OPINION

This is an appeal by defendant Abdul Crommarty from the judgment of the District Court in a criminal case following a bargained-for guilty plea to a charge of carrying a firearm by a convicted felon. Crommarty’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), stating, inter alia:

Counsel has concluded that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal in this matter and pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), has submitted the instant brief, which refers to those portions of the record that might arguably support the appeal and directs the Court to the relevant law.

Having read the entire record, we agree with counsel that there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal. Judge Joyner’s plea colloquy was thorough and precise, and there has been no suggestion of any problem with it. We acknowledge that the Anders brief is terse. After setting forth the background, basic facts, 1 and procedural history, 2 it goes on to state:

The appellant, Abdul Crommarty, asserts that the sentence imposed is illegal. Pursuant to U.S.S.G., Chapter Five, Part A, based on a total offense level of 21 and a criminal history category of VI, the guideline range for imprisonment is 77 to 96 months. Appellant was sentenced to 84 months imprisonment. The $250.00 fine imposed is the least amount that can be imposed in his *421 case. The Court may also impose a term of supervised release of not more than three years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2). The Court denied additional downward departure under § 5K2.0 and § 5K2.13 in calculating the offense level. In light of these objections, the sentencing of appellant was within the proper guideline range.

Notwithstanding the terseness of the brief, our reading of the record reflects that the succinct statements are accurate and does not suggest that there was more to say.

Crommarty was given notice that, under the circumstances, he could file a pro se brief, and he did so. The gravamen of the pro se brief is two-fold. First, Crommarty relates his dissatisfaction with (Court appointed) counsel’s competence and attention to his case; he also relates “irreconcilable difference” with counsel. In a related vein, Crommarty alleges that counsel essentially abandoned him after sentencing (“leaving town”), so that he had to file his own notice of appeal. Second, and more substantively, Crommarty contends that counsel should have advanced additional grounds for downward departure, principally diminished capacity as the result of a head injury sustained in an assault when he was young. 3

Whatever may be the merit of Crommarty’s claims, they sound in ineffective assistance of counsel, which is not cognizable on direct appeal but only on a petition, which Crommarty is free to file, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2002). Under the circumstances, the appeal is wholly without merit. We will therefore grant counsel’s request to withdraw, deny the motion by appellant for appointment of new counsel, and affirm the judgment of the District Court. 4