25-526-cv Peralta v. City of New York

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 19th day of December, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: AMALYA L. KEARSE, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ ROBINSON PERALTA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 25-526-cv

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HANSEL SALCEDO, DANIEL WYNNE,

Defendants-Appellees.

------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: ROBINSON PERALTA, pro se, New York, NY

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance

Appeal from orders of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Jesse M. Furman, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the orders of the District Court are AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Robinson Peralta, proceeding without counsel, appeals from two

post-judgment orders of the United States District Court for the Southern District

of New York (Furman, J.). The first order, entered February 20, 2025, denied

Peralta’s motion, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), for relief from a

judgment dismissing his complaint; the second, entered March 4, 2025, denied

Peralta’s motion for recusal and his renewed request for Rule 60(b) relief. 1 We

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and the record of prior

1 Peralta’s notice of appeal refers only to a “02-04-2025” order. The District Court did not enter either of its orders denying Rule 60(b) relief on that date. However, we construe pro se notices of appeal “liberally.” Elliott v. City of Hartford,

(2d Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted). Because (a) Peralta’s brief on appeal addresses both orders, (b) his notice of appeal is timely as to both, and (c) the defendants would not be prejudiced by a liberal construction of his notice of appeal, we construe Peralta’s appeal as challenging both of the District Court’s orders denying Rule 60(b) relief.

2 proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to

affirm.

In 2024 the District Court dismissed Peralta’s complaint after concluding

that his claims were barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion, time-barred

under the applicable statute of limitations, or improperly premised on statutes

that do not provide a private cause of action. See Peralta v. City of New York, 23-

CV-10785 (JMF),

, at *4–8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2024). The District

Court also denied leave to amend as futile. See

This Court affirmed the

District Court’s judgment in Peralta v. City of New York, No. 24-1356,

(2d Cir. Nov. 22, 2024). Peralta then filed the Rule 60(b) motions that the

District Court denied in the two orders that are at issue in this appeal.

On appeal, Peralta argues that the District Court erred when it denied his

Rule 60(b) motions. Rule 60(b) provides that a district court may grant relief

from a final judgment for the following reasons: “(1) mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence that, with

reasonable diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new

trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . . , misrepresentation, or misconduct by an

opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,

3 released, or discharged . . . ; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b). “A denial of a motion to vacate a judgment under Rule 60(b) is

reviewed for abuse of discretion . . . .” Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted). Peralta principally challenges the

District Court’s conclusion that his claims were barred by claim preclusion or

were untimely and not subject to equitable tolling.

We are not persuaded. The “mandate rule” is a prong of the law-of-the-

case doctrine that “describes the duty of the district court . . . upon receipt of the

mandate, which is the appellate court’s direction to the trial court. Barring

exceptional circumstances not applicable here, the district court must follow the

mandate issued by an appellate court, and it has no discretion in carrying out the

mandate.” United States v. Brooks,

(2d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).

This Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment dismissing Peralta’s complaint

because his claims were either precluded or untimely, and also specifically

rejected Peralta’s equitable tolling argument. See Peralta,

, at *1–

2. The mandate rule thus barred the District Court from granting a Rule 60(b)

motion on the same rejected grounds. See Sompo Japan Ins. Co. of Am. v. Norfolk S.

Ry. Co.,

(2d Cir. 2014); see also DeWeerth v. Baldinger,

4 1266, 1270 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[A] district court does not have jurisdiction to alter an

appellate ruling where the appellate court has already considered and rejected

the basis for the movant’s Rule 60(b) motion.”).

Among other arguments, Peralta principally contends in the alternative

that (1) the District Court mischaracterized the procedural history of the case and

should have permitted him to amend his complaint; (2) the District Court’s

dismissal of the complaint violated Peralta’s constitutional rights and the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure; and (3) defense counsel engaged in fraud,

misrepresentation, and misconduct. Based on our review of the record, we are

not persuaded by these or any of the other Rule 60(b) arguments that Peralta

advances. The District Court properly exercised its discretion in denying

Peralta’s Rule 60(b) motions. See Mandala,

.

Peralta also argues that the District Court should have granted his recusal

motion. “Recusal motions are committed to the sound discretion of the district

court, and this Court will reverse a decision denying such a motion only for

abuse of discretion.” LoCascio v. United States,

(2d Cir. 2007).

Unfavorable rulings, without more, are “insufficient to establish” the need to

recuse. Gallop v. Cheney,

(2d Cir. 2011). Nothing in the record

5 suggests that the District Court abused its discretion in denying Peralta’s motion

for recusal.

We have considered Peralta’s remaining arguments and conclude that they

are without merit. Peralta’s pending motions to supplement the record are

denied as unnecessary as the documents in question are part of this Court’s

record of the prior appeal. For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the District

Court are AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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