OPINION

Appellant Olivia Drake appeals pro se the District Court’s grant of Steamfitters Local Union 420’s (Local 420) motion for summary judgment on her complaint alleging numerous civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Title VII), and 43 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 951-963 (PHRA). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. We will also grant Appellee’s motion to seal Appellant’s brief.

*934 The parties are familiar with the facts, thus, we will only briefly summarize them here. In 1980, Drake entered an apprenticeship training program administered by the Local 420 Joint Apprenticeship Training Program (JATP), an employee benefit plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). Drake completed the program in 1984. She then started paying Local 420 membership dues as a journey person, which she continued paying until 1997. Local 420 then terminated her membership status after six months of non-payment. Around the same period, Drake sued Local 420 for violations similar to those alleged in the current complaint, but lost in the District Court, Drake v. Steamfitters Local Union 420, E.D.Pa. Civ. No. 97-cv-00585, and on appeal in this Court. Drake v. Steamfitters Local Union 420, 242 F.3d 370 (3d Cir. Oct.17, 2002) (Table).

She took no further action until May 2, 2000, when she filed the underlying charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Declining to act on the charges, the EEOC issued Drake a right-to-sue letter on September 25, 2001. Drake then filed the current complaint alleging numerous civil rights violations. In August, 2003, the District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to prosecute, which was vacated by this Court on May 10, 2004. Upon returning to the District Court, Local 420 deposed Drake and filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. The District Court granted the motion, finding that the majority of the claims were time-barred and the remaining counts lacked support. Drake appealed. “We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review.” See Kelly v. Drexel University, 94 F.3d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1996). 1

We largely agree with the District Court that Drake’s complaint can be broken down into several categories. Thus, there is no need to repeat the extensive categorization here. Assuming arguendo that Drake’s claims are asserted against the proper party, 2 the majority of her claims are time-barred. Where an injury arises in Pennsylvania, a Title VII claim must be brought with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e—5(e)(1); 29 C.F.R. *935 § 1601.13(a)(4); West v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 754 (3d Cir. 1995). 3 Drake filed her charge on May 2, 2000, meaning the limitation period prevents the consideration of any act occurring prior to July 7, 1999. Although several of Drake’s claims assert continuous or ongoing violations, Drake’s relationship with Local 420 terminated in 1997. After her membership status ended, she was no longer entitled to the benefits she claims were denied because of her race and gender, such as job referral, voting rights, and the ability to run for office.

Drake argues in her reply brief that her membership status was not revoked until 2000, but she concedes she stopped paying dues in 1997. Neither party has submitted a copy of a notice of expulsion. However, the Union’s Constitution expressly provides that “[a]ny member in arrears for dues for a period of six (6) months shall stand expelled____” United Association Constitution § 165 (1986). Drake does not argue, and the record does not reflect, that she is entitled to equitable tolling.

Only claims 9 and 31 survive the statute of limitation. However, they fail on their merits. Claim 9 alleges that in February of 2000, Local 420 stated Drake was not qualified for positions despite her JATP training. Even if we accept that the statement was made, Drake cites no adverse employment action. See Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 390 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004). With respect to claim 31, Drake fails to counter Local 420’s assertion that any withdrawal or transfer of her pension fund is permitted at all.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Drake’s claims are either time-barred or lack persuasive merit. Accordingly we will affirm.