25-1201-cv Binder v. Cap. One Bank, N.A.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of December, two thousand twenty-five.

PRESENT: JOSÉ A. CABRANES, BARRINGTON D. PARKER, RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., Circuit Judges. ------------------------------------------------------------------ NEIL BINDER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 25-1201-cv

CAPITAL ONE BANK, N.A.,

Defendant-Appellee,

FAWBS, INC.,

Intervenor-Defendant-Appellee.

------------------------------------------------------------------ FOR APPELLANT: Neil Binder, pro se, Westhampton Beach, NY

FOR APPELLEE CAPITAL ONE: Philip A. Goldstein, McGuireWoods LLP, New York, NY

FOR APPELLEE FAWBS: No appearance

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the

Southern District of New York (Vernon S. Broderick, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff Neil Binder, representing himself, appeals from a judgment of the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Broderick, J.)

dismissing his complaint against Defendant Capital One Bank, N.A. for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction. 1 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as

necessary to explain our decision to affirm.

1 After dismissing the case on March 28, 2024, the District Court did not enter final judgment pursuant to Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Judgment therefore would have been entered by default 150 days after entry of the dismissal order, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B), but Binder filed a motion for reconsideration during that period. Binder timely filed this appeal after the District Court denied that motion. See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert,

, 197 (2019).

2 In November 2019 a New Jersey State court entered judgment in favor of

Capital One on a breach of contract claim against FAWBS, Inc., a company in

which Binder was vice-president and owned a 50 percent share. The state court

action concerned a July 2018 settlement agreement (the “Settlement Agreement”)

among Binder, FAWBS, and Capital One to settle a debt that Binder owed to

Capital One. The state court concluded that FAWBS committed “a clear

violation of the terms of the [Settlement A]greement,” App’x 21, by paying

Binder but not Capital One, and it ordered FAWBS to pay Binder’s future

distributions to Capital One until Binder’s debt was satisfied. In March 2022

Binder brought the present action, which the District Court dismissed for lack of

subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Binder filed a

motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not

apply because he was not a formal party to the New Jersey action. The District

Court denied the motion, concluding that Rooker–Feldman applied because Binder

is an alter ego of FAWBS.

“Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, federal district courts lack jurisdiction

over cases that essentially amount to appeals of state court judgments.”

Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc.,

(2d Cir. 2014). “There

are four requirements for the application of Rooker–Feldman: (1) the federal-court

3 plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state

court judgment; (3) the plaintiff invites review and rejection of that judgment;

and (4) the state judgment was rendered before the district court proceedings

commenced.”

(cleaned up). “Because Rooker–Feldman [implicates] subject-

matter jurisdiction, we review de novo [a] district court’s application of the

doctrine.” Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. of Elections,

, 83 (2d Cir. 2005).

We also “afford a special solicitude to pro se litigants” in the form of “liberal

construction of pleadings . . . and appellate briefs[.]” Rosa v. Doe,

(2d Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted).

Binder first contends that he never “lost in state court” because FAWBS

was the only named defendant in the New Jersey State court action. Vossbrinck,

. We disagree. The New Jersey court found that the Settlement

Agreement had been breached and thus ordered FAWBS to pay Capital One as

described above. Under Rooker–Feldman, “[s]omeone who loses an ownership

interest in property” in a state court proceeding, as Binder did in the New Jersey

action, “has lost in state court,” even if he was “not [a] named part[y] to the state

action.” See Dorce v. City of New York,

(2d Cir. 2021). 2

2 Having reached this result, we need not resolve whether a federal court plaintiff who is an alter ego to a state court loser has “lost in state court” under Rooker–Feldman. Vossbrinck,

; see Lance v. Dennis,

, 466 & n.2 (2006).

4 Binder also asserts that he “does not seek to overturn the New Jersey

[S]tate court judgment” and instead brings “independent” claims. Appellant’s

Br. 4. We are not persuaded. The main premise of Binder’s claims against

Capital One is that he “never defaulted on the [Settlement] Agreement.” Supp.

App’x 2. But the New Jersey court reached the contrary conclusion. For Binder

to prevail in the present action, the District Court would have to “review and

reject[]” that determination. Vossbrinck,

(quotation marks

omitted). We therefore conclude that the District Court did not err in applying

the Rooker–Feldman doctrine here.

We have considered Binder’s remaining arguments and conclude that they

are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court

is AFFIRMED.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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