*624 OPINION OF THE COURT

Kristila Chandra, a native and citizen of Indonesia, petitions for review of a March 24, 2004, decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming without opinion the September 23, 2002, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her applications for asylum and withholding of removal. 1 When the BIA issues a summary affirmance, “the IJ’s opinion effectively becomes the BIA’s, and, accordingly, a court must review the IJ’s decision.” Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2001). Because we write only for the parties, we do not set out the facts.

We lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s denial of Chandra’s asylum application as untimely. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3), (a)(2)(B) (“No court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination” as to whether “the alien demonstrate^] by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.”); Tarawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2003) (“the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) clearly deprives us of jurisdiction to review an IJ’s determination that an asylum petition was not filed within the one year limitations period, and that such period was not tolled by extraordinary circumstances”).

We do have jurisdiction to consider the IJ’s denial of Chandra’s withholding of removal claim, and we hold that the IJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Xie v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 239, 246 (3d Cir. 2004) (adverse credibility determinations must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence). 2 The IJ’s thorough oral opinion devotes ten pages to credibility analysis, see A.R. 61-70, and we find it persuasive in light of the record as a whole. Most importantly, as the IJ noted, Chandra cannot explain the discrepancy between her 1-589 Application (which stated that she was a Buddhist) and her oral testimony (where she claimed that she was a Christian). Even if Chandra’s proffered explanation for this discrepancy were accepted, Chandra still cannot explain why she could not articulate basic tenets of Christianity. See, e.g., id. at 63 (“she went as far as to say that Christians do not believe in communion”; “[s]he could not describe how Christ died”). These deficiencies go to the heart of Chandra’s claim that she fears religious persecution in Indonesia, and are therefore proper grounds for dismissal of her claim.

At all events, there is no evidence in the record that would compel a reasonable adjudicator to find that there is a clear probability that Chandra’s life or freedom will be threatened on account of her religion or ethnicity if she returns to Indonesia. None of the incidents described by Chandra rises to the level of persecution (which requires more than mere harassment or discrimination). While ethnic Chinese may have been discriminated against in *625 Indonesia, the State Department reports evidence improved conditions since Chandra left Indonesia in July 1999. See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530 (3d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, Chandra’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision is denied.