OPINION

The United States of America and the Government of the Virgin Islands (collectively “government”) appeal from the order of the District Court of the Virgin Islands granting Clint Sobratti’s motion to suppress evidence. We will reverse.

I.

Sobratti was arrested on the evening of June 2, 2002 and indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), unauthorized possession of a firearm in violation of title 14, section 2258(a) of the Virgin Islands Code, and the knowing use of force, threat, and intimidation against a potential witness in an attempt to influence or prevent testimony contrary to title 14, section 1510(a) of the Virgin Islands Code. Three police officers, Terrence Aaron, Cecil Gumbs, and Herman Lynch, were patrolling the area of Glimpses Nightclub in a police vehicle. Lynch indicated that they went to this nightclub due to past problems of gun fire and drug use on the weekends. 1 Lynch testified that, as they drove into the well-lit parking lot, he noticed the apparent smell of burning marijuana coming from the immediate area around a Toyota Célica. He saw three individuals near this car. The two other officers confirmed this account of the smell of marijuana and the Célica.

Parking behind the car, the three police officers approached the Célica to investigate. Lynch went to Jeffrey Ramos, who was leaning against the rear part of the driver’s side of the Célica and facing away from the officers. Ramos turned back and looked in Lynch’s direction. Lynch testified that he heard Ramos say something. 2 Gumbs and Aaron also stated that they heard Ramos speaking to Sobratti, who was standing next to an open door on the passenger’s side of the Célica. According to Lynch, Ramos tossed what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette over the front of the car. Ramos was detained, and Lynch recovered the tossed cigarette, which was still lit. A field test indicated the presence of marijuana.

According to Gumbs, Sobratti was standing next to an open door on the passenger’s side of the Célica with one hand on top of the roof and his other hand over the door. Facing away from the approaching officers, he was wearing an untucked baseball jersey and speaking with the woman standing on the opposite side of the opened door. After Ramos’s statement, Sobratti looked to Ramos and then turned in the direction of the police vehicle. Gumbs stated that Sobratti lifted up the jersey and pulled a dark or black object from his waist. 3 According to Gumbs, Sobratti then reached into the Célica and placed the object in the car. Gumbs was concerned about this conduct due to a fear, *75 particularly given the secluded nature of the parking lot and the nightclub’s reputation for violence, of a weapon. He stated that he decided to investigate the object because of Sobratti’s hurried manner and “the fact that there was a high odor of marijuana at the time.” App. at 56.

Sobratti then tried to close the car door. Gumbs did not want the door to be closed because of the object. According to Gumbs:

... As I held the car door and I pulled it back, and I started to — he tried to close. He was trying to close the door, and I was trying to keep him from closing the door.

So we had a brief struggle to keep the car from closing. When [the woman] saw, she immediately turned around and walked away.

App. at 45-46. Aaron witnessed this straggle and went to assist Gumbs. After succeeding in keeping the ear door open, Gumbs pushed Sobratti back and looked inside the car without ever actually entering the vehicle. He testified that he first saw marijuana in the console next to the front seat. He then spotted a gun on the floor on the passenger’s side of the vehicle. He announced the police code for the discovery of a firearm and handcuffed Sobratti. Aaron also looked into the car and observed the gun, with its handle pointing up and the nozzle facing toward the front of the vehicle, on the floor next to the shift mechanism.

On September 16, 2002, Sobratti moved to suppress all of the evidence obtained as a result of his seizure and the search of the Célica. The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on October 9, 2002. Lynch, Gumbs, and Aaron appeared on behalf of the government. Brandy Amber Pereira, Demaris Carroll, and Detective Terrence Desormeaux testified at the behest of the defense. 4 The District Court granted the motion to suppress in an order entered on October 10, 2002. In an accompanying memorandum opinion, the District Court found that a search occurred when Gumbs prevented Sobratti from closing the car door and looked into the Célica. It further held that the police lacked the requisite probable cause to conduct this search. On October 16, 2002, the government moved for reconsideration based in part on the claim that Sobratti lacked standing to challenge the search of the Célica. The District Court denied this motion in an order dated October 30, 2002, providing its reasons in an accompanying memorandum opinion. The government filed a timely notice of appeal.

II.

The government argues that the acts of restraining Sobratti were justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), because of the reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and a threat to personal safety from an apparent firearm. According to the government, it was then constitutionally permissible after the struggle over the car door to look into the Célica and seize the gun and marijuana in plain view. Alternatively, the government contends that Sobratti lacked standing. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3731. We review *76 the District Court’s factual findings for clear error but exercise plenary review over its legal determinations. See, e.g., United States v. Coggins, 986 F.2d 651, 654 (3d Cir. 1993).

The government’s proffered framework of analysis is not necessarily the most appropriate in these circumstances. Sobratti, however, relies on the Terry standard to argue that there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on his part and that Gumbs acted on a constitutionally insufficient “hunch” that the object placed in the car was a weapon. We likewise apply this approach. We conclude that the conduct of the police officers here satisfied Terry. 5

It is well established under Terry that a police officer is permitted to stop an individual for purposes of investigation and then perform a limited search for weapons to ensure the safety of the officer and others. A “brief investigatory stop” is appropriate when “ ‘the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’ ” United States v. Robertson, 305 F.3d 164, 167 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 123 S.Ct. 2104, 155 L.Ed.2d 1079 (2003). A limited weapons search is then justified when the officer “has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; see also, e.g., Robertson, 305 F.3d at 170; Leveto v. Lapina, 258 F.3d 156, 164 (3d Cir. 2001). Such a search may extend beyond the person of the suspect to the area under his immediate control, including a passenger compartment of an automobile. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983) (“These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant’ the officers in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21)).

It appears that Gumbs was justified in seizing Sobratti by preventing him from closing the door and pushing him away from the car. There were specific circumstances raising the well-founded suspicion of Sobratti’s involvement in criminal activity and the threat of a deadly weapon. The officers smelled marijuana coming from the area of the Célica, which was located in a parking lot known for the use of drugs and gun fire. Sobratti did not remove the object from his waist until after Ramos spoke to him and he looked back in the direction of the police. Contrary to Sobratti’s suggestion, these actions, taken together with his placement of the object in the car and his attempt to close the car door, constituted at the very least “nervous or ... evasive behavior.” Sobratti’s Br. at 15. 6 We therefore must conclude that the police possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct and had cause to believe that they were dealing with an armed and dangerous person. Any other result fails to acknowledge the dangers and uncertainties faced by police officers confronting multiple individuals acting in a very suspicious fashion and standing *77 around a car in a secluded area known for criminal and violent behavior. Having properly secured both Sobratti and the car door, Gumbs was entitled to look into the car and seize the gun and the marijuana in plain view. We accordingly find that the District Court erred in suppressing this evidence.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court entered on October, 10, 2002 will be reversed. This matter will be remanded to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.