25-25-cr United States v. Cheema

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 19th day of December, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

v. No. 25-25-cr

SURINDER SINGH CHEEMA,

Defendant-Appellant. * ------------------------------------------------------------------

* This appeal was consolidated with the appeal of Defendant-Appellant Bhupinder Singh Virk, No. 24-2017. Counsel for Virk has moved for permission to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California,

(1967). The Government has moved to dismiss Virk’s appeal and for summary affirmance. We address these motions in a separate order. The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption of No. 25-25 as set forth above. 1 FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: JEFFREY COHN, ESQ., New York, NY

FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW R. SHAHABIAN (Thomas S. Burnett, Jane Y. Chong, Michael D. Maimin, on the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys, for Jay Clayton, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (John P. Cronan, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Surinder Singh Cheema appeals from a December 20, 2024 judgment of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Cronan, J.)

sentencing him principally to 216 months’ imprisonment. Cheema’s conviction

follows his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine in

violation of

, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(B). Cheema challenges his

sentence on multiple grounds. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

2 underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as

necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

Cheema first argues that the eight-month delay between his originally

scheduled sentencing date and the date he was ultimately sentenced violated his

due process right to a prompt sentencing. “In order to determine whether a

defendant has been deprived of [his] due process right to a prompt sentencing,

we must consider [1] the reasons for the delay as well as [2] the prejudice to the

accused.” United States v. Ray,

(2d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks

omitted). The District Court granted the Government’s multiple requests to

adjourn for good reasons. The Government’s first opposed request to adjourn

occurred after it uncovered new evidence suggesting Cheema’s continued post-

conviction involvement in narcotics trafficking, including a narcotics-related

shooting in Canada, while Cheema was in federal custody. Two further

adjournment requests resulted from the Government’s need to obtain evidence

from Canada. Finally, Cheema’s sentencing submission contradicting the new

post-conviction evidence that the Government had adduced prompted the

Government’s final request for an adjournment. None of these adjournments

suggest that “the [G]overnment intended to cause [a] delay” or even “that

3 [Cheema’s] case was allowed to languish due to ordinary negligence.”

.

We therefore conclude that Cheema has failed to “show an . . . unjustified reason

for the delay.”

; see United States v. Paul,

(2d Cir. 2011).

Cheema also argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable for two

reasons: first because the District Court considered his uncharged post-arrest

conduct, and second because it failed to specify what portion of the sentence it

imposed was attributable to Cheema’s post-arrest conduct. We disagree.

A sentencing court may consider “uncharged conduct proven by a

preponderance of the evidence as long as that conduct does not increase either

the statutory minimum or maximum available punishment.” United States v.

Ulbricht,

(2d Cir. 2017), abrogated on other grounds by Carpenter v.

United States,

(2018); see United States v. Martinez,

, 214–

15 (2d Cir. 2008). Following a Fatico hearing, the District Court found by a

preponderance of the evidence that Cheema encouraged and facilitated acts and

threats of violence to collect on a drug debt. Cheema does not claim that the

District Court’s finding increased his statutory maximum or his mandatory

minimum sentence. At most, he suggests that it may have created an

unwarranted disparity with another criminal defendant who was in any event

4 not similarly situated. We accordingly identify no procedural error in the

District Court’s consideration of the uncharged conduct. Nor are we persuaded

by Cheema’s argument, made after his sentence was imposed and judgment

entered, see United States v. Fletcher,

, 712 n.1 (2d Cir. 2025), that the

District Court should have specified what portion of Cheema’s sentence was

attributable to Cheema’s post-arrest conduct. 1 None of our precedents announce

such a requirement. Cf. United States v. Williams,

(2d Cir. 2021).

Finally, Cheema argues that the District Court violated his constitutional

right to confrontation at sentencing by admitting third-party records without

requiring the Government to call a record custodian to testify. We reject this

argument because “[b]oth the Supreme Court and this Court . . . have

consistently held that the right of confrontation does not apply to the sentencing

context and does not prohibit the consideration of hearsay testimony in

sentencing proceedings.” United States v. Martinez,

(2d Cir.

2005).

1 The parties dispute whether this issue should be reviewed for plain error. Because we conclude that Cheema’s argument fails even on de novo review, we need not address this question. 5 We have considered Cheema’s remaining arguments and conclude that

they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District

Court is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

6