22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit ___________________________

August Term, 2022 Argued: May 10, 2023 Decided: November 26, 2025

Docket No. 22-1191 ___________________________

ROBERT E. SHAPIRO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

—v.—

UNITED STATES SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Vermont No. 19-cv-238, Christina Reiss, Chief Judge. _____________________________________

Before: CARNEY, SULLIVAN, and LEE, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellee Robert E. Shapiro submitted a request under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”),

, for documents related to how Defendant-Appellant, the United States Social Security Administration (“SSA”), assesses disability claims for migraines and other headache disorders. Under

(c), the SSA can require a requesting party to repay the agency for the 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

“full cost” of responding to a FOIA submission that is “not directly related to the administration” of an applicable SSA program. At the same time, FOIA prohibits agencies from charging fees if they did not timely respond to the FOIA request. See

(a)(4)(A)(viii). The SSA sought reimbursement from Shapiro according to § 1306(c)’s cost-reimbursement provision, but Shapiro refused because the agency had failed to respond to his request within FOIA’s statutory deadline. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont ruled in favor of Shapiro (Christina Reiss, Chief Judge), holding that FOIA’s fee-preclusion provision prevailed over § 1306(c)’s cost-reimbursement provision and ordering a refund of the fee charged to Shapiro. Based in part on this ruling, the district court also awarded Shapiro attorneys’ fees and costs.

On appeal, we hold that the text of the SSA’s cost-reimbursement provision, § 1306(c), is unambiguous and takes precedence over the competing FOIA provision. The cost-reimbursement provision begins with a “notwithstanding” clause that expressly exempts the agency from “section[] 552,” i.e., FOIA, when the FOIA request is “not directly related to the administration of” an applicable SSA program. Here, the SSA determined that Shapiro’s request was not program-related, and we agree. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and VACATE its order granting attorneys’ fees and costs. ___________________________

CAROLINE D. LOPEZ, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, (Charles W. Scarborough, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, on the brief), for Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC; Nikolas Kerest, United States Attorney for the District of Vermont, Burlington, VT (on the brief); Royce B. Min, General Counsel, U.S. Social Security Administration (on the brief), for Defendant-Appellant United States Social Security Administration.

JUSTIN G. SHERMAN, Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP, Burlington, VT (Emily J. Joselson on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee Robert E. Shapiro.

2 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

Katie Townsend, Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. ___________________________

EUNICE C. LEE, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiff-Appellee Robert E. Shapiro submitted a request under the Freedom

of Information Act (“FOIA”),

, for documents related to how

Defendant-Appellant, the United States Social Security Administration (“SSA”),

assesses disability claims for migraines and other headache disorders. Under

(c), the SSA can require a requesting party to repay the agency for the

“full cost” of responding to a FOIA submission that is “not directly related to the

administration” of an applicable SSA program. At the same time, FOIA prohibits

agencies from charging fees if they did not timely respond to the FOIA request.

See

(a)(4)(A)(viii). The SSA sought reimbursement from Shapiro

according to § 1306(c)’s cost-reimbursement provision, but Shapiro refused

because the agency had failed to respond to his request within FOIA’s statutory

deadline. The United States District Court for the District of Vermont (Christina

Reiss, Chief Judge) ruled in favor of Shapiro, holding that FOIA’s fee-preclusion

provision prevailed over § 1306(c)’s cost-reimbursement provision and ordering a

refund of the fee charged to Shapiro. Based in part on this ruling, the district

3 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

court also awarded Shapiro attorneys’ fees and costs.

On appeal, we hold that the text of the SSA’s cost-reimbursement provision,

§ 1306(c), is unambiguous and takes precedence over the competing FOIA

provision. The cost-reimbursement provision begins with a “notwithstanding”

clause that expressly exempts the agency from “section[] 552,” i.e., FOIA, when

the FOIA request is “not directly related to the administration of” an applicable

SSA program. Here, the SSA determined that Shapiro’s request was not

program-related, and we agree. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s

judgment and VACATE its order granting attorneys’ fees and costs.

BACKGROUND

I. Relevant Statutes

We begin with a brief overview of FOIA and the Social Security Act’s cost-

reimbursement provision.

Originally enacted in 1966, FOIA created a public right of access to agency

records. See

et seq.; Am. C.L. Union Immigrants’ Rts. Project v. U.S.

