APE’s

distributor, Alessi Equipment, Inc. (“Alessi”), for breach of a distribution

agreement executed by the parties in 2012 (the “2012 Distributor Agreement”). 1

On January 6, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment against APE as

to liability on Alessi’s claim for breach of the 2012 Distributor Agreement and in

favor of APE as to liability and damages on its breach-of-contract counterclaim

against Alessi. A jury thereafter awarded Alessi $920,846.70 in damages arising

from APE’s breach. The district court later denied APE’s motion for judgment as

a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), or in the

alternative, for a new trial or remittitur pursuant to Rule 59(a). The district court

also awarded Alessi pre-judgment interest over APE’s objection that Alessi’s

request for such interest was untimely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e).

       In a summary order filed today, we reject APE’s challenges on appeal to the

district court’s grant of summary judgment as to liability on Alessi’s breach-of-

contract claim, as well as its denial of APE’s post-trial motion under Rule 50(b) and

Rule 59(a). Here, we address APE’s argument that the district court erred in


1Magistrate Judge McCarthy handled the case for all purposes with the consent of the parties
pursuant to 

(c).
                                             3
awarding Alessi prejudgment interest and conclude that Alessi’s motion for that

interest pursuant to Rule 59(e) was timely filed. Specifically, we hold that the

purported judgment entered by the district court on June 23, 2022 was not

sufficiently “final,” and thus did not trigger the 28-day deadline for filing the Rule

59(e) motion, because it omitted any reference to APE’s successful counterclaim or

to the award of prejudgment interest to which each party was entitled, and did not

satisfy the requirements for the entry of a judgment under Rule 58. We therefore

AFFIRM the judgment of the district court as to its award of prejudgment interest

to Alessi.

                                I.    BACKGROUND

      Alessi commenced this action in May 2018, alleging, among other things,

that APE breached the 2012 Distributor Agreement by selling equipment covered

by that agreement directly to third parties.       After Alessi filed an amended

complaint on July 24, 2018, APE filed an answer and asserted counterclaims

against Alessi on March 19, 2019, alleging breach of contract and unjust

enrichment arising from Alessi’s failure to remit payment to APE for amounts

owed under a rental agreement entered into by the parties in January 2016 (the

“Rental Agreement”), as well as for various purchases that Alessi made from APE



                                          4
between November 2016 and December 2017 (the “Purchase Agreements”). As

relief, APE requested damages equaling the amounts owed under those

agreements – a total of $52,505.92 – as well as “[s]tatutory interest accruing on

Alessi’s indebtedness . . . from the date of its default through the present.” Dist.

Ct. Doc. No. 36 at 23.

      After the completion of discovery, the parties consented to have the case

heard by a magistrate judge, and then each moved for summary judgment. On

January 6, 2022, the district court granted summary judgment as to liability on

Alessi’s contract claim for breach of the 2012 Distributor Agreement, but

concluded that the issue of damages would have to be decided at trial. At the same

time, the district court granted summary judgment to APE with respect to both

liability and damages on its breach-of-contract counterclaim regarding Alessi’s

failure to remit payment under the Rental Agreement and Purchase Agreements.

Finally, the court dismissed all remaining claims and counterclaims.

      After a four-day trial held in June 2022, the jury returned a verdict awarding

Alessi $920,846.70 in damages flowing from APE’s breach of the 2012 Distributor

Agreement. Shortly thereafter, on June 15, 2022, the district court recognized that

“[b]efore the Clerk of Court can determine prejudgment interest, the Court must



                                         5
determine the date from which prejudgment interest shall be computed.” Dist. Ct.

Doc. No. 175 (citing 

(b)). The district court therefore “directed

[the parties] to advise the [c]ourt of their positions” on that issue by June 22, 2022.

 The parties timely complied with that order, submitting letters that offered

competing methods of calculating prejudgment interest. 2

       On June 23, 2022, the district court issued a document labeled a “Judgment”

and directed the Clerk of Court to close the case (the “June 23, 2022 Judgment”).

