23-6279-cr United States v. Seabrook UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 4th day of December, two thousand twenty-five. Present: GERARD E. LYNCH, WILLIAM J. NARDINI, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant, v. 23-6279-cr NORMAN SEABROOK,

Defendant-Appellee.*

_____________________________________

For Appellant: LARA POMERANTZ (Danielle R. Sassoon, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Edward Y. Kim, Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

1 For Defendant-Appellee: ROGER B. ADLER, Roger B. Adler, P.C., New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of

New York (Alvin K. Hellerstein, District Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

DECREED that the judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED

with instructions that it be reassigned and that the sentence previously imposed on Seabrook be

reinstated.

The government appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York entered on February 24, 2023, granting Defendant-Appellee

Norman Seabrook’s motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to

(c)(1)(A),

commonly known as a compassionate release motion.

To explain our decision, we begin with some background of the prosecution of Seabrook

and his two co-defendants, Murray Huberfeld and Jona Rechnitz. A fuller account can be found

in our opinion in United States v. Seabrook,

(2d Cir. 2020). 1 Seabrook was

the long-time president of the New York City Correction Officers Benevolent Association

(“COBA”). Seabrook directed millions of dollars belonging to COBA into investments with

Platinum Partners, a hedge fund founded by Huberfeld. In return, Huberfeld paid a kickback to

Seabrook. Rechnitz acted as their intermediary, delivering to Seabrook a luxury handbag stuffed

with $60,000 in cash.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, when quoting cases, all internal quotation marks, alteration marks, emphases, footnotes, and citations are omitted.

2 Rechnitz was approached by law enforcement and began cooperating in their investigation.

Rechnitz pled guilty, pursuant to a cooperation agreement, to a criminal information that charged

him with conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, in violation of

. The cooperation agreement provided that the government would file a motion pursuant to

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, recognizing that his substantial assistance would allow for a downward

departure at sentencing, so long as Rechnitz met his obligations under the agreement, including

testifying against Seabrook and Huberfeld. After fulfilling his obligations under the agreement,

Rechnitz appeared before District Judge Hellerstein for sentencing on December 19, 2019.

Rechnitz was sentenced principally to 5 months of imprisonment, but after multiple appeals, we

ultimately remanded the case for reassignment to another district judge for plenary resentencing.

See United States v. Rechnitz,

(2d Cir. 2023). Rechnitz is currently awaiting

resentencing before District Judge Katherine Polk Failla.

While Rechnitz’s criminal proceedings were ongoing, Seabrook and Huberfeld were

named in a two-count indictment, charging them with conspiracy to commit honest services wire

fraud and substantive honest services wire fraud. Initially, both Huberfeld and Seabrook

proceeded to trial. After a two-week trial, the presiding judge, District Judge Andrew L. Carter,

declared a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a verdict on either count as to either

defendant. The case was then reassigned to Judge Hellerstein.

Before retrial began, Huberfeld entered a plea agreement with the government, whereby

he pled guilty to a superseding information charging a single count, conspiracy to commit wire

fraud, in violation of

, for defrauding Platinum Partners (his employer) out of the

$60,000 that was delivered to Seabrook in the handbag. Seabrook,

. Thereafter,

Huberfeld appeared before Judge Hellerstein for sentencing. Judge Hellerstein applied the

3 commercial bribery sentencing guidelines under U.S.S.G. § 2B4.1 to Huberfeld’s conduct,

yielding an advisory guidelines range of 30 to 37 months, and sentenced him principally to 30

months of imprisonment. Huberfeld appealed his sentence to this Court, arguing that the district

court should have applied the fraud guidelines of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, yielding the much lower

advisory range of 6 to 12 months, because he had not pled guilty to an honest-services offense.

We agreed, vacated his sentence, and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 232-35. On remand, Judge

Hellerstein recused himself from Huberfeld’s resentencing, which was reassigned to District Judge

Lewis Liman. At resentencing on June 22, 2021, Judge Liman sentenced Huberfeld principally to

7 months of imprisonment, within the newly calculated guideline range.

In contrast to Huberfeld, Seabrook did not plead guilty. Instead, he was retried before

Judge Hellerstein. At the conclusion of his retrial, the jury found Seabrook guilty of two counts:

(1) conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, in violation of

, 1346, and

1349, and (2) a substantive count of honest services wire fraud, in violation of

,

1346, and 2. On February 8, 2019, Judge Hellerstein sentenced Seabrook principally to 58 months

of imprisonment. This Court affirmed his sentence on direct appeal.

That brings us to the present proceeding. While incarcerated, and after learning that this

Court vacated Huberfeld’s 30-month sentence and that Judge Liman resentenced Huberfeld to 7

months of imprisonment, Seabrook sought a reduction from Judge Hellerstein of his 58-month

sentence pursuant to

(c)(1)(A). As relevant here, Seabrook argued that the

disparity between his sentence and the sentences Huberfeld and Rechnitz ultimately received was

an extraordinary and compelling circumstance justifying his release. The district court agreed,

granting Seabrook’s motion and reducing his sentence to time served (approximately 21 months).

More specifically, the district court stated that “Huberfeld’s successful appeal changed the

4 calculus,” and that because Huberfeld was resentenced to 7 months of imprisonment, there was

“an unjust disparity” between the sentences of Seabrook and his co-defendants. App’x 101. The

government now appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion when it granted

Seabrook’s motion.