Immigr. & Customs Enf’t,

(2d Cir. 2023). FOIA requires virtually

any agency record to be made available to the public subject to certain exemptions.

Am. C.L. Union Immigrants’ Rts. Project,

. The original version of the

statute required that an agency make records “promptly available to any person”

4 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

“in accordance with published rules stating the time, place, [and] fees to the extent

authorized by statute and procedure to be followed,” but did not set express time

limits for when an agency had to respond to initial FOIA requests or appeals of

adverse determinations. Act of July 4, 1966,

Stat. 250, 251

(1966) (codified as amended at

).

A few decades later, the Social Security Act, which predated FOIA and was

originally passed in 1935, was amended to add a provision that authorized the SSA

to charge the requesting party the “full cost” of responding to FOIA requests “not

directly related to the administration of” an applicable SSA program (the “Cost-

Reimbursement Provision”). See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981,

,

, 839 (1981) (codified at

(c)).

The Cost-Reimbursement Provision reads, in relevant part:

Notwithstanding sections 552 and 552a of title 5 [i.e., FOIA] or any other provision of law, whenever the Commissioner of Social Security or the Secretary determines that a request for information is made in order to assist a party in interest . . . with respect to the administration of an employee benefit plan . . . or is made for any other purpose not directly related to the administration of the program or programs under this chapter to which such information relates, such Commissioner or Secretary may require the requester to pay the full cost . . . of providing such information.

(c) (emphases added).

The SSA’s regulations implement this provision, including rules regarding

5 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

“[w]hat fees may be charged” for responding to FOIA requests,

, 1

and how to determine whether such requests are directly related to the

administration of an applicable SSA program, see

§ 402.170. 2 The SSA

regulations also permit the Commissioner to charge “the full cost of supplying the

information where the information is requested” for non-program-related purposes

“notwithstanding the fee provisions of the FOIA . . . or any other provision of law.”

Id. § 402.175(a). In addition, the regulations include a fee schedule governing the

costs to be paid by the requester for responses to non-program-related requests.

Id. § 402.175(c).

After passing the SSA Cost-Reimbursement Provision of § 1306(c) in 1981,

Congress later amended FOIA, as relevant to this case, in 2007. As part of the

OPEN Government Act of 2007 (the “2007 FOIA Amendment”), Congress again

amended subparagraph 4 of FOIA, this time to prohibit an agency from assessing

any fees “if the agency fails to comply with any time limit under paragraph (6)

[setting statutory time limits for agencies to act on requests], if no unusual or

1We rely on the version of the regulations in effect at the time of the agency’s decisions. Revised provisions became effective on January 17, 2025. These revisions do not affect our analysis.

2 As explained in the Discussion infra, the regulations promulgate a list of criteria to be considered in making the determination of whether a request is program-related.

6 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

exceptional circumstances . . . apply to the processing of the request.” See

Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Government Act of 2007,

,

, 2526 (2007) (codified at

(a)(4)(A)(viii)). 3

II. Facts and Procedural History

Shapiro is a medical doctor specializing in neurology who advocates for

Americans with disabling headache disorders. In October 2018, Shapiro

submitted a FOIA request to the SSA seeking information regarding the SSA’s

decision-making process for choosing migraine and other headache-related

disorders for inclusion in the SSA’s Listing of Impairments. 4 He also sought

information related to how SSA adjudicators evaluate disability claimants for such

3 As relevant here, under FOIA, an agency has “20 days . . . after the receipt of any such request [to determine] whether to comply with such request” and to “immediately notify the person making such request of such determination and the reasons therefor.”

(a)(6)(A)(i). Similarly, the agency has twenty federal working days to respond to appeals of adverse determinations.

§ 552(a)(6)(A)(ii).

4 The Listing of Impairments is an appendix in the SSA’s regulations that “describes[,] for each of the major body systems[,] impairments that we consider to be severe enough to prevent an individual from doing any gainful activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience.”

(a). The agency uses the criteria in the Listing of Impairments to evaluate claims for disability benefits. See

§ 404.1525(c)(5) (explaining how the SSA uses the listing to find whether a claimant is “disabled or still disabled”).