That “judgment” indicated that Alessi was entitled to an award of $920,846.70 in

damages on its breach-of-contract claim but made no mention of the fact that APE

had prevailed on its breach-of-contract counterclaim for $52,505.92, or that either

party was entitled to pre-judgment interest. In fact, the only indication that APE’s

counterclaims had been resolved was contained in a footnote stating that the

district court had “decided all other remaining claims in its January 6, 2022”

summary judgment ruling. Dist. Ct. Doc. 178 at 2 n.2. The June 23, 2022 Judgment

also omitted any mention of either pre- or post-judgment interest with respect to

Alessi’s damages award, even though Alessi had already applied for such an




2In its letter, APE indicated its intent to move for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59 and asked that the district court “refrain from calculating prejudgment interest until
after determination of” that motion. Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 177 at 1.
                                                6
award; the court’s June 15, 2022 order recognized Alessi’s statutory entitlement to

prejudgment interest; and the parties had complied with the court’s directive to

file letters stating their positions as to the start date for calculating interest owed.

Instead of ruling on the pending prejudgment interest issue, however, the district

court, in a separate order entered on the same day, directed Alessi to file a motion

under Rule 59(e) to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest with its

preferred computation.

      Two weeks later, on July 7, 2022, at APE’s request, the district court issued

a separate “judgment” memorializing that APE had prevailed on its breach-of-

contract counterclaim, for which it was entitled to damages in the amount of

$52,505.92 (the “July 7, 2022 Judgment”). This “judgment” again made no mention

of pre- or post-judgment interest on the counterclaim. Instead, as it had done with

respect to the June 23, 2022 Judgment, the district court simultaneously entered an

order directing APE to pursue prejudgment interest through a separate Rule 59(e)

motion to amend the judgment.

      On July 21, 2022, APE moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

50(b) for judgment as a matter of law, or for a new trial or remittitur pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a) on the grounds that the jury’s verdict was



                                           7
excessive and unsupported by the evidence at trial. On July 31, 2022, Alessi

submitted a motion and brief pursuant to Rule 59(e) in support of its request for

prejudgment interest on its damages award. Three days later, APE submitted its

own motion for prejudgment interest on its lesser award for counterclaim

damages. APE also opposed Alessi’s motion for prejudgment interest, contending

that such a motion was untimely because it was filed more than twenty-eight days

after entry of the June 23, 2022 Judgment, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

      The district court ultimately denied APE’s motion for judgment as a matter

of law and for a new trial. Later, on December 30, 2022, the district court entered

a single, comprehensive “amended judgment” that set out both Alessi’s and APE’s

respective damages awards and calculated prejudgment interest amounts for each

party (the “December 30, 2022 Amended Judgment”).              This timely appeal

followed.

                                II.    DISCUSSION

      APE argues that the district court erred by granting Alessi’s motion under

Rule 59(e) to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest. A motion

pursuant to Rule 59(e) “must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the

judgment,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and a court may not grant an extension to file such



                                          8
a motion, Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). APE maintains that Alessi’s July 31, 2022 motion

was untimely because it was not filed within twenty-eight days of June 23, 2022,

when the district court entered “judgment” with respect to Alessi’s breach-of-

contract claims. That “judgment,” in APE’s view, constituted the final judgment

in this matter, thereby starting the clock on Alessi’s ability to move under Rule

59(e). Alessi, in response, asserts that its motion was timely filed after the district

court’s   subsequent    entry    of   “judgment”     on   APE’s    breach-of-contract

counterclaims on July 7, 2022.

      At the outset, we note two uncontroversial aspects of the parties’ dispute

here. First, neither party contests that, save for the question of timeliness, Alessi

was entitled to some measure of prejudgment interest on its damages award.

Under New York law, “pre[]judgment interest is recoverable as a matter of right

in an action at law for breach of contract.” Lee v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 

 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing 

(a), 5002). Prejudgment

interest consists of both “pre-decision interest,” which applies from the time that

a plaintiff’s cause of action accrues to the time a verdict or decision is rendered

under section 5001(a); and “post-decision interest,” which applies “from the date

of the verdict . . . to the date of entry of final judgment” under section 5002.



