OPINION OF THE COURT

Juanita Brown appeals from her conviction pursuant to a plea agreement. Brown argues that her trial level counsel’s performance was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. For the reasons stated below, we dismiss her appeal.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Brown pleaded guilty to one count of making false statements and representations to federally licensed firearms dealers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(A). Following a hearing, the district court imposed a prison term of 21 months and a supervised release term of three years.

On appeal, Brown argues that her counsel’s performance at the sentencing hearing was constitutionally ineffective because her counsel stipulated to the applicability of a two-level enhancement under USSG § 2K2.1(b)(4) (obliterated serial number), and failed to object to the application of a two-level adjustment under USSG § 3C1.1 (obstruction of justice). However, “we have stated repeatedly that Sixth Amendment claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should ordinarily be raised in a collateral proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than on direct appeal.” United States v. Jake, 281 F.3d 123, 132 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2002) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Thornton, 327 F.3d 268, 271 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t is preferable that such claims be considered on collateral review rather than on direct appeal.”) (citing Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003)). 2

The rationale underlying this rule is that “ ‘[w]hen an ineffective-assistance claim is brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel and the court must proceed on a trial record not developed precisely for the object of litigating or preserving the claim and thus often incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.’ ” Thornton, 327 F.3d at 272 (quoting Massaro, 123 S.Ct. at 1694). In contrast, the district court is well-positioned to receive evidence that develops the record on the issues germane to a *236 claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. Moreover, “ ‘the § 2255 motion often will be ruled upon by the same district judge who presided at trial. The judge, having observed the earlier trial, should have an advantageous perspective for determining the effectiveness of counsel’s conduct and whether any deficiencies were prejudicial.’ ” Id.

Our preference for ineffective assistance claims being raised in the first instance in a habeas petition to the district court is sufficiently strong that recently, in a case where the “[government concede[d] defense counsel’s error,” Thornton, 327 F.3d at 272 (emphasis supplied), we nonetheless denied the appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, though “without prejudice to his right to raise th[e] claim on a collateral attack brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. at 273. Brown identifies no reason why this outcome is not appropriate here. Accordingly, we will dismiss Brown’s appeal without prejudice to her right to raise a claim for ineffective assistance in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the district court.