MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant George Kostas Stantzos (“Stantzos”) takes this appeal pursuant to *85 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. Specifically, Appellant alleges that in allowing his mother to testify at trial in the absence of an interpreter, his attorney effectively deprived him of the competent assistance guaranteed to him by the Constitution. For the reasons that follow, we find that Appellant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel, and we affirm the District Court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion.

Following a jury trial, Stantzos was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 942(c)(1)(A) for carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, and on March 3,1999, he was sentenced by the District Court to the mandatory term of five years imprisonment, consecutive to a sentence of four to eight years imprisonment that he has received in state court for the underlying drug offense.

On November 24, 1999, this Court affirmed Stantzos’s conviction, rejecting his argument on appeal that there was insufficient evidence that he carried a gun in relation to a drug offense. On October 16, 2000, Stantzos filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 Motion, alleging that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel, and requesting the vacation of his sentence. This motion was denied by the District Court six months later, and this appeal followed.

In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must demonstrate that 1) his attorney’s performance was deficient, and 2) that this deficiency actively prejudiced his defense. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Stantzos alleges that his mother was the only witness other than himself whose testimony was capable of establishing that the gun he had on his person during his participation in the drug transaction was to be used for self-protection at the job he was traveling to, and not in conjunction with the subject transaction.

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that counsel was not derelict in failing to procure an interpreter. Here, the decision not to hire an interpreter may very well have been a tactical decision, either because the witness’s knowledge was limited or because the testimony may have been unfavorable. In any case, Appellant has failed to establish that the result of his trial would have been any different in light of the substantial evidence in this case. See id. We therefore agree with the District Court’s ultimate assessment that the lack of a translator in this case is not a ground for vacating Appellant’s conviction. Accordingly, for the reasons substantially set forth in the written opinion of the District Court, we will AFFIRM.