                                          9
Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 

 (2d Cir. 1994). Second, both the

Supreme Court and this Circuit have recognized that a Rule 59(e) motion to amend

the judgment is an appropriate vehicle for a party to request the prejudgment

interest to which it may be entitled. See, e.g., Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 

, 177 & n.3 (1989); Lee, 592 F.2d at 42–44; Goodman v. Heublein, Inc., 

 (2d Cir. 1982). 3

        The only question, then, is whether Alessi’s July 31, 2022 motion for interest

was timely, which in turn depends on when the twenty-eight-day clock under

Rule 59(e) began to run. Although the parties devote little space in their briefs to

this issue, their dispute touches on procedurally complex, and often interrelated,

questions regarding the meaning of “judgment,” “finality,” and the “entry” of

judgment as those terms are used in relation to post-judgment motions. We



3In Osterneck, the Supreme Court held that “a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment
interest constitutes a motion to alter or amend the judgment under [Rule] 59(e).” 

(emphasis added). But the Osterneck Court added in a footnote, “We do not believe the result
should be different where prejudgment interest is available as a matter of right,” i.e., mandatory.

 at 176 n.3. We have not yet expressly passed on the import of Osterneck as it relates to the
question of mandatory prejudgment interest, and Alessi does not contest that Rule 59(e) motions
can support post-judgment requests for interest. But every circuit to have considered the issue
has concluded that the Supreme Court’s holding applies to both discretionary and mandatory
prejudgment interest alike. See Winslow v. FERC, 

, 1135–36 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Crowe
v. Bolduc, 

 (1st Cir. 2004); Kosnoski v. Howley, 

 (4th Cir. 1994); Pogor
v. Makita U.S.A., Inc., 

 (6th Cir. 1998); McCalla v. Royal MacCabees Life Ins. Co., 

 (9th Cir. 2004); McNickle v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 

, 682 (10th Cir.
1989).
                                                  10
endeavor to untangle these concepts below and ultimately agree with Alessi that

its motion for prejudgment interest was timely.

A.    Judgment, Finality, and Entry of Judgment

      Judgment: We begin with the term “judgment,” which Rule 54 defines as

“any order from which an appeal lies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a). Rule 54(b) goes on

to explain what happens when a court adjudicates fewer than all claims in “an

action [that] presents more than one claim for relief” or “multiple parties are

involved.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). In those actions, like the case between Alessi and

APE here,

      the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
      fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines
      that there is no just reason for delay. Otherwise, any order or other
      decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
      claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does
      not end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised
      at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims
      and all the parties’ rights and liabilities.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). In short, adjudication of “fewer than all” the claims at issue

in a case is simply not a “judgment” unless the district court makes an express

determination that there is no just reason for delay. Id.

      Finality: A “final” decision is one “that ends the litigation on the merits and

leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.” Bey v. City of New


                                         

 F.3d 157, 163 (2d Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted); Citizens

Accord, Inc. v. Town of Rochester, 

 (2d Cir. 2000) (“A ‘final’ judgment

or order is one that conclusively determines the pending claims of all the parties

to the litigation.”).   In most instances, the question of finality is relatively

straightforward, and neither the parties nor the courts (district or appellate) have

any trouble determining that the litigation is over. But on those occasions when it

is not, “we eschew formalism in favor of a pragmatic approach” and “look to

whether, following the district court’s decision, further proceedings are

contemplated or required.”       Bey, 999 F.3d at 163 (internal quotation marks

omitted); see also Fiataruolo v. United States, 

 (2d Cir. 1993) (“What

essentially is required is some clear and unequivocal manifestation by the trial

court of its belief that the decision made, so far as it is concerned, is the end of the

case.”). To be sure, “a district court’s intent, standing alone, is not sufficient to

confer finality upon every decision,” but instead “is relevant . . . only when the

court’s rulings reveal that the action could be final and it therefore matters whether

the trial judge contemplated further proceedings.” Mead v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co.,

 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations accepted and internal quotation marks

omitted).