7 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

disorders. Specifically, he requested the following from the SSA:

I seek all documents, regardless of age, pertaining to SSA assessment, evaluation, and decisions regarding inclusion or exclusion of a proposed listing for impairments due to migraine and other headache disorders in the SSA Listing of Impairments (Blue Book). These documents should relate to, but not be limited to, the 2013 to 2016 process of SSA rules-making, ANPRM, NPRM and final rules-making for revision of Medical Criteria for Evaluating Neurological Disorders listings (11.00 Neurological – Adult). These documents should include, but be not limited to, all relevant correspondence, emails, memoranda, drafts, cost-benefit analyses, public comments, and related guidance documents, including those documents from and between all relevant SSA offices (i.e. Office of Regulations and Reports Clearance, Office of Disability Policy, Office of General Counsel, Offices of the Chief Actuary and Budget, etc.), as well as those document[s] from and between SSA offices and offices of other Federal Government agencies. I also seek all documents (i.e. from SSA Office of Disability Policy or other SSA offices), regardless of age, pertaining to, and/or informing, guidance as to how Listings of Impairments (e.g[.] 11.02 Epilepsy) are to be appropriately utilized and interpreted (i.e. by SSA adjudicators and administrative law judges) in order to assess and determine medical equivalency with impairments attributed to, or caused by, migraine or other headache disorders, such as cluster headache.

Joint App’x at 45. According to Shapiro, he sought these records to further

scholarship on migraine disability and the public’s understanding of how the SSA

evaluates migraine and headache-related disorders for disability benefits.

In May 2019, more than six months after Shapiro submitted his initial FOIA

request, the SSA responded by letter and asked Shapiro to pay $2,908 for

processing fees associated with his “unusual,” “non-program related” request.

8 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

Id. at 42. The agency also explained that Shapiro could narrow his request or set

a limit on the amount he was willing to pay. Shapiro promptly paid the fee in

full. In July 2019, the SSA issued a decision on Shapiro’s FOIA request, producing

two memoranda and explaining that the agency was otherwise withholding 1,377

pages of responsive documents under FOIA Exemption 5. 5 The decision also

explained that personal information had been deleted from the enclosed

memoranda pursuant to FOIA Exemption 6. 6

Shapiro filed an administrative appeal in August 2019, challenging the

agency’s withholding of documents. See id. at 14 (“I appeal the withholding by

SSA of 1,377 page(s) of respons[ive] documents . . . . I also appeal the withholding

by SSA of any further relevant documents responsive to the FOIA request . . . .”).

Further, he appealed and sought a refund of the $2,908 fee he paid for the cost of

5 FOIA Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.” Am. Oversight v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

(2d Cir. 2022) (quoting

(b)(5)). In other words, “agency documents that would be privileged in ordinary civil discovery are also protected from disclosure under FOIA.”

at 588 (quoting N.Y. Times v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 488 (2d Cir. 2019)).

6 Under FOIA Exemption 6, agencies can withhold “personnel and medical files and similar files[,] the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Jabar v. U.S. Dep’t of Just.,

, 50 n.3 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting

(b)(6)).

9 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

processing the request. In particular, he cited the SSA’s failure to comply with

the FOIA time limits as the basis for his request to “discharge and refund the

$2,908.00 FOIA fee.”

.

In December 2019, before the SSA had adjudicated the administrative

appeal, Shapiro initiated the underlying litigation in federal district court on the

assumption that the agency’s twenty-day deadline to decide the appeal, which had

been filed four months earlier, had expired. Shapiro’s complaint alleged

violations of his rights under

(a)(3), (4), and (6) and asserted three

claims against the SSA: (1) failure to respond to Shapiro’s FOIA request within the

statutory timeframe; (2) failure to produce responsive records; and (3) failure to

grant Shapiro’s request for a fee waiver or reduction. Shapiro also sought an

award of attorneys’ fees and costs.

In July 2020, the SSA filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or

in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. The SSA asserted three

arguments in support of its position. First, the agency argued that Shapiro failed

to exhaust his administrative remedies because his FOIA request did not

“reasonably describe the records sought” and therefore was not “perfected.”

Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss or, for Summ. J. & Mem. in Supp., at 8, Shapiro v. U.S. Soc.

Sec. Admin., No. 19-cv-238 (D. Vt. July 24, 2020), ECF No. 14. Second, the SSA

10 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

argued that, with respect to its purported failure to produce documents, the

agency was not required to respond because Shapiro’s FOIA request was

“unreasonably broad.”

