*642 OPINION OF THE COURT

Sammi D. Wright appeals from an order entered in the District Court granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss her First Amendment retaliation claim pursuant to Fed.R.CivJP. 12(b)(6). 1 Wright argues that this Court should entertain a damages claim for this alleged violation of her free speech rights. Because this remedy is expressly forbidden by clear precedent, Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S.Ct. 2404, 76 L.Ed.2d 648 (1983), we will affirm.

The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of a District Court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is plenary. Langford v. City of Atlantic City, 235 F.3d 845, 847 (3d Cir. 2000).

As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our analysis. Wright alleges that her supervisors at a federal veterans hospital unlawfully discharged her in retaliation for a letter she wrote to her senator, complaining about conditions for veterans at the hospital. In September 2000, Wright filed a First Amendment retaliation claim with the District Court based on this allegation. 2 In May 2003, the District Court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim, relying on Bush.

In Bush, the Supreme Court held that where a federal employee claims his or her First Amendment rights have been violated by a superior, and where the employee is protected by an “elaborate” and “comprehensive” scheme such as the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (“CSRA”), 3 courts must decline to augment such an Act by “creat[ing] ... a new judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue.” Bush, 462 U.S. at 388, 390. Following Bush, our Court, in Mitchum v. Hurt, 73 F.3d 30 (3d Cir. 1995), clearly acknowledged that the CSRA provides the sole remedy for damage claims brought by federal employees who are subject to its protections. Id. at 35. We added, however, that where such employees seek declaratory and/or injunctive relief for alleged violations of their constitutional rights, courts may still entertain the claim. Id. at 36.

First, Wright argues that we should stretch Mitchum to reach cases where damages are sought by federal employees. Second, and alternatively, Wright argues that Bush is unconstitutional and should be overruled. 4

*643 It is undisputed that Wright is a federal employee who enjoys the protections afforded by the CSRA. Therefore, it seems clear that Bush controls and that Wright is precluded from raising a damages claim here. Nevertheless, Wright puts forth a perplexing argument that we should broaden Mitchum so that it will apply to federal employees’ actions for damages. Clearly, this is impossible because doing so would directly contradict the holding in Bush. Alternatively, Wright urges us to declare Bush unconstitutional and to overrule it. Quite obviously, however, we are not authorized to overturn a Supreme Court decision. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989); McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 108 (3d Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).

Therefore, because the District Court correctly granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we will affirm.