                                          12
       Generally speaking, a judgment is not final if it has not determined the

amounts the parties must pay, see Cinerama, Inc. v. Sweet Music, S.A., 

(2d Cir. 1973), except in cases that require no more than a “simple arithmetic

calculation” or “some other mechanical task,” Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea

Boliviana, 

 (2d Cir. 1996). Notably, and as particularly relevant

here, we have held that a judgment is not final when “the court has determined

part of the damages, [such as] the principal, but has reserved, as raising fact issues,

the amount of prejudgment interest,” since calculation of interest is not considered

a “purely ministerial act.” See Cinerama, 482 F.2d at 69–70 (treating undetermined

claim for prejudgment interest as separable from claim for principal would violate

final judgment rule). 4 This makes sense, since “prejudgment interest traditionally

has been considered part of the compensation due plaintiff.” Osterneck, 

. Moreover, the calculation of prejudgment interest generally “implicates

the merits of the district court’s judgment” because questions of “[whether] and

how much prejudgment interest should be granted” are often “intertwined in a



4Our sister Circuits have likewise concluded that “[a] judgment that awards a principal sum but
reserves the matter of interest on that amount is not final.” Wheeler Mach. Co. v. Mountain States
Min. Enters., Inc., 

, 789–90 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing Cinerama, Inc., 

); see
also, e.g., Dieser v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 

, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2006) (same); Calderon v. GEICO
Gen. Ins. Co., 

, 204–07 (4th Cir. 2014) (same); Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n v. Lipman, 

 (7th Cir. 1995) (same).
                                                 13
significant way with the merits of the plaintiff’s primary case as well as the extent

of his damages.” 

 at 175–77 & n.3.

      Entry and Rendition of a Judgment: Finally, Rule 58 governs when and how a

judgment is entered, and what form it must take. Under Rule 58(c)(2), “judgment

is entered . . . when the judgment is entered in the civil docket under Rule 79(a)

and the earlier of these events occurs: (A) it is set out in a separate document; or

(B) 150 days have run from the entry in the civil docket.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c).

Rule 79(a) provides that judgments “must be marked with the file number and

entered chronologically in the [civil] docket,” and “must briefly show . . . the

substance and date of entry of each . . . judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 79(a)(2), (3).

Subject to a few exceptions not relevant here, “[e]very judgment and amended

judgment must be set out in a separate document.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a); Zaretsky

v. William Goldberg Diamond Corp., 

 (2d Cir. 2016) (requiring the

district court set forth its judgment in a separate document).

      Rule 58(a)’s “separate document” rule was designed to eliminate the

“considerable uncertainty over what actions of the District Court would constitute

an entry of judgment, and occasional grief to litigants as a result of this

uncertainty.” United States v. Indrelunas, 

 (1973) , abrogated on



                                         14
other grounds by Bankers Tr. Co. v. Mallis, 

 (1978); see, e.g., Axel

Johnson Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 

 (2d Cir. 1993). Of course,

uncertainty as to what constitutes a judgment, and when it is entered, risks

confusing the parties’ timing for what actions may follow. For starters, the entry

of judgment starts the clock on a party’s time to appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A)

(requiring notice of appeal to be filed “within 30 days after entry of the

judgment . . . appealed from”); see, e.g., Cooper v. Town of East Hampton, 

 (2d Cir. 1996). Indeed, this was the primary purpose of Rule 58’s separate-

document rule: “to clarify when the time for appeal . . . begins to run.” Bankers

Tr. Co. v. Mallis, 

 (1978). But in addition to governing the timing

of a party’s appeal, and as particularly relevant here, the entry of judgment also

determines the time for the filing of post-judgment motions. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P.

59(e) (“A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days

after the entry of the judgment.”); Casey v. Long Island R.R. Co., 

(2d Cir. 2005) (“[The] period for filing the new-trial motion is expressly triggered

by the entry of judgment.”).

      With this goal of clarity in mind, we have explained “that the document

granting judgment [must] be separate from any judicial memorandum or



                                         15
opinion,” per Rule 58(a)’s “separate document” rule. Axel Johnson Inc., 

. Thus, “an order that is part of a district court opinion or memorandum” – for

example, a decision granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs in a “14–

page opinion that state[s] ‘So Ordered’ at the end” – does not satisfy Rule 58’s

requirement. RR Vill. Ass’n v. Denver Sewer Corp., 

 (2d Cir. 1987).

