Hibberd v. McGill
Hibberd v. McGill
Opinion of the Court
The facts, as disclosed by the record in this case, are as follows:
John Wiseman and George McGill traded together in Philadelphia, as partners? under the firm name of Wiseman & McGill, in the wholesale grocery business, for a number of years prior to 1891. In January, 1891, George McGill died. There stood to his credit as capital, on the books of the firm, about $18,000. He left surviving him his widow, this claimant, and one daughter, Anna E. McGill. Dr. George W. Bailey was executor of his will, and one of the trustees for Anna E. McGill. Shortly after George McGill’s death, Dr. Bailey, as executor, and acting as attorney in fact for Mrs. McGill and as trustee for Anna E. McGill, made a settlement with Mr. Wiseman, the surviving partner. In that settlement, it was agreed between Mr. Wiseman, the surviving partner, and Dr. Bailey, that $9,000 should be carried to the credit of Mrs. McGill. It was also agreed that Mrs. McGill should be paid $75 per month. This agreement was made prior to March 16, 1891, because on that date, there is a check in evidence, signed “Wiseman & McGill,” for the first month’s installment (probably the month of February) under that agreement. This sum was regularly paid each month, by checks signed in the same way during several years, and until the firm name was changed to Wiseman & Wallace. There is also in evidence the following receipt:
"Philadelphia, April 1, 1891.
“Received of Ella McGill Nine Thousand Dollars and the same is placed to her credit on our books.
“$9,000.00.
[Signed]
Wiseman & McGill.”
The opinion of the learned judge, which comes to us in the record, is as follows:
“McPherson, J. I regret to say, that I find myself unable to agree witb the learned referee in his finding of facts in this case. I have read the testimony with care, and it seems to me to establish clearly the fact that the agreement in controversy was originally made with John Wiseman individually, and not with the firm of Wiseman & Wallace. This being so, of course it could not become an obligation of the firm unless Mrs. McGill assented thereto. The firm could not be substituted as her debtor in place of John Wiseman unless she agreed to the change, and there is no evidence that she ever made any such agreement. It is true that the amount due her was entered upon the books of the firm, and that the monthly payments were made by checks of the firm out of partnership funds, but obviously these facts could not of themselves change the character of the debt. It is not shown that she knew of the entry upon the books, and certainly it could make no difference to her from what source the monthly payments were made. The testimony leaves me in no doubt, therefore, that Mrs. McGill is entitled to make her claim against the individual estate of John Wiseman. Concerning the monthly payments, I agree with the leárned referee, that they were not made as interest and are therefore not obnoxious to the charge of usury. In this respect, the report of the Referee is confirmed, but his disallowance of. Mrs. McGill’s claim against the individual estate of John Wiseman must be disapproved.” 123 Red. 187.
We have, however, carefully examined the testimony set out in the record, and are inclined to agree with the conclusions reached by the court below, and its order and judgment in the premises are therefore affirmed.
Reference
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- Syllabus
- , 1. Bankruptcy — Partnership or Individual Debt. An indebtedness contracted by a member of a partnership individually before the partnership was formed cannot be converted into a firm obligation by its entry as such on the books without the creditor’s knowledge, or by the making of payments thereon by firm cheeks, so as to preclude the creditor from proving it against the estate of the individual partner in bankruptcy.