25-478-cv Vayani v. 146 W. 29th St. Owners Corp.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 11th day of December, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT:

DENNY CHIN, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, MARIA ARAÚJO KAHN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

ABDUL KHALIQ VAYANI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 25-478-cv

146 WEST 29TH STREET OWNERS CORPORATION, BERIK MANAGEMENT, Managing 146 Building, PRESIDENT RIKIN SHETH, Berik Management, LOCAL UNION 32BJ SEIU, MICHAEL FISHMAN, Former President Trustee Local Union 32BJ & Present Vice President SEIU Washington D.C., HECTOR J. FIGUEROA, President & Trustee Local Union 32 BJ SEIU, TODD JENNING, Officer Union 32BJ, DENIS JOHNSTON, Vice President Union 32BJ, MIKE GRAHAM, Officer Union 32BJ, THOMAS GIORDANO, Officer Union 32BJ, KEVIN J. DOYLE, Executive Vice President, Local 32BJ, SEIU, Health Fund, BRIAN LAMBERT, Vice President, Local 32BJ, SEIU, Pension Fund, KYLE BRAGG, Vice President, Local 32BJ, SEIU, SRSP, LARRY ENGELSTEIN, Assistant to the President, Local 32BJ, SEIU, Shortman Fund, JOHN PAGNOTTA, District Leader, Local 32BJ, SEIU, Legal Fund, LENORE FRIEDLANDER, Vice President, Local 32BJ, SEIU, SUSAN COWELL, Executive Director, REGINE BRETON, Pension Fund & SRSP, ANGELO DASCOLI, Health Fund, LINDA NELSON, Shortman Fund, ALAN SNYDER, Legal Fund, HOWARD I. ROTHSCHILD, Secretary of the Building Service 32BJ Benefit Fund and President of the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc., JOHN SANTORA, Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice President, Asset Services, Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., CHARLES DOREGO, General Counsel, Glenwood Management, FRED WARD, Vice President for Labor Relations, One Source, MANOHAR POHANI, JAY KAPADIA, JOHN DOE, JANE DOE,

Defendants-Appellees,

2 FORMER ACCOUNTANT GEETA PATHAK, of Berik Management,

Defendant. * _____________________________________

For Plaintiff-Appellant: Abdul Khaliq Vayani, pro se, Avenel, NJ.

For Defendants-Appellees 146 West Meredith Cavallaro, Paduano & 29th Street Owners Corporation; Berik Weintraub LLP, New York, NY Management; Rikin Sheth; Monohar Pohanil; and Jay Kapadia:

For Defendants-Appellees Local Union Susan J. Cameron, SEIU Local 32BJ, 32BJ SEIU; Todd Jenning, Officer New York, NY. Union 32BJ; Denis Johnston, Vice President Union 32BJ; Mike Graham, Officer Union 32BJ; Thomas Giordano, Officer Union 32BJ; Kyle Bragg, Vice President, Local 32BJ, SEIU; John Doe; and Jane Doe:

For Defendants-Appellees Michael Ira Sturm, Raab, Sturm & Fishman, former President/Trustee, Ganchrow, LLP, New York, NY. Local Union 32BJ & Present Vice President, SEIU Washington D.C.; Hector J. Figueroa, President & Trustee, Local Union 32BJ SEIU; Kevin J. Doyle, Executive Vice President, Local 32BJ SEIU, Health Fund; Brian Lambert, Vice President, Local 32BJ SEIU, Pension Fund; Kyle Bragg, Vice President, Local 32BJ SEIU, SRSP; Larry Engelstein, Assistant to the President, Local 32BJ

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.

3 SEIU, Shortman Fund; John Pagnotta, District Leader, Local 32BJ SEIU, Legal Fund; Lenore Friedlander, Vice President, Local 32BJ SEIU; Susan Cowell, Executive Director; Regine Breton, Pension Fund & SRSP; Angelo Dascoli, Health Fund; Linda Nelson, Shortman Fund; Alan Snyder, Legal Fund; Howard I. Rothschild, Secretary of the Building Service 32BJ Benefit Fund and President of the Realty Advisory Board on Labor Relations, Inc.; John Santora, Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice President, Asset Services, Cushman & Wakefield, Inc.; Charles Dorego, General Counsel, Glenwood Management; Fred Ward, Vice President for Labor Relations; and One Source:

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (John G. Koeltl, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the February 6, 2025 judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

Abdul Khaliq Vayani, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district court’s

dismissal of his amended complaint, which asserts seventeen claims against his

employer, a union, the union’s benefit funds, and various managers, trustees, and

employees of those entities. In essence, Vayani alleges that the defendants

4 conspired to exclude him from membership in the union and from coverage under

the union’s collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”). We assume the parties’

familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to

which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.