And to promote even greater clarity, we have held that the “separate document

must be labeled a ‘judgment.‘” Axel Johnson Inc., 

; see Kanematsu-Gosho,

Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 

 (2d Cir. 1986) (“One clear way to [ensure

parties’ have clear notice] is to call a judgment a judgment.”).

      This precedent, however, gets us no closer to resolving the dispute in this

case, where we have two separate documents – one docketed on June 23, 2022, the

other on July 7, 2022 – that are each clearly labeled “judgment.” As then-Judge

Sotomayor observed, “not every piece of paper labeled a ‘judgment’ satisfies Rule

58.” Dudley ex rel. Est. of Patton v. Penn-Am. Ins. Co., 

 (2d Cir. 2002)

(Sotomayor, J., concurring). Nevertheless, we have said little else about what a

“judgment” must contain or look like.

      Our primary authority on this question appears to be Ellender v. Schweiker,

in which we suggested that “the final judgment in a case” need not “be



                                           16
comprehensive” under Rule 58. 

, 317–18 (2d Cir. 1986). In that case,

the Court dismissed as untimely the appeal of a judgment that memorialized the

district court’s award of monetary relief and attorneys’ fees to the plaintiffs, but

omitted mention of the permanent injunctive relief that the district court had

granted earlier in the litigation. Id. at 318–19. We held that the January 4, 1985

judgment at issue satisfied Rule 58 and Rule 79(a) because it was set out in a

separate document and labeled “Judgment,” and “its contents were summarized

in the clerk’s docket for the case”; we then focused on whether the judgment “was

final within the meaning of 

.” 

. In concluding that it was,

we rejected the appellees’ argument that the district court’s failure to specify the

award of permanent injunctive relief rendered the January 4, 1985 judgment non-

final: “While we would normally expect that the final judgment in an action

would at least mention the permanent relief granted by the court, . . . we find no

requirement in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the document that

constitutes the final judgment in a case be comprehensive.” 

. Instead, we

noted that “[t]he dispositive fact in the present case is that the record reveals that

the district court ‘intended the [J]udgment to represent the final decision in the

case.’” 

 (quoting Bankers Tr. Co., 

 n.6).



                                          17
      By contrast, numerous other circuits have been more explicit in requiring

that a judgment “be self-sufficient, complete, and describe the parties and the relief

to which the party is entitled.” Villoldo v. Castro Ruz, 

 (1st Cir.

2016) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Loc. Union No. 1992 of Int’l Bhd.

of Elec. Workers v. Okonite Co., 

 (3d Cir. 2004) (requiring that a

judgment “be a self-contained document, saying who has won and what relief has

been awarded, but omitting the reasons for this disposition” (internal quotation

marks omitted)); Am. Interinsurance Exch. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of N.C., 

 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 58 the judgment must be self-

contained and complete. . . . It must describe the relief to which the prevailing

party is entitled and not simply record that a motion has been granted.” (citation

omitted)); Manookian v. Flippin, No. 20-5979, 

, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 5,

2021) (unpublished order) (applying the test set forth in Loc. Union No. 1992 of Int’l

Bhd. of Elec. Workers).    These minimum requirements likewise advance the

“purpose of the separate judgment” rule: “to let the parties (and the appellate

court) know exactly what has been decided and when.” Brown v. Fifth Third Bank,

, 699–700 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

      We conclude with one final note on the separate document rule and issues



                                         18
of timing. Notwithstanding Rule 58(a)’s clear mandate, “the simple separate

document requirement” was historically “ignored in many cases,” with the result

that the time for making post-judgment motions and for filing an appeal “never

beg[an] to run.”        Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a) advisory committee’s note to 2002

amendment. To account for this unfortunate eventuality, Rule 58 was amended

in 2002 to provide that where a separate document is required, but no separate

document has been issued, the judgment is deemed entered 150 days after the

order or decision giving rise to the judgment is entered in the docket. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 58(c)(2); see Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 

, 363 n.3 (2d Cir. 2003). 5

       As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the concept of finality is

technically distinct from Rule 54’s definition of a judgment and Rule 58’s

requirements regarding the entry and rendition of a judgment – although the

concepts frequently overlap, and courts do not always take care to differentiate

between them. See, e.g., Ellender, 781 F.2d at 317–18 (addressing the question of

finality distinct from Rule 58’s separate document requirement); see also Murphy v.