. Third, regarding Shapiro’s request for a fee

waiver, the SSA argued that it had “clear authority” under the Cost-

Reimbursement Provision, § 1306(c), to charge Shapiro the full cost of processing

his request “notwithstanding” any of FOIA’s fee provisions. Id.

In response, Shapiro filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the

same three issues. See Pl.’s Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec.

Admin., No. 19-cv-238 (D. Vt. Sept. 22, 2020), ECF No. 16. As relevant to this

appeal, he presented two counterarguments against the SSA’s right to charge him

processing fees. First, Shapiro argued that he qualified for a fee waiver even if

the Cost-Reimbursement Provision was enforced because his request was “directly

related to the administration of the SSA.” Id. at 17. Second, Shapiro argued that

the 2007 FOIA Amendment, which prohibits fees when the agency response is

untimely, should override the SSA’s Cost-Reimbursement Provision because the

2007 FOIA Amendment was enacted later in time than the SSA provision, and

courts should prioritize the most recently enacted statute as Congress’s latest

intent when interpreting statutes. See Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of Cross-Mot. for

Summ. J., at 9, Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 19-cv-238 (D. Vt. Oct. 27, 2020),

11 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

ECF No. 21 (comparing 2007 FOIA Amendment with Cost-Reimbursement

Provision, which was last amended in 1994).

The district court issued a series of decisions from March 2021 to March 2022

partly granting and partly denying both parties’ motions. The first order was

published on March 8, 2021, and held that, although the SSA did not need to

respond to Shapiro’s FOIA request because it was “unreasonably broad and

burdensome,” Shapiro was nevertheless entitled to a refund of his FOIA

processing fees because the SSA had not timely responded to the request and

therefore relinquished its right to assess fees under the 2007 FOIA Amendment.

Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., 525 F. Supp. 3d. 528, 539, 542 (D. Vt. 2021).7 The

district court also ordered the SSA to “specify a basis for withholding” certain

responsive documents under FOIA Exemptions 5 and 6. Id. at 540.

To reach its conclusion that the fee refund was warranted under the 2007

FOIA Amendment and that § 1306 did not justify the SSA’s charging of the fee, the

district court relied on the canon of statutory interpretation disfavoring implied

7 The district court also held as a preliminary matter that Shapiro had exhausted his administrative remedies because the SSA had failed to timely respond to his FOIA request and appeal.

12 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

repeals. 8 In the district court’s view, the 2007 FOIA Amendment “underscore[d]

Congress’s belief in the importance of [FOIA’s] statutory time limit.” Id. at 541

(quoting Bensman v. Nat’l Park Serv.,

(D.D.C. 2011)). The

district court reasoned that construing the Cost-Reimbursement Provision of 1981

to allow the SSA to recoup its fees notwithstanding the FOIA fee provisions would

impliedly repeal the 2007 FOIA Amendment because the agency could then

“charge fees regardless of whether it complied with FOIA deadlines.” Id. at 542.

Accordingly, the district court “harmonized” the two statutes by “interpreting the

2007 Amendment as prohibiting the charging of fees when an agency fails to

timely respond to a FOIA request.” Id. at 541. That is, the Cost-Reimbursement

Provision had to give way to the 2007 FOIA Amendment because “[a]ny other

interpretation would render the 2007 Amendment a nullity and frustrate its

legislative purpose.” Id. at 542. The district court did not reach the issue of

whether Shapiro’s request warranted a fee waiver because it had already ruled

that the SSA could not charge any fees due to its failure to comply with FOIA

8 “[R]epeals by implication are not favored . . . .” Me. Cmty. Health Options v. United States,

, 315 (2020) (quoting Morton v. Mancari,

(1974)). Thus, when “[p]resented with two statutes, the Court will regard each as effective— unless Congress’[s] intention to repeal is clear and manifest, or the two laws are irreconcilable.”

(internal quotation marks omitted).

13 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

deadlines. It also deferred its decision on attorneys’ fees pending the SSA’s

submission of supplemental information regarding the documents withheld from

Shapiro.

Nine months later, the district court issued its second order regarding the

cross-motions and ruled that the SSA had properly withheld the disputed

documents under FOIA Exemption 5. See Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 19-

cv-238,

, at *8 (D. Vt. Dec. 10, 2021) (concluding that the “SSA’s

withholding of all 1,845 pages of documents is justified under Exemption 5, and

the court need not determine whether withholding the same documents is also

justified under Exemption 6”). Nevertheless, the district court awarded Shapiro

partial attorneys’ fees and costs, even though he “did not prevail on the central

issue of his case, [i.e.,] obtaining the release of the requested records or establishing

that SSA wrongfully withheld them,” because he did successfully obtain a refund

of his FOIA fees and an order requiring the SSA to explain the reasons for its

withholdings.

