OPINION OF THE COURT

Pedro Adames (a/k/a “Sandino”) and Magdalena Dolison were convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. (21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(2)(B)(ii)(II)). Sandino was also convicted of conspiracy to import cocaine. (21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963 and 960(b)(2)(B)(ii)). The principal issue on appeal is the sufficiency of evidence. We will affirm.

I.

In July 2000, a man called “Sizzler” asked Anthony Hewie to take “something” from Curacao to St. Thomas, for which Hewie would be paid between $9,500 and $10,000 upon delivery.1 Hewie agreed and was instructed to deliver three packages to “Sandino.” He neither looked into the packages nor was told the packages contained drugs. Instead, throughout the conspiracy, the packages were referred to as the “stuff’ or “something.”

Hewie arrived in St. Thomas and on August 14, 2000, he telephoned a number Sizzler had given him to contact Sandino. A female, later identified as Dolison, answered. When Hewie asked to speak with Sandino, Dolison said, “It’s okay. You can talk to me.” Hewie told her, “I got something from somebody in Curacao for you.” Dolison replied, “Okay. I’m going to be in the area in about five minutes. I’ll be in front of the Nova Scotia Bank.” Hewie took the drugs to the bank where he met Sandino and Dolison for the first time and said, “I have the stuff.”

After Dolison and Sandino conversed with each other in Spanish,2 Dolison said to Hewie, “We were not expecting anything so we don’t have any money. We’re going to have to go and get the money.” Dolison then said to Hewie, “This is a serious and dangerous business, you know.” Hewie replied, “I know that.” The parties arranged to meet in an hour after Sandino and Dolison obtained the money. But before they were able to do so, Hewie was found in possession of the three packages containing more than 500 grams of cocaine and was arrested. Sandino and Dolison were subsequently arrested.

The government filed a two-count indictment, charging Sandino and Dolison with conspiracy to import and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine. Before trial, Sandino sought a determination that Hewie was not a co-conspirator. But the District Court found Hewie was in fact a co-conspirator. As noted, a jury convicted Sandino of conspiracy to import cocaine and conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and Dolison of conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine.

II.

We review to “determine whether there is substantial evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to *444support the jury’s verdict.”3 United States v. Thomas, 114 F.3d 403, 405 (3d Cir. 1997) (quotations omitted). The elements of a conspiracy may be proven entirely by circumstantial evidence, but each element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citing United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986)). Seen in this light, the evidence is sufficient to support defendants’ convictions.

A conspiracy conviction will be sustained where the government proves the “alleged conspirators shared a unity of purpose, the intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together toward the goal.” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). Defendants argue there could be no conspiracy because Hewie had no specific knowledge of what he was transporting, never met nor spoke with defendants before the transaction at issue, and never referred to the objects he was carrying as “cocaine” or “drugs.” Thus, defendants argue, citing Thomas, that the government failed to prove they entered into an agreement and knew the specific unlawful purpose charged in the indictments.4 Id.

But unlike the defendant in Thomas, defendants here directly participated in the illicit transaction and were principals in the conspiracy.5 Sizzler gave Sandino’s *445telephone number to Hewie with instructions to deliver packages that contained cocaine. As noted, for this simple act, Hewie would be paid between $9,500 and $10,000. Although defendants had no contact with Hewie before the transaction, they met him without hesitation and sought to obtain money for the packages Hewie was carrying based on his statement: “I got something from somebody in Curacao for you.” Defendants arranged to meet Hewie in an hour and to bring the money without asking him to what “something” or to whom “somebody” referred. Furthermore, Dolison’s statement to Hewie, “This is a serious and dangerous business” is probative of knowledge. Thus, a jury could reasonably infer defendants knew the packages contained illegal drugs.

There is other circumstantial evidence of knowledge. Sandino traveled to Curacao just days before the transactions. Also, Dolison transferred approximately $10,000 from St. Thomas to Curacao during the time frame of the conspiracy. A jury reasonably could infer Sandino traveled to arrange for the delivery of cocaine and Dolison sent money to facilitate the importation and distribution of cocaine. Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict.

III.

Dolison also contends the District Court erred by rejecting her motion to suppress post-arrest statements made pri- or to Miranda warnings.6 But, “where a subsequent confession is obtained constitutionally, the admission of prior inadmissible confessions [is] harmless error.” United States v. DeSmnma, 272 F.3d 176, 180

(3d Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 922 (3d Cir. 1987)). Because Dolison made a subsequent, constitutionally obtained, admissible statement that mirrored earlier statements, we find admission of the initial statements harmless error.

Dolison and Adames argue the District Court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of their recent unexplained wealth. But “ ‘the sudden unexplained acquisition of wealth by an impecunious person at or about the time of a theft which he had an opportunity to commit, is competent evidence of guilt and will support ... conviction.’ ” United States v. Hall, 44 Fed.Appx. 532, 534-35, 2002 WL 1809652 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571, 575 (3d Cir. 1971)). We see no abuse of discretion.

We reject defendants’ contention the District Court committed error in admitting Sizzler’s statements to Hewie. These out-of-court statements are admissible when made by a co-conspirator in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy, under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). We see no error.

We also reject defendants’ assertion raised and ruled on in a pre-trial suppression hearing that their arrests were the unlawful result of an uncorroborated, anonymous tip or information from an unreliable informant, namely Hewie. The record contains testimony of several law enforcement agents who observed defendants meet Hewie at the Nova Scotia Bank and drop him off. Law enforcement officers later conducted a traffic stop of defendants, wherein defendants gave *446statements inconsistent with the agent’s observations. Hewie’s statement to the agents was consistent with their own observations. We see no error.

Finally, we reject Dolison’s contention the District Court failed to properly instruct the jury. The jury was properly instructed on intent to commit the underlying offense, to wit, conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine.7

IV.

For these reasons, the judgment of conviction and sentence will be affirmed.