5Even before Rule 58’s 2002 amendments, courts recognized that “parties to an appeal may waive
the separate-judgment requirement of Rule 58,” such that a party cannot argue that an appeal
was prematurely taken. Bankers Tr. Co., 

; see Selletti v. Carey, 

, 109–10
(2d Cir. 1999) (“Where an order appealed from clearly represents a final decision and the
appellees do not object to the taking of an appeal, the separate document rule is deemed to have
been waived and the assumption of appellate jurisdiction is proper.”).


                                                19
Schaible, 

 (10th Cir. 2024) (distinguishing between

“substantive” and “technical” finality).      For example, a “judgment can be a

judgment without being final,” Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd., 

, meaning that

it may not completely resolve the merits of a case, because Rule 54(a) defines

judgment to include “any order from which an appeal lies,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a),

including interlocutory orders made appealable by statute, see McCowan v. Sears,

Roebuck & Co., 

 (2d Cir. 1990). Or a separate document bearing

the label of “judgment” might comply with Rule 58, but fail to completely resolve

a case, because some claim or question bearing on a party’s right or liability – e.g.,

prejudgment interest – remains unresolved. Conversely, a decision might be

“final” in that it completely resolves the merits of the case but not become a

“judgment” for purposes of time to file an appeal or post-judgment motions until

it is properly rendered in a separate document, or until 150 days have elapsed

since the decision’s entry on the civil docket.

B.    Application

      Returning to the parties’ dispute, we reject APE’s argument that the June 23,

2022 Judgment was the operative judgment that started the clock for the filing of

post-judgment motions. We adopt the definition of “judgment,” as used by the



                                         20
First Circuit in Villoldo, to this case. 

 (requiring that a judgment “be

self-sufficient, complete, and describe the parties and the relief to which the party

is entitled.”).

   1. The June 23, 2022 Judgment Was Not Sufficiently Final.

       We do not think that the June 23, 2022 Judgment was sufficiently final to

trigger the time for the parties to appeal or file post-judgment Rule 59(e) motions.

It is true that in setting forth the June 23, 2022 Judgment, the district court directed

the Clerk of Court to close the case, which might suggest that it contemplated no

further proceedings. But as we have recognized, “finality ultimately turns on the

substance of the district court’s order,” not a “district court’s assertion of finality.”

Mead, 

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Several aspects of the

June 23, 2022 Judgment support our conclusion that it was not final.

       Most importantly, the June 23, 2022 Judgment only mentions the

compensatory damages granted to Alessi on its breach-of-contract claim, omitting

any reference whatsoever to prejudgment interest despite the fact that the district

court had already acknowledged the need to calculate that interest, ordered

briefing on the issue, and received written submissions from both parties. As we

have explained, prejudgment interest is “part of the compensation due plaintiff,”



                                           21
Osterneck, 

, and therefore must generally be determined and set forth

in the judgment in order for the judgment to be final, see Cinerama, 482 F.2d at 69–

70.   At the time of the June 23, 2022 Judgment, the district court had not

adjudicated Alessi’s request for an award of prejudgment interest, even though it

had the parties’ written submission on that issue before it. The question of Alessi’s

entitlement to prejudgment interest was not resolved by the June 23, 2022

Judgment – and therefore, that judgment was not final and appealable.

       It bears noting that this is not a case where the issue of prejudgment interest

was raised for the first time after the entry of a final judgment. See Tru-Art Sign

Co., Inc., v. Loc. 137 Sheet Metal Worker’s Int’l Ass’n, 

 (2d Cir. 2017). 6

To the contrary, the district court was well aware of its obligation to calculate

prejudgment interest but declined to do so, effectively placing the onus on Alessi

to re-request, through a motion to amend the judgment, an interest award that it

had already sought.




6This case is also factually distinguishable from Osterneck, in which – immediately after the jury
verdict was announced – the district court declined to hear argument on petitioner’s motion for
discretionary prejudgment interest, issued a judgment, and directed the parties to submit their
motions for such interest within 10 days. Here, the court was statutorily obligated to calculate
interest and was aware of that obligation at the time of the June 23, 2022 Judgment. Moreover,
the district court in Osterneck expressly determined that “[t]he judgment will be entered on this
particular verdict as soon as possible,” which arguably satisfied the “no just reason for delay”
exception of Rule 54(b). 