Accordingly, on March 30, 2022, the district court entered

judgment awarding Shapiro $10,262.75 in attorneys’ fees, $444.50 in costs, and

$2,908 in refunded FOIA fees.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment rulings in FOIA actions are reviewed de novo. See Am.

14 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

C.L. Union Immigrants’ Rts. Project,

. This Court also reviews

questions of statutory interpretation de novo. See Carroll v. Trump,

,

767 (2d Cir. 2022). We consider awards of attorneys’ fees and costs for abuse of

discretion and consider arguments that the district court committed an error of

law in denying the award de novo. Wilson v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation,

(2d Cir. 2024).

DISCUSSION

On appeal, multiple statutory provisions are arguably in tension. The SSA

asserts that the use of the word “notwithstanding” in the Cost-Reimbursement

Provision of the Social Security Act is a textual indication of Congress’s intent for

the statute to supersede FOIA and all subsequent amendments to FOIA, including

those prohibiting fees for an untimely response. In contrast, Shapiro argues that

we should turn to various canons of statutory interpretation to harmonize the

statutes or, in the alternative, give effect to the later-enacted fee provisions of the

2007 FOIA Amendment over the Cost-Reimbursement Provision, which was

enacted in 1981.

We conclude that the plain text of § 1306(c), the Cost-Reimbursement

Provision, is crystal clear: despite FOIA or any other law, the SSA can charge the

requesting party for processing non-program-related information requests.

15 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

Congress’s use of the word “notwithstanding” unambiguously demonstrates its

intent to permit the SSA to recoup the “full cost” of processing fees for FOIA

requests that meet the requirements of § 1306(c) and overrides any other provision

of law which would otherwise conflict. Thus, the SSA had the authority to charge

Shapiro the “full cost” of FOIA processing fees despite the agency’s failure to

respond to his request within the twenty-day statutory deadline.

I. SSA Authorization to Charge Fees “Notwithstanding” Any Failure to Comply with FOIA Deadlines

The plain language of the Cost-Reimbursement Provision expressly

specifies that it applies notwithstanding FOIA. See

(c)

(“Notwithstanding section[] 552 . . . of title 5 [i.e., FOIA] or any other provision of

law . . . .”). Therefore, we read the “notwithstanding” clause in § 1306(c) to mean

that the Cost-Reimbursement Provision supersedes FOIA.

To reach our conclusion, we begin our analysis with the plain text of the

statute. See Carroll, 49 F.4th at 767 (“Like any other statutory interpretation case,

our inquiry begins with the text of the statute.”). Section 1306(c) reads as follows:

Notwithstanding section[] 552 . . . of title 5 [i.e., FOIA] or any other provision of law, whenever the Commissioner of Social Security or the Secretary determines that a request for information . . . is made for any other purpose not directly related to the administration of the program or programs . . . , such Commissioner or Secretary may require the requester to pay the full cost . . . of providing such

16 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

information.

(c) (emphasis added). Here, our analysis starts with the word

“notwithstanding.” “The ordinary meaning of ‘notwithstanding’ is ‘in spite of,’

or ‘without prevention or obstruction from or by.’” N.L.R.B. v. SW Gen., Inc.,

(2017) (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1545

(1986); Black’s Law Dictionary 1091 (7th ed. 1999)). According to the Supreme

Court, the use of “notwithstanding” in a statute is an unambiguous congressional

statement that such statute supersedes other specified laws enumerated in the text.

See

(explaining that the use of the word “notwithstanding” in a statute “shows

which provision prevails in the event of a clash” (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner,

Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 126–27 (2012))).

Further, the “notwithstanding” clause at issue here is followed by the all-

encompassing phrase “any other provision of law,”

(c), which

expressly indicates Congress’s intent that the Cost-Reimbursement Provision

supersede not only FOIA but also all other laws. See Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Grp.,

(1993) (noting favorably that “the Courts of Appeals generally have

interpreted similar ‘notwithstanding’ language . . . to supersede all other laws,

stating that [a] clearer statement is difficult to imagine” (alterations in original and

internal quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, our Circuit regularly determines that

17 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

“notwithstanding” clauses “clearly signal[] the drafter’s intention that the

provisions of the ‘notwithstanding’ section override conflicting provisions of any

other s[tatute].” United States v. Shkreli,

(2d Cir. 2022) (emphasis

added) (quoting Cisneros,

); see Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran,

(2d Cir. 2010) (same); Conyers v. Rossides,

(2d Cir. 2009)

(same).

