OPINION

Salvatore Amadeo appeals from a final order of judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Amadeo challenges the District Court’s affirmance of the Social Security Commissioner’s decision to deny him Social Security benefits. As the basis of his appeal, Amadeo contends that there is insufficient evidence to uphold the ALJ’s holding that Amadeo could perform light work.

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is limited to determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence has been *100 defined as more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate. Id. citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971). We find that the Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

In determining such a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits, the Commissioner follows a five-step analysis. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. In doing so, the Commissioner considers: (1) whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, (2) whether the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment, (3) whether the claimant’s impairment meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment, (4) whether the claimant has the inability to return to his past work, and (5) if not, whether the claimant can perform any other work available in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f).

Amadeo argues that the ALJ, in following this five-step process, failed to recite sufficient indications of his rejection of appellant’s claim as required by the Cotter Doctrine. See Cotter v. Hams, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) (‘We need from the ALJ not only an expression of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but also some indication of the evidence which was rejected”). Amadeo specifically argues that the ALJ did not give the proper weight to the evidence of Amadeo’s psychologist and that the ALJ erroneous failed to consider Amadeo’s subjective complaints.

An ALJ, however, in reviewing the evidence presented, need not give controlling weight to a medical opinion unless it “ ‘is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.’ ” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). We find that the ALJ properly explained his decision based on the substantial evidence found.

Amadeo also contends that the ALJ erroneously rejected his subjective complaints. However, subjective complaints must be supported by some objective medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, the ALJ determined that the record failed to support Amadeo’s allegations that obstructive pulmonary disease prevented all substantial gainful activity on or before December 31, 1990. From our review of the record for substantial evidence to support this determination, we conclude that the ALJ met his duty as a fact-finder.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.