 The same cannot be said here.
                                               22
      Contrary to APE’s assertion, it is clear from the June 23, 2022 Judgment that

the district court had not “adjudicate[d] the rights and liabilities” of “all the parties

to the litigation.” Citizens Accord, Inc., 

 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Specifically, while the district court there indicated in a footnote that it

had “decided all other remaining claims in its January 6, 2022” order, Dist. Ct. Doc.

178 at 2 n.2, neither that footnote nor the January 6, 2022 summary judgment order

addressed, let alone resolved, the issue of APE’s “interest” and “[s]tatutory

interest” on its damages award, as APE had originally requested as relief on its

counterclaim, see Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 36 at 23.            In fact, the district court

acknowledged that the issue of APE’s prejudgment interest remained outstanding

months later when it entered an order – at the same time as the July 7, 2022

Judgment – directing APE to brief the issue through yet another Rule 59(e) motion.

      The December 30, 2022 Amended Judgment was sufficiently final, because

it resolved all issues of liability, principal damages, and compulsory prejudgment

interest in one comprehensive document. As the district court resolved all the

necessary issues it needed to in this judgment, it was sufficiently final to trigger

the time for the parties to appeal or file post-judgment Rule 59(e) motions.




                                           23
    2. The June 23, 2022 Judgment Does Not Satisfy Rule 58.

       Even if the June 23, 2022 Judgment were substantively final within the

meaning of section 1291, we cannot say that it satisfies Rule 58’s requirements for

the entry and rendition of a judgment. While a judgment perhaps need not be

“comprehensive,” Ellender, 781 F.2d at 318, the June 23, 2022 Judgment’s omissions

render it so incomplete and so lacking finality, as to undermine the purpose

behind Rule 58’s separate document rule altogether.                        Most glaringly, that

judgment explains “who ha[d] won and what relief ha[d] been awarded” with

respect to Alessi’s claims, but made no mention of “who ha[d] won and what relief

ha[d] been awarded” with respect to APE’s counterclaims. Loc. Union No. 1992,

. Indeed, the only suggestion that the court might have awarded

APE any relief is the passing reference to the fact that APE asserted counterclaims

against Alessi and a footnoted indication that “[t]he Court decided all other

remaining claims in its January 6, 2022 Opinion and Order.” Dist. Ct. Doc. at 2 n.2.

7




7 Ellender is inapposite. There, the court concluded that there was ““nothing left for the [district]

court to do,” 781 F.2d at 316–17 (observing that district court “had disposed of the main claims
in the case; . . . resolved all issues as to fees; . . . discontinued all of the remaining claims,” and
“annexed” all relevant opinions and set forth amounts that plaintiff would recover, including
attorneys’ fees). Here, by contrast, there were still unresolved issues pending before the district
court at the time the June 23, 2022 Judgment in this case was entered: as of June 23, 2022, the


                                                  24
       Far from being “self-sufficient” and “complete,” Villoldo, 

, the

June 23, 2022 Judgment requires a reader to refer to the January 6, 2022 Order to

determine what other relief, if any, APE (or Alessi, for that matter) is entitled to.

Even then, the decretal language of that January 6, 2022 Order – as also reflected

on the docket – specifies only that Alessi must pay APE the “amounts reflected in

the outstanding invoices, Purchase Orders and Rental Agreement.” Dist. Ct. Doc.

No. 114 at 56. In fact, to arrive at APE’s actual damages award only later identified

in the July 7, 2022 Judgment, one must comb through the January 6, 2022 Order to

discover that: (1) “[a]ccording to APE, the total amount due . . . is $52,505.92,” id.

at 13, and (2) Alessi “admi[ts] that the amounts under the invoices are accurate

and otherwise past due,” id. at 54. Therefore, the June 23, 2022 Judgment falls well

short of “let[ting] the parties (and the appellate court) know exactly what has been

decided and when.” Brown, 

; see also 11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur

R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2785 (3d ed. 2024) (“[T]he

required separate judgment should be self-sufficient and should not merely

incorporate other documents by reference.”).




