OPINION OF THE COURT

Appellant Rita L. Gehly appeals from adverse summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Gorell Enterprises, Inc. Ms. Gehly filed a complaint charging age *581 discrimination under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C §§ 621-634 (2000), and gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C 2000e-16, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 951-963 (1991). In the course of the summary judgment proceedings, Ms. Gehly relied only on the ADEA claim. The district court held that Gorell presented a nondiscriminatory motive for discharging Ms. Gehly and that she failed to prove that the reason was pretextual. We have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will affirm.

I.

Because we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts, procedural history and contentions presented, we will not recite them except as necessary to the discussion.

II.

When deciding a summary judgment motion under the ADEA, courts apply the burden-shifting framework articulated by the Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas test has three parts. First, the employee has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. If the employee succeeds, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the employer to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the employee’s rejection.” Id. at 802. Once the employer articulates a reason, the burden of going forward with the evidence rebounds to the employee who must then show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s explanation is pretextual. Id.

To establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, the employee must show that she: (1) is a member of a protected class, i.e. at least 40 years of age; (2) is qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment decision; and (4) was replaced by a sufficiently younger person to create an inference of age discrimination. Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 644 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1998). In Jones v. School District of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1999), we emphasized that “the elements of a prima facie case depend on the facts of the particular case.” Id. at 411.

Here, the district court correctly held that Gorell presented a legitimate, nondiseriminatory reason for the adverse employment action and Ms. Gehly did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason was pretextual. Ms. Gehly was discharged because she was unable to handle the responsibilities of her position. Brian Zimmerman, the son in law of the owners, stated that Ms. Gehly was unable to sufficiently organize, design or implement the customer service functions of her department. He had discussions with her regarding her unsatisfactory performance, including the many ways in which she needed to improve in order to become a more competent employee. Ms. Gehly failed to produce evidence that this reason was pretextual.

III.

We have considered all of the arguments advanced by the parties and conclude that no further discussion is necessary. We hold that summary judgment is proper because Gorell presented legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Ms. Ghely’s discharge and she failed to produce evidence to prove that the reason was pretextual. *582 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be affirmed.