This Court reviews a district court’s ruling on a motion for compassionate release “for

abuse of discretion and underlying matters of statutory interpretation de novo.” United States v.

Halvon,

(2d Cir. 2022). “A district court has abused its discretion if it has

(1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, (2) made a clearly erroneous assessment of

the evidence, or (3) rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible

decisions.” United States v. Keitt,

(2d Cir. 2021).

“Pursuant to

(c)(1) as modified by the First Step Act, . . . a district court

may reduce a term of imprisonment upon motion by a defendant.” Halvon,

. “But

there are three requirements that must be satisfied before a court can grant such relief. First, absent

waiver or forfeiture by the government, an inmate must exhaust administrative remedies by

requesting such relief from prison authorities.” Keitt,

. Second, a district court must

“consider the factors set forth in

(a) to the extent they are applicable.”

“Third,

the inmate must demonstrate that his proffered circumstances are indeed extraordinary and

compelling such that, in light of these § 3553(a) factors, a sentence reduction is justified under

§ 3582(c)(1)(A) and would not simply constitute second-guessing of the sentence previously

imposed.” Id. District courts may “consider the full slate of extraordinary and compelling reasons

that an imprisoned person might bring before them.” United States v. Brooker,

, 237

5 (2d Cir. 2020). 2 But not every reason proffered by a defendant will be extraordinary and

compelling.

In United States v. Fernandez,

(2d Cir. 2024), we held that a sentencing

disparity between a defendant and his co-defendants was not an extraordinary and compelling

reason that justified a sentence reduction. 3 We explained that “[i]t is not extraordinary (indeed, it

should be expected) that a defendant who proceeds to trial and is convicted receives a longer

sentence than his co-defendants who plead guilty to different crimes, accept responsibility, and

assist the government by cooperating.”

That is precisely what occurred here. Seabrook and

his co-defendants differed in their acceptance of responsibility for their misconduct. Seabrook

went to trial twice, whereas Huberfeld and Rechnitz admitted their culpability by pleading guilty.

Rechnitz took this acceptance of responsibility one step further by cooperating with the

government, which led to his receiving a downward departure for substantial assistance pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Additionally, Seabrook was convicted of more serious crimes than

Huberfeld. 4 Having been convicted of different crimes, Seabrook and Huberfeld were properly

2 Judge Hellerstein decided this motion before the amended U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 went into effect, so Brooker provided the governing standard and we need not consider the application of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See United States v. Black,

(7th Cir. 2025); United States v. Bricker,

(6th Cir. 2025); United States v. Rutherford,

(3d Cir. 2024); United States v. D’Angelo,

(1st Cir. 2024); United States v. Bradley,

(10th Cir. 2024); United States v. Feliz, No. 16-cr-809,

, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2023). 3 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Fernandez to decide “[w]hether a combination of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under

(c)(1)(A) can include reasons that may also be alleged as grounds for vacatur of a sentence under

.” Fernandez v. United States,

, 2732 (2025). Because any holding from the Supreme Court on that issue will not affect the disposition of this case, we need not reserve decision here. 4 Seabrook was found guilty of conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud and honest services wire

fraud, based on a kickback scheme where, for his own personal gain, he diverted $20 million of COBA funds into investments with Platinum Partners. By contrast, Huberfeld was convicted of only conspiracy to commit wire fraud, which was premised on the much narrower accusation that he defrauded his employer of $60,000 by falsely invoicing this kickback as a reimbursement for Knicks tickets. Rechnitz was convicted of only conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud.

6 subject to different base offense levels under different sentencing guidelines provisions. And

because those base offense levels led to different advisory guidelines ranges, it is unsurprising

(much less extraordinary) that their sentences varied. See United States v. Joyner,

(2d Cir. 1991) (describing how Congress and the Sentencing Commission purposefully

structured the guidelines in a way that prescribed different ranges for different conduct, producing

different punishments). Moreover, Seabrook betrayed the COBA membership for his own

personal gain, leading the district court to impose a two-level sentencing enhancement to his base

offense level for his abuse of a position of trust “in a manner that significantly facilitated the

commission or concealment of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3. Huberfeld and Rechnitz were not

subject to the same two-level enhancement because they neither occupied nor abused such a

position of trust.

We recognize that Judge Liman eventually gave Huberfeld a sentence that was

substantially lower than the 30-month sentence originally imposed by Judge Hellerstein. But this

is unsurprising, and hardly an extraordinary or compelling reason to reduce Seabrook’s sentence.

After we found that Judge Hellerstein had procedurally erred by applying the wrong guidelines

provision at Huberfeld’s first sentencing, we vacated the 30-month sentence and remanded for

resentencing under a different guideline. See Seabrook,

. The fact that Judge

Liman resentenced Huberfeld to a lower term of imprisonment, within a lower and correctly

calculated guidelines range, did not justify revisiting and recalculating the sentences of any or all

of Huberfeld’s co-defendants. There is nothing extraordinary and compelling about different

sentences being imposed on differently situated defendants. Accordingly, we conclude that the

district court abused its discretion by reducing Seabrook’s sentence.

7 On remand, we direct that this case be reassigned for any future proceedings to a different

district judge, consistent with our decision in Seabrook’s co-defendant’s case, Rechnitz,

.

We have considered Seabrook’s remaining arguments and find them unpersuasive. For the

foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and the case is

REMANDED, with instructions that it be reassigned to a new district judge and that the sentence

previously imposed on Seabrook be reinstated.

FOR THE COURT:

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

8