OPINION OF THE COURT

Steven Liwe, a citizen of Indonesia, entered the United States in September 2001 *142 but overstayed his visa. The former Immigration and Naturalization Service initiated removal proceedings in February 2003. Liwe conceded removability, but applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), alleging persecution on account of his religious and political affiliations. An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Liwe’s applications and his request for voluntary departure. He appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed the decision of the IJ, and this petition followed. We will deny the petition.

Regarding his claim of political persecution, Liwe testified before the IJ that Indonesian militants suspected him of supporting the government by using his position as a tour guide to spy on the militants and report their locations. He explained that he and his touring party had once been captured by militants, but the militants released them after three days. He also testified that he once escaped another plot to capture his tour group by seeking an alternate route, and that he was aware that militants had killed other tour guides. Finally, Liwe recounted an incident at a hotel when militants, attempting to evade the Indonesian military, used him as a shield. Regarding his claim of religious persecution, Liwe— who is Christian — testified that Christians are generally persecuted.

The IJ first ruled that Liwe’s asylum claim was barred by the one-year period of limitations. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Liwe argued that he was unaware of the requirement and that conditions had worsened in Indonesia since his departure, but the IJ discounted his first argument and found that he failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances or changed country conditions sufficient to overcome the deadline. In the alternative, the IJ found that Liwe did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution. In part, the IJ reasoned that Liwe’s subjective fears were based on his chosen profession as a tour guide, rather than his political affiliation, and that his testimony regarding the general persecution of Christians was undermined by his ability to remain in Indonesia for twenty-seven years without suffering any alleged persecution. Consequently, the IJ denied Liwe’s application for withholding of removal and, because he did not allege any instances of torture, his CAT claim.

Here, Liwe principally argues that the IJ and BIA erred by denying his asylum claim because they required him to demonstrate that he would “more likely than not” suffer persecution in Indonesia, the standard applicable to withholding applications, Toussaint v. Attorney General, 455 F.3d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 2006). He suggests that the “well-founded fear” standard, applicable to asylum applications, Obale v. Attorney General, 453 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 2006), should have guided the IJ’s analysis.

But, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of Liwe’s untimely asylum claim. Gabuniya v. Attorney General, 463 F.3d 316, 320 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2006) (Section 1158(a)(3) clearly deprives us of jurisdiction “to review an IJ’s determination that an asylum petition was not filed within the one year limitations period, and that such period was not tolled by extraordinary circumstances[.]”); Tarrawally v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 2003) (same). We therefore limit our review to Liwe’s withholding of removal application and CAT claim.

Liwe, though, fails to provide a basis to undermine the denial of his withholding application or CAT claim. He generally argues that his testimony provided an objective basis for his fear of persecution, but his vague testimony of being mistreat *143 ed by militants does not show “a clear probability of persecution,” nor does he allege any instances of torture sufficient to establish a CAT claim. Gabuniya, 463 F.3d at 321.

Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.