OPINION OF THE COURT

Ronald Brow filed a petition for mandamus-like relief in the District Court, requesting that the Court direct the Virgin Islands Police Department to pay him back pay for the ongoing approximately ten-year period during which the administrative appeal of his allegedly wrongful dismissal has been pending. The District Court denied the petition after finding that Brow had failed to meet the high standard required in order to grant the extraordinary remedy because he has an adequate remedy in his current suit against the Department. We agree that Brow’s current litigation in the District Court provides an adequate remedy by which he can seek the relief that he desires, thus precluding a grant of mandamus-like relief, and accordingly will affirm the District Court.

I.

Ronald Brow (“Brow”) alleges that he was wrongfully dismissed from work at the Virgin Islands police department on August 29, 1994, while litigating a dispute against the department. On the day Brow alleges to have been dismissed, he filed an appeal of the dismissal with the Government Employee Services Commission (“GESC,” now known as the Public Employees Relations Board). The GESC provided Brow with a receipt acknowledging the filing of appeal. It is unclear whether the GESC ever held the required hearing, but it appears as though no such hearing took place, perhaps due to the ongoing litigation. That litigation remains in the discovery stage, approximately ten years after its filing,1 and the original District Judge and Magistrate Judge have recently recused themselves in response to Brow’s requests that they do so.

On December 19, 2003, Brow filed a petition for mandamus-like relief in the District Court, asking the Court to order the government to pay his salary from the day of his dismissal to the present.2 He *445relied on GESC regulations, which state that, until GESC issues a decision in an appeal filed before it by an employee, an employer must continue paying the employee’s salary.3 The District Court rejected the mandamus petition because Brow had not shown a clear right to the relief sought, a plainly defined and peremptory duty on the government’s part, and a lack of another adequate remedy. The Court found that Brow has an action pending before it against the same parties, based on the same facts, and asking for the same relief, and thus, that he had an adequate remedy. Brow appeals from the rejection of his mandamus petition.

II.

In order to justify mandamus-like relief under 5 V.I.Code Ann. § 1361, “[a] plaintiff must have a clear right to the relief sought; there must be a plainly defined and peremptory duty to do the act in question; and there must be no other adequate remedy available.” King v. Mahogany Run Dev. Corp., 23 V.I. 274, 276 (D.V.I. 1987) (citing Richardson v. V.I. Hous. Auth., 18 V.I. 351, 356 (D.V.I. 1981)). “An order of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and should be granted only under compelling circumstances.” Richardson, 18 V.I. at 356. “The extraordinary remedy of mandamus traditionally lies within the trial court’s discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings or an incorrect legal standard. Whether each element of the three-part mandamus test is satisfied is a question of law.” Garcia v. Taylor, 40 F.3d 299, 301 (9th Cir. 1994).

It is unclear whether the District Court found that Brow had failed to meet all of the requirements for mandamus, as the government’s brief suggests, or that it found that he failed at least one of them. This, however, is not important, as it is evident from the Court’s opinion that it found that he failed on the last element-no adequate remedy-and, in any event, this Court reviews all of the elements de novo. We will start with the last element-that the petitioner has no adequate remedy-as it was explicitly discussed by the District Court.

The District Court found that Brow could not satisfy the “adequate remedy” element, as the courts provide an adequate *446remedy for him to sue for his back pay, and he is, in fact, currently availing himself of that remedy. There can be no dispute that the courts offer a remedy, but, given the history of Brow’s case, it may be argued that it is not an adequate remedy. The Supreme Court of Oregon has expounded upon the “adequacy” requirement:4

We must concede it to be a fundamental principle that mandamus will not he where there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. However, such remedy, to prevent the execution of the writ, must be “adequate” to afford the relief to which the relator is entitled. Moreover, the writ may issue even where other remedies exist, if they are not sufficiently speedy to prevent material injury.... There is much authority to the effect that it is the inadequacy, not the mere absence, of all other legal remedies, and the danger of a failure of justice without it, that generally determines the propriety of the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

State ex rel. Pierce v. Slusher, 117 Or. 498, 244 P. 540, 541 (1926). In the context of 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which is substantially similar to the Virgin Islands provision, the Supreme Court has stated that “the common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy only if the plaintiff has exhausted all other avenues of relief.” Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616, 104 S.Ct. 2013, 80 L.Ed.2d 622 (1984).

Brow’s most forceful contention is that the District Court, by not enforcing its own discovery orders over the last ten years, has rendered inadequate the remedy of litigation. However, appeal appears to be correct avenue for correction of this alleged abuse. If an extreme solution were required because appeal was deemed too onerous or ineffective, the appropriate remedy would be a mandamus petition to this Court to force the District Court to enforce its discovery orders.5 In either case, the granting of this mandamus petition, filed in the District Court and aimed at the Commissioner of Finance, among other government officials, is not necessary in order to provide Brow an adequate remedy for his back-pay claim. Therefore, we agree with the District Court that Brow has not carried his burden of showing that no adequate remedy exists for him to attain the relief that he desires.

*447ill.

As discussed above, Brow has failed to show that he has no adequate remedy for the requested relief, obviating the need to consider the other requirements for mandamus to be issued. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion, and the denial of the mandamus petition by the District Court will be affirmed.