OPINION

These appeals arise from a jury trial concerning the alleged fraudulent conveyance of family assets by Appellants Jayne and William Kiesewetter (the “Kiesewetters”) to the detriment of Appellees and Cross-Appellants Constance Elliott, Patricia Kiesewetter, Linton Elliott, Charles Elliott and Jonathan Elliott (the “Beneficiaries”). Judgment was entered on February 26, 2003, and the parties filed timely notices of appeal. We have jurisdiction *823 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the two appeals and cross-appeal.

I.

As the parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we review them only briefly. The parties are all members of the same family. They have previously litigated the assets at issue. See Elliott v. Kiesewetter, 98 F.3d 47 (3d Cir. 1996). In the matter now before us, Beneficiaries’ fraudulent transfer action alleged the illegitimacy of asset transfers by William Kiesewetter to Jayne Kiesewetter. The transfers at issue involved money as well as real estate in Pittsburgh and Florida. At trial, Beneficiaries presented evidence of, inter alia, computer spreadsheets summarizing accounting activity and an expert witness in the field of asset valuation. On December 20, 2002, the jury answered special verdict interrogatories, finding the Kiesewetters fraudulently transferred the properties and money and that Jayne Kiesewetter was unjustly enriched as a result. The jury also awarded punitive damages against both Kiesewetters. In its final judgment and order, the District Court reduced the underlying damages award by approximately $1.5 million to reflect monies the Beneficiaries had already recovered from the Kiesewetters. The District Court then awarded prejudgment interest.

II.

All told, the parties raise some thirteen issues on appeal. However, the Kiesewetters fail to pursue certain issues, and they raise others for the first time on appeal. “When an issue is not pursued in the argument section of the brief, the appellant has abandoned and waived that issue on appeal.” Nagle v. Alspach, 8 F.3d 141, 143 (3d Cir. 1993). Further, “[tjhis Court has consistently held that it will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.” Harris v. City of Philadelphia, 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994). Those issues are therefore waived. 1 We address the remaining issues in turn.

The Kiesewetters first contend it was error for the District Court to admit the Beneficiaries’ computer spreadsheets. We review the District Court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1341 (3d Cir. 2002). The admissibility of the spreadsheets is governed by Fed. R.Evid. 1006, which allows presentation of voluminous writings in summary form provided the underlying originals be made available for examination. Here, the record shows the Kiesewetters had such opportunity and that the summaries contained only information set forth in those underlying originals. To the extent the Kiesewetters contend the underlying records were inadmissible, our review of the record shows that neither of them made such an objection at trial. The contention is therefore waived. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Environmental Defense Foundation *824 (P.E.D.F.) v. Canon-McMillan School District, 152 F.3d 228, 233 (3d Cir. 1998) (“In the usual circumstance, a party’s failure to object will result in waiver of an issue on appeal.”). While we have recognized that the concept of plain error may be applied in the civil context, the exercise of such power is reserved for “serious and flagrant” errors jeopardizing “the integrity of the proceeding.” Id. at 234; see generally Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 520-521 (3d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074, 118 S.Ct. 1516, 140 L.Ed.2d 669 (1998). Here, the record shows no such error occurred.

The Kiesewetters next contest the admissibility of the Beneficiaries’ expert witness. The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Fed.R.Evid. 702. We have summarized the requirements of Rule 702 as focusing on the “trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: qualification, reliability and fit.” Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999). Here, the record shows the Beneficiaries’ expert possessed the specialized expertise necessary for qualification, employed a methodology necessary for reliability, and gave relevant testimony that assisted the jury. See generally In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741-743 (3d Cir. 1994). The expert had been qualified previously and testified here that his methodology is customarily relied upon in his industry for the valuation of assets, a subject beyond the experience of most jurors. For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion as to the admission of the Beneficiaries’ expert.

Next, all parties contend insufficient evidence supported certain of jury’s answers to the special verdict interrogatories. Our review is plenary, but because the jury determined the issues, “our scope of review is limited to examining whether there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the verdict winner.” Le v. University of Pennsylvania, 321 F.3d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 2003). Additionally, because the jury in this case answered special verdict interrogatories, and because the parties allege inconsistencies in those answers, we observe that “a verdict must be molded consistently with a jury’s answers to special interrogatories when there is any view of the casé which reconciles the various answers.” Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153, 1159 (3d Cir. 1989), ce rt. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 542, 107 L.Ed.2d 539 (1989) (emphasis added); see also Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 293 (3d Cir. 1980) (“Since there is at least one way to explain the jury’s answers to the interrogatories, we are bound to affirm them.”). “Thus, our role as an appellate court is limited to determining, after plenary review, cf. Bradford-White, 872 F.2d at 1158, whether the district court’s molding of the jury’s answers is a minimally plausible ‘view of the case.’” McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 764 (3d Cir. 1990).

In this regard, the Kiesewetters first contend the District Court failed to mold the verdict properly by fading to. deduct approximately $1.5 million from the jury’s verdict to offset sums the Beneficiaries had already recovered in prior litigation. Our review of the record, however, shows that the Beneficiaries moved the District Court to deduct $1,533,826.80 from the jury’s award of $2,842,000.00, thus reducing the fraudulent transfer judgment against the Kiesewetters to $1,308,173.20. This was the sum the District Court en *825 tered as judgment before adding prejudgment interest, which neither of the Kiesewetters now contests. Accordingly, we do not find error.

The Kiesewetters next argue that the special verdict interrogatories caused the jury to make an inconsistent, duplicative award which the District Court failed to modify. Because our review of the record shows that neither of the Kiesewetters ever objected to the special verdict form, this issue is waived. Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Services, Inc., 63 F.3d 166, 200 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]here a defendant fails to object to ... special verdict forms ... objections are waived.”). Even were this Court to engage in a plain error review, Walden, 126 F.3d at 520-21, the record shows the District Court and the parties anticipated that the Beneficiaries’ separate fraudulent transfer and unjust enrichment theories could properly address separate harms if the jury viewed the sums fraudulently transferred as distinct from any rents and profits subsequently gained through use of the acquired properties. As such, we cannot find error in the District Court’s decision not to mold the jury’s answers on this point. 2

Finally, the above considerations also govern the Beneficiaries’ contention on cross-appeal that the jury inconsistently answered the special verdict interrogatories regarding the Florida property. Here, the record shows that “there is at least one way to explain the jury’s answers to the interrogatories.” Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 626 F.2d at 293. The jury heard testimony that Jayne Kiesewetter paid $60,894.44 towards the property some eight months after William Kiesewetter had purchased it with fraudulently transferred funds; that her payment came from an account she had opened in 1992 in her sole name; and that she had made an oral agreement with her husband that she would make additional payment with funds from the sale of her property in Colorado. This evidence allows a view of the case whereby most of the Kiesewetters’ transfers were part of a fraudulent scheme, but not all. Whether or not this one transfer from Jayne Kiesewetter to her husband was part of their overall scheme was precisely one of the questions directed to the jury in the special verdict interrogatories, and it was well within the jury’s role as fact finder to determine it was not. The District Court’s decision not to mold the jury’s answer on this point reconciles all of the jury’s answers through a view of the case that is “minimally plausible.” McAdam, 896 F.2d at 764. As such, “we are bound to affirm them.” Jones & Laughlin Steel, 626 F.2d at 293.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.