OPINION OF THE COURT

Petitioner Ladji Fofana petitions for review of an final order of removal issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“BICE”). The BICE found that Fofana, by virtue of a Pennsylvania state conviction for trademark counterfeiting, was an aggravated felon pursuant to INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R). The government has moved for dismissal and argues that subject to substantial constitutional claims not present here, our jurisdiction does not extend beyond determining the predicate jurisdictional facts showing that Fofana is an alien who is removable by reason of committing an aggravated felony as defined in the statute.

We have without doubt jurisdiction to determine whether Fofana is an alien removable for committing an aggravated felony. See Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2001). The term “aggravated felony” means “an offense relating to commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, or trafficking in vehicles the identification numbers of which have been altered for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” INA § 101(a)(43)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R) (emphasis added). 1 Sub *491 ject to exceptions inapplicable here, in determining whether Fofana’s conviction is an offense “relating to” counterfeiting, we employ a formal categorical approach that looks to the offense of conviction. See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir. 2004).

Fofana was convicted of trademark counterfeiting under Pennsylvania law, which states “[a]ny person who knowingly manufactures, uses, displays, advertises, distributes, offers for sale, sells or possesses with intent to sell or distribute any items or services bearing or identified by a counterfeit mark shall be guilty of the crime of trademark counterfeiting.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4119(a). A “counterfeit mark” is either “[a]ny unauthorized reproduction or copy of intellectual property” or “[ijntellectual property affixed to any item knowingly sold, offered for sale, manufactured or distributed or identifying services offered or rendered, without the authority of the owner of the intellectual property.” Id. § 4119(i). “Intellectual property” means “[a]ny trademark, service mark, trade name, label, term, device, design or word adopted or used by a person to identify that person’s goods or services.” Id.

Pennsylvania criminal trademark counterfeiting categorically relates to counterfeiting by the statute’s plain language. 2 By definition, it requires an unauthorized reproduction, copy, or affixation of any of the types of intellectual property defined in the statute along with a requisite act, knowledge, and intent. See also Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) (“Counterfeiting includes producing or selling an item that displays a reproduction of a genuine trademark, usu. to deceive buyers into thinking they are purchasing genuine merchandise.”). Fofana’s narrow construction of INA § 101(a)(43)(R) would read the critical phrase “relating to” out of the federal statute. In Drakes, we construed the scope of “forgery” in the same subsection at issue here, and held that “[u]nless the words ‘relating to’ have no effect, the enumerated crime — here, forgery — must not be strictly confined to its narrowest meaning.” 240 F.3d at 249; see also Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2002) (harboring alien is crime “relating to” alien smuggling under INA § 101(a)(43)(N)).

We conclude that Fofana’s conviction for trademark counterfeiting is a crime “relating to” counterfeiting and is therefore an aggravated felony for purposes of INA § 101(a)(43)(R). The government’s motion to dismiss will be GRANTED and the petition for review will be DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 3