district court had not resolved APE’s counterclaim for breach of contract or determined whether
either party was entitled to pre-judgment interest.
                                              25
      APE argues that the “judgment” with respect to the district court’s January

6, 2022 Order awarding damages on its counterclaims “became final 150 days later

on June 5, 2022” under Rule 58(c), since that judgment was not set out on a separate

document. APE Br. at 46. As a result, APE asserts, “by the time the June 23, 2022

judgment was entered nothing else was required in order for the judgment to be

final and the time to amend the judgment to begin to run.” Id. But that argument

runs afoul of Rule 54’s plain text in two separate ways. First, the January 6, 2022

Order, at the time it was entered, did not constitute a “judgment” for the simple

reason that it was not an “order from which an appeal” could be taken. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(a). Second, because the January 6, 2022 Order “adjudicate[d] fewer than

all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties,” it could not

have been final: the district court could have “revised” that order “at any time

before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights

and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). We therefore reject APE’s contention that the

January 6, 2022 Order as to APE’s counterclaims somehow became a judgment by

operation of Rule 58(c)(2)(B), or otherwise became final as a partial standalone

“judgment.”




                                           26
      For these reasons, we conclude that Rule 58’s separate-document

requirement – the primary purpose of which is to provide the parties with clear

notice as to when their time to appeal and to file any post-judgment motions

begins to run – demands substantially more than what the June 23, 2022 Judgment

provided for here. Thus, consistent with the case law in other circuits, and in

furtherance of the Rule 58’s purpose, we hold as follows with respect to final

judgments entered in a multi-party action or any action involving claims and

counterclaims: The separate-document rule requires a judgment to describe the

parties and the relief (monetary or otherwise) to which each and every party is

entitled, and relatedly, must be self-contained and complete, such that it can stand

alone without reference to any other document. See, e.g., Villoldo, 

;

Loc. Union No. 1992 of Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 

; Am. Interinsurance

Exch., 

. A final judgment entered on a single, separate document

consistent with those requirements not only tracks the meaning of “judgment” as

it is defined in Rule 54, but also best promotes Rule 58 by providing clarity to the

parties (and the appellate court) as to the deadlines for appealing and filing post-

judgment motions – and avoiding the confusion engendered in this case, in which




                                          27
there are multiple documents designated as a “judgment” and disagreement as to

which one controls.

       Of all the documents labelled as “judgments” in the record, the December

30, 2022 Amended Judgement is the only one that satisfies all the requirements to

be a final judgment. There, in a standalone and separate document, the district

court resolved all issues of liability, principal damages, and prejudgment interest.

Accordingly, that is the judgment in this case from which to calculate time to

appeal or to file a post-judgment Rule 59(e) motion.

       Even if we were to accept APE’s arguments, July 7, 2022 would still be the

earliest possible date on which a final judgment could have been issued in this

case. At that time, the district court had definitively, albeit separately, on two

different documents, decreed its award of damages as to both Alessi and APE,

thereby “adjudicat[ing]” – even if procedurally erroneously – “the rights and

liabilities” of “all the parties to the litigation.” Citizens Accord, Inc., 

.

And because Alessi filed its Rule 59(e) motion within 28 days of the entry of the

July 7, 2022 Judgment, we therefore conclude that that motion was timely filed.

                                  III.   CONCLUSION

       In sum, we:



                                            28
        • Hold that a final judgment entered in a multi-party action or any

           action involving claims and counterclaims must describe the parties

           and the relief to which each and every party is entitled, and must also

           be self-contained and complete, such that it can stand alone without

           reference to any other document.

        • Conclude that the June 23, 2022 Judgment here was not substantively

           final because it omitted any reference to prejudgment interest,

           notwithstanding the fact that the district court had acknowledged the

           need to calculate that interest and had already ordered and received

           submissions from both parties addressing that issue. Instead, the July

           7, 2022 Judgment is the earliest time from which a final judgment was

           arguably entered, and Alessi’s Rule 59(e) motion was timely filed

           within 28 days from that date.


     Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above and in our separately issued

summary order, we AFFIRM the amended judgment of the district court.




                                       29