We therefore conclude that the Cost-Reimbursement Provision’s

“notwithstanding” clause need not be harmonized with but, rather, takes

precedence over subsequently enacted laws like the 2007 FOIA Amendment. 9 See,

e.g., Castro v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec.,

(11th Cir. 2006) (holding

that the phrase “notwithstanding any other provision of law” reflects Congress’s

intent for the statute containing that language to take precedence over existing and

later-enacted laws on the same subject (quoting United States v. McLymont,

(11th Cir. 1995))); McLymont,

(“Congress’[s] use of the

phrase ‘notwithstanding any other provision of law’ makes it clear that Congress

9 We note that because there is no conflict between the Cost-Reimbursement Provision and the 2007 FOIA Amendment, Shapiro’s argument that we must “give effect to the most recently enacted statute” “when two statutes are in irreconcilable conflict” is thus inapplicable. See Appellee’s Br. at 17 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 1990)).

18 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

intended the penalty provisions of § 924(c) to take precedence over any preexisting

or subsequently-enacted sentencing legislation, including the Sentencing

Guidelines.”); cf. Lockhart v. United States,

(2005) (“The fact that

Congress may not have foreseen all of the consequences of a statutory enactment

is not a sufficient reason for refusing to give effect to its plain meaning.” (quoting

Union Bank v. Wolas,

(1991))); Hall v. United States,

(2012) (“We assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes

legislation . . . .” (quoting Miles v. Apex Marine Corp.,

(1990)). It

follows that § 1306(c) authorizes the SSA to charge requesting parties the “full

cost” of processing their FOIA requests for non-program-related information—

even if the SSA fails to comply with FOIA’s time limits.

Shapiro contends that permitting the SSA to submit untimely responses to

requesters under FOIA while still allowing the agency to charge the “full cost” of

fees under § 1306(c) “would render the 2007 Amendments a nullity and

superfluous because it would allow an agency to charge fees regardless of whether

it complied with FOIA deadlines.” Appellee’s Br. at 15 (internal quotation marks

omitted). This argument misses the mark.

In our view, the Social Security Act’s Cost-Reimbursement Provision creates

an express (and quite narrow) exemption to FOIA specifically for the SSA, and

19 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

only when an information request submitted to that agency is not directly

connected to a program-related purpose. Indeed, this interpretation is supported

by the legislative history underlying § 1306(c), which indicates Congress’s clear

desire to protect the SSA’s trust funds from being used to cover FOIA requests.

See H.R. Rep. No. 97-158, at 287 (1981) (explaining that § 1306(c) “make[s] clear

that reimbursement of [] costs is not governed by the Freedom of Information Act or by

the Privacy Act, which contain provisions limiting the extent to which the cost of

furnishing information can be recovered” (emphasis added)); id. (explaining that

§ 1306(c) allows the SSA to charge the “full cost of retrieving and transmitting any

[FOIA] information requested” for non-program-related purposes).

Moreover, even under our interpretation of § 1306(c), the 2007 FOIA

Amendment still applies to all other agencies—and even the SSA when the

information request is made for a purpose directly related to the administration of

an applicable SSA program. Thus, we do not see giving effect to the

“notwithstanding” clause in the Cost-Reimbursement Provision as an implied

repeal of the 2007 FOIA Amendment.

In sum, we hold that the SSA is authorized to charge FOIA fees for any non-

program-related requests, “notwithstanding” any failure by the agency to comply

with FOIA deadlines based on the plain text of § 1306(c).

20 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

II. Shapiro’s FOIA Request is Not Program-Related

Shapiro alternatively argues that even if § 1306(c) controls, he should not

have been charged a fee because his FOIA request was designed to educate the

public and to inform disability claimants how to assert claims based on headache

and migraine disorders. According to Shapiro, this goal is directly related to the

administration of SSA programs, thereby exempting his request from the Cost-

Reimbursement Provision. We disagree.

