NAZARETH NATIONAL BANK v. TRINA-DEE, INC.
Cases that cite this one
19 later published cases cite this decision.
- Bartucci v. O'Neil (3d Cir. 2003)
- In re Poissant (United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Ohio 2009)
- Magnolia Portfolio, LLC v. Dye (In re Dye) (United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania 2013)
- Orrstown Bank v. Biltwood Properties LLC (In re Biltwood Properties LLC) (United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Pennsylvania 2012)
- In re Ripley (United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania 2008)
- Bank of New York v. Epic Resorts—Palm Springs Marquis Villas, LLC (In re Epic Capital Corp.) (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Delaware 2003)
- In re Dupell (United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania 1999)
- In re Indian Palms Associates, Ltd. (3d Cir. 1995)
- IN RE: Indian Palms (3d Cir. 1995)
- Nantucket Investors II v. California Federal Bank (In re Indian Palms Associates, Ltd.) (3d Cir. 1995)
- In re Siciliano (United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Pennsylvania 1994)
- In re Leonard (United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York 1992)
- In re Hanley (District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania 1989)
- In re Nashua Trust Co. (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. New Jersey 1987)
- Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (9th Cir. 1987)
- Matter of Dunes Casino Hotel (District Court, D. New Jersey 1986)
- First Agricultural Bank v. Jug End in Berkshires, Inc. (In re Jug End in the Berkshires, Inc.) (United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Massachusetts 1985)
- In re Western Preferred Corp. (United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Texas 1985)
- James P. Stewart, Trustee of the James P. Stewart and Jeanne F. Stewart Trust v. Phillip S. Gurley Dba Modoc Rock (9th Cir. 1984)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
In this proceeding for reorganization under Chapter 11, the debtor, Trina-Dee, Inc., appeals from an order of the district court affirming an order of the bankruptcy court, entered pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982), permitting Nazareth National Bank to proceed with a foreclosure proceeding. Section 362(d) authorizes relief from the automatic stay provision of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982) on two grounds. Either ground alone is sufficient to justify relief from the stay. Section 362(d) provides:
*171 (d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if—
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
In a hearing with respect to relief from the automatic stay provision, the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof on the issue of the debtor’s equity. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(1) (1982). The debtor concedes that this burden was carried and that it has no equity in the property. On other issues the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof. 11 U.S.C. § 362(g)(2) (1982). Thus, the debtor had the burden of proving that the property in issue is necessary to an effective reorganization. The bankruptcy court held that the debtor failed to carry this burden, and the debtor does not on this appeal contest that finding. Thus, Nazareth satisfied the second ground for relief from the stay.
Relying on La Jolla Mortgage Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Associates, 18 B.R. 283, 287-88 (Bkrtcy.Cal. 1982), the debtor urges that the test applied by the bankruptcy court for relief under section 362(d) was in error, in that the court focused on the absence of equity in the debtor rather than on the adequacy of protection of the interests of the secured claimant. That reading of section 362(d), however, is inconsistent with its plain language. Subsections (1) and (2) are plainly disjunctive. Only in cases where the court finds an equity in the debtor, or where the court finds that the property is necessary to an effective reorganization, is it necessary to consider the first ground for relief from the stay— the adequacy of protection of the secured party seeking relief. Thus, the bankruptcy court did not err in taking into account all secured claims against the property.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.