I. Claim Preclusion

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint on res judicata

grounds. Soules v. Connecticut, Dep't of Emergency Servs. & Pub. Prot.,

(2d Cir. 2018). Because Vayani “has been pro se throughout, his pleadings and

other filings are interpreted to raise the strongest claims they suggest.” Shakirov v.

Philips Med. Sys. MR, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2024).

On appeal, Vayani argues that the district court erred in dismissing all but

two counts as barred by claim preclusion. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars

re-litigation if “(1) the previous action involved an adjudication on the merits; (2)

the previous action involved the plaintiffs or those in privity with them; and (3)

the claims asserted in the subsequent action were, or could have been, raised in

the prior action.” Monahan v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Corr.,

, 285 (2d Cir. 2000).

“Where all requirements are met, res judicata can act as a bar to virtually any sort

of claim.” Id. at 290. Each of these requirements is met here.

5 First, Vayani previously asserted nearly identical claims against the same

defendants. See Vayani v. 146 W. 29th St. Owners Corp., No. 16-cv-1774,

, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2017) (“Vayani I”), aff’d

(2d Cir.

2018). In Vayani I, the district court dismissed the action for failure to state a claim,

which “is a final judgment on the merits and thus has res judicata effects.” Berrios

v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.,

(2d Cir. 2009).

Second, the previous action was brought by Vayani, and thus “involved the

plaintiff[].” Monahan, 214 F.3d at 285.

Third, the claims asserted in this action were or could have been raised in

Vayani I. “Suits involve the same claim (or ‘cause of action’) when they arise from

the same transaction, or involve a common nucleus of operative facts.” Lucky

Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc.,

(2020) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Both of Vayani’s suits arise from his

contention that the Defendants conspired to prevent him from joining the union

and excluded him from benefits associated with union membership and the CBA.

See App’x at A1–294, F31–109. As the two suits involve “a common nucleus of

operative facts,” the third prong is easily satisfied. See

6 We therefore agree with the district court that res judicata bars the majority

of Vayani’s claims.

II. Fraud on the Court

Vayani attempts to avoid the district court’s res judicata ruling by claiming

that the Defendants perpetrated a fraud on the court in Vayani I. According to

Vayani, that fraud requires vacatur of the prior judgment and permits him to

renew the claims that were dismissed in the earlier case. 1 We disagree.

Because Vayani’s new counts concern the same alleged misconduct

underlying Vayani I, and since the relief he seeks for each count is the vacatur of

the judgment in Vayani I, we treat both counts as claims under Rule 60(d) – which

allows courts to set aside fraudulently obtained judgments. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d).

We review a district court’s denial of relief under Rule 60(d) – whether the relief

was sought as a motion in the original action or as an independent action for fraud

on the court – for abuse of discretion. See Marco Destin, Inc. v. Levy,

,

218–19 (2d Cir. 2024). To warrant relief under Rule 60(d), the plaintiff “must

1In Count Two, Vayani alleges that the Defendants perpetrated a “fraud upon the court,” relying on several interactions between the Defendants and himself related to his purported union membership and eligibility for pension benefits. App'x at A-283. Similarly, in Count Three, Vayani asserts an “independent action” to set aside the prior judgment in Vayani I pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(d)(1) and (3) based on the same alleged fraud on the court as detailed in Count Two.

at A-284.

7 prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant interfered with the

judicial system’s ability to adjudicate impartially and that the acts of the defendant

[were] . . . of such a nature as to have prevented the plaintiff from fully and fairly

presenting a case or defense.” Mazzei v. The Money Store,

, 93–94 (2d Cir.

2023).

Vayani’s allegations, at most, reveal confusion as to whether Vayani was a

union member who was covered by the CBA. See App’x at B-18, A-81. And all

but one of the exchanges that Vayani relies upon in his Rule 60(d) claim post-date

the judgment in Vayani I, and therefore could not have influenced the district

court’s adjudication of that case. Consequently, that correspondence cannot be

“clear and convincing evidence” that Defendants “interfered with the judicial

system’s ability to adjudicate impartially” or “prevented the plaintiff from fully

and fairly presenting a case or defense” in Vayani I. Mazzei,

. The

remaining interaction relied on by Vayani was simply that on January 5, 2016,

Vayani purportedly went to the union’s office, filled out an enrollment form, and

received a union membership number. This interaction, on its own, is insufficient

to meet the demanding standard of Rule 60(d). Therefore, we find no error in the

district court’s dismissal of Counts Two and Three.

8 * * *

We have considered Vayani’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

9