The plain language of § 1306(c) authorizes the SSA to impose full costs on

information requests that are “not directly related to the administration of [SSA]

programs,” notwithstanding FOIA.

(c) (emphasis added)

(explaining that the SSA “may require the requester to pay the full cost”). When

interpreting a statute, the Court looks first to the statute’s plain meaning. United

States v. Dauray,

(2d Cir. 2000). Congress’s use of “directly” to

qualify “related” in § 1306(c) suggests that a party seeking to avoid the imposition

of full costs must demonstrate that the FOIA information is indisputably

connected to the SSA’s administration of benefits, not merely plausibly, loosely, or

inferably tied to the SSA’s program. See Directly, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.

2024) (defining “directly” as “[i]n a straightforward manner”; “[i]n a straight line

or course”; “[i]mmediately”); Directly, Am. Heritage Coll. Dictionary (5th ed. 2022)

21 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

(defining “directly” as “without anyone or anything intervening”).

Additionally, the legislative history of § 1306(c) provides more context as to

what constitutes a sufficiently program-related FOIA request. The legislative

history suggests that Congress’s intent was for the SSA to subsidize requesters

seeking information related to its programmatic purposes but to recover full

payment from requesters whose “request[s] [are] not directly related to

determining an individual’s social security benefit.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-158, at 253;

see also id. at 287 (“[T]he [SSA] would have authority to recover the full cost of

retrieving and transmitting any information requested for any other purpose not

directly related to the administration of the program or programs under the Social

Security Act. This authority, of course, would not be used to recover the full cost

of furnishing to individuals information requested for social security program

purposes.”).

Analysis of the SSA’s regulations implementing § 1306(c) confirms that

Shapiro’s request is not program-related. When evaluating whether a request is

program-related, including whether the information is needed “for a purpose

which is directly related to the administration of a program under the Social

Security Act,” the SSA considers whether the request satisfies certain “major

criteria.”

(a)(1)–(2)(i). “The major criteria [the SSA]

22 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

consider[s] in deciding whether a proposed use is [directly] related [to the

administration of SSA programs] are: (A) Is the information needed to pursue a

benefit under the Act? (B) Is the information needed solely to verify the accuracy

of information obtained in connection with a program administered under the

Act? (C) Is the information needed in connection with an activity which has been

authorized under the Act? [and] (D) Is the information needed by an employer to

carry out her or his taxpaying responsibilities under the Federal Insurance

Contributions Act or section 218 of the Act?”

§ 402.170(a)(i)–(2)(i).

Shapiro argues that two factors, (A) and (C), weigh heavily in his favor.

With respect to factor (A), Shapiro contends that the “[d]isclosure of the

[requested] records will educate the public, informing them about how to pursue

disability benefits under the Social Security Act related to migraine and headache

disorders.” Appellee’s Br. at 18. With respect to factor (C), Shapiro argues that

“[t]he information is needed in connection with an activity authorized under the

Act: namely, how Defendant reviews, evaluates and considers disability

applications for migraine and headache disorders.” Id. at 18–19. Shapiro

explains further that the SSA’s opaqueness has contributed to inequities in its

program implementation in violation of federal and constitutional law with

respect to claimants disabled by migraine and headache disorders. See id. at 19

23 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

(citing

(Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); U.S. Const.

amend. XIV § 1 (Due Process Clause)). We are not persuaded.

Regarding factor (A), Shapiro’s request is “not needed to pursue some benefit

under the Act,”

(a)(1)–(2)(i) (emphasis added), but rather is for

the general purpose of raising public awareness about governmental activity;

namely, the SSA’s approach to evaluating disability claims from individuals with

migraine and headache disorders. While greater public awareness might assist

future applicants in pursuing Social Security benefits, this does not turn Shapiro’s

request into one seeking information “needed” to pursue benefits. Similarly,

regarding factor (C), Shapiro’s sweeping request is “not needed in connection

with,”

(emphasis added), or even focused on, a specific activity of the SSA, but

rather seeks broad information about the SSA’s rubrics for evaluating two specific

categories of claimants in order to inform those claimants about what he argues,

without explanation, are violations of federal and constitutional law. At best,

Shapiro’s request is only tenuously “connect[ed to] an activity under SSA’s

purview,”

permitting the SSA to impose full costs under § 1306(c).

