OPINION

Stratton Neal Peay filed this appeal, but he originally did not pay the applicable *32 fees or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Therefore, his appeal was dismissed pursuant to LAR 3.3 and LAR Mise. 107.1(a). Peay then filed a “motion for rehearing” that the Clerk’s Office construed as a motion to reopen his appeal and denied without prejudice to a renewed motion after the filing and docketing fees were paid or an application to proceed in forma pauperis was filed. Peay has filed a renewed motion, captioned “petition for rehearing,” and a complete application for in forma pauperis status.

Peay has shown good cause to reopen his appeal, so his renewed motion to reopen is granted. His motion to proceed in forma pauperis is also granted, because he has no appreciable assets. However, his appeal will be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)®.

We have jurisdiction over Peay’s appeal. Although the District Court ordered Peay’s case to remain “administratively closed,” 1 and “an order administratively closing a case is not, in and of itself, a final order,” see WRS, Inc. v. Plaza Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.2d 424, 426 (3d Cir. Apr. 4, 2005) (citing Penn West Assocs. Inc. v. Cohen, 371 F.3d 118, 124 (3d Cir. 2004)), the District Court also dismissed the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(l). The District Court held that Peay sought relief unavailable under Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-9, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Also, after Peay filed a motion for reconsideration, the District Court reiterated its reasons for the dismissal, denied reconsideration, and stated that Peay’s case would remain closed for statistical purposes. Therefore, Peay appeals from a final order. Cf. Penn West Assocs. Inc., 371 F.3d at 124.

However, Peay’s appeal of the orders dismissing his case and denying his motion for reconsideration is legally frivolous. In his complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Peay alleged that he was wrongfully convicted and imprisoned in violation of federal constitutional law. He also claimed that, against his wishes, counsel had been appointed to represent him in Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) proceedings. He contended that, because he has not been permitted to proceed pro se, he has missed hearings and has failed to get a response to documents he filed without his attorney’s assistance in the PCRA court. Therefore, he sought an injunction to require the state court to rule on his self-authored amended PCRA petition and to permit him to proceed pro se. He also claimed that he was being framed for a state crime that he did not commit, and sought an order to dismiss the state charges.

To the extent that Peay challenged the proceedings leading up to his conviction, or the fact or duration of his imprisonment, his claims were not cognizable in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 500, 93 S.Ct. 1827. To the extent that Peay sought an injunction to force the PCRA courts to allow him to proceed pro se 2 or to bar a pending state criminal *33 proceeding, Younger and its progeny-barred such relief. See 401 U.S. at 43-49, 91 S.Ct. 746.

For the foregoing reasons, this appeal ■will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)© (2005).