OPINION OF THE COURT

In this diversity case, the District Court denied Appellants’ motion for a new trial following a defense jury verdict in their personal injury action. We will affirm.

I.

Appellants Matthew and Margaret Spinelli filed suit in state court against Costco Wholesale Corporation (“Costco”) for personal injuries suffered by Margaret Spinelli at a Costco store in Montgomeryville, Pennsylvania. Mrs. Spinelli alleged she slipped on a food-like substance and as a result broke her right knee, which required surgery. Costco removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. § 13S2 and § 1441. The jury returned a verdict for Costco. Appellants filed a motion for a new trial, which the District Court denied, and Appellants now appeal.

II.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, “[a] new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States.” We review issues of law de novo and the District Court’s decision to grant or deny a new trial for abuse of discretion. Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic, 251 F.3d 448, 453 (3d Cir. 2001).

III.

Appellants’ theory of the ease is that Mrs. Spinelli fell in an area that was frequently dirty with trash and food and that Costco had prior knowledge of this condition but failed to fix it. On appeal, Appellants claim trial and evidentiary errors necessitate granting a new trial.

A.

Appellants first challenge the District Court’s evidentiary ruling concerning the testimony of Guy Delmonte. As a general manager of Costco’s store, Delmonte supervised store operations, including general safety. Appellants sought to elicit his testimony on whether the area of Mrs. Spinelli’s incident was routinely the “dirtiest” in the store. Appellants contend the District Court erred in instructing their counsel to rephrase a question using the word “messiest” instead of “dirtiest.”

The argument lacks merit because the District Court gave no such instruction. The record is clear that the court neither prevented nor impeded counsel’s questioning of the witness. After a succession of questions and objections by the parties, the court requested that Appellants’ counsel clarify and repeat his question to Mr. Delmonte. But the court placed no limitation on use of the word “dirtiest” as opposed to “messiest.” Counsel then withdrew the question and elected not to press the matter further. We see neither error nor prejudice.

B.

Olga Miaño was one of several Costco employees responsible for making periodic store inspections and summarizing the findings in reports called “floor walk sheets.” Appellants sought to elicit testimony from Miaño on the nomenclature *260 used in the floor walk sheets. 1 They also sought her testimony concerning every floor walk sheet completed during the two and a half weeks preceding the incident. Apparently Appellants believed this was probative of Costco’s knowledge of the floor condition. The District Court ruled that Miaño need not testify about every floor walk sheet, but only about those which she personally had prepared. 2 We see no prejudicial error here. See Fed. R.Evid. 602 (generally limiting testimony to matters with which the witness is personally familiar). Furthermore, all of the floor walk sheets were stipulated to by Costco, entered into the record, and were available to the jury during deliberations. 3 It would have been unnecessary and redundant to read to the jury the full content of each document.

IV.

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the denial of appellants’ motion for a new trial.