In short, Shapiro’s request primarily seeks to further his “scholarly research

on migraine disability,” Joint App’x at 11 (quoting Compl. ¶ 28), which is not

related to him, as an individual, or to his employer, or to the administration of any

24 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

SSA program, but instead is geared toward general educational purposes.

Shapiro’s more routine FOIA request is akin to requests where the SSA has

imposed costs rather than requests that the SSA has responded to free of charge.10

Thus, analyzing the plain meaning of § 1306(c), the legislative history, and the

SSA’s implementing regulations, we conclude that Shapiro’s request is not directly

program-related, and therefore the SSA was well within its authority to impose a

processing fee. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s judgment granting

Shapiro a refund of his FOIA processing fees.

III. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs

“[A] district court may ‘assess against the United States reasonable attorney

fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred’ by a complainant who ‘has

substantially prevailed’ in his or her FOIA action.” Wilson, 91 F.4th at 598–99

(quoting

(a)(4)(E)(i)); see also Pietrangelo v. U.S. Army,

(2d Cir. 2009) (same). “[A] complainant has substantially prevailed if the

10 For example, the SSA has clarified that, pursuant to § 1306(c), it provides information free of charge to requesters seeking to verify an employer’s earnings report or compute an individual’s Social Security taxes and, by contrast, imposes costs on requesters seeking information such as a more detailed earnings report or for civil litigation purposes. See SSA, Social Security Handbook § 1419.2, https://perma.cc/B5U8-M6K5 (last updated Aug. 8, 2011); see also John A. Svahn, Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981: Legislative History and Summary of OASDI and Medicare Provisions, 44 Soc. Security Bull. 3, 17 (1981).

25 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

complainant has obtained relief through . . . a judicial order, or an enforceable

written agreement or consent decree[.]”

(a)(4)(E)(ii)(I). Relevant

here, “enforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees

create the ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’ necessary to

permit an award of attorney’s fees.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va.

Dep’t of Health & Hum. Res.,

(2001) (quoting Tex. State Teachers

Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist.,

, 792–93 (1989)).

The district court noted that determining “whether Plaintiff substantially

prevailed here [was] a close call” but ultimately awarded partial attorneys’ fees

and costs to Shapiro, reasoning that he had substantially prevailed by obtaining

an order directing the SSA to (1) refund the FOIA processing fees and (2) explain

the reasons for its withholdings. See Shapiro,

, at *8–10. The

district court concluded that because this order “changed the legal relationships

of the parties,” it was sufficient to make Shapiro eligible for attorneys’ fees.

.

However, because we reverse the district court’s decision regarding the first

issue, i.e., the refund of the FOIA fees, and because we now conclude that the

portion of the order requiring the SSA to explain its withholdings is insufficient to

make Shapiro a “substantially prevailing” party, the judgment awarding

26 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

attorneys’ fees must also be vacated. See Jacobson v. Healthcare Fin. Serv.,

(2d Cir. 2008) (partially reversing the judgment appealed from and vacating

the award of attorneys’ fees and costs where the “basis for granting costs and fees

was necessarily erroneous”). Under the specific procedural and factual posture

of this case, in which the only relief obtained was an order requiring a further

explanation without requiring additional disclosure or other substantive change

in position by the SSA, Shapiro cannot be deemed to have “substantially

prevailed” under FOIA. A plaintiff “prevails” when actual relief on the merits of

the claim “material[ly] alter[s] the [] legal relationship of the parties”—not when

the court merely directs the agency to clarify its reasoning. See Buckhannon Bd.,

(internal quotation marks omitted); Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111–12.

The district court’s order determining that the SSA’s response was

“untimely and unsupported by adequate explanation,” Joint App’x at 150,

required the SSA to provide a more detailed explanation but did not compel the

release of documents, change the agency’s withholding decisions, or otherwise

grant Shapiro the substantive relief he sought. Thus, that procedural ruling

neither constitutes success on a “significant issue” nor confers “prevailing” party

status, substantially or otherwise. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 109 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Put differently, while Shapiro may have obtained a judicial

27 22-1191-cv Shapiro v. U.S. Soc. Sec. Admin.

order, he did not obtain meaningful relief on the merits of his FOIA claim.

Because Shapiro has not “substantially prevailed” on any significant issue, we

vacate the district court’s order granting attorneys’ fees and costs.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the judgment of the United States

District Court for the District of Vermont is REVERSED and its order granting

attorneys’ fees and